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Abstract 
 
John Rawls’s international theory, The Law of Peoples, has been read and 
criticized as “A Theory of International Justice”. His major objective, however, is 
not the establishment of a just (liberal) world order, but to guide liberal societies 
towards a reasonable peaceful, stable and just international system. From this 
starting point, the thesis assesses whether Rawls’s international theory can 
meet its task to function as a guideline for the promotion of international peace, 
stability and justice and how that peace might be conceived. The author argues 
that Rawls sketches the path to a “decent peace”. 
 
The scrutiny of the issue takes the form of an in-depth analysis and discussion 
of The Law of Peoples and a systematic investigation of a number of cases. The 
dissertation examines the possible contribution of Rawls’s ideas, primarily the 
Society of Peoples and the principles of the Law of Peoples, to international 
peace, stability and justice. As the focus lies on decent regimes and a decent 
peace, three actual decent societies are identified (Oman, Qatar and 
Singapore), in order to highlight the applicability of the notion to the international 
system, as well as to ensure that decent regimes are not mere constructions 
serving to justify imposing liberal principles of non-liberal regimes. The 
dissertation finally investigates the enlargement of the democratic peace thesis 
towards a decent peace; it discusses the arguments for a democratic peace and 
applies them to Rawls’s conception of decent peoples as well as to the identified 
regimes. It concludes asserting that the decent peace thesis is theoretically well-
founded, whereas the empirical evidence is – due to only three identified 
regimes – rather weak. As a guideline for the foreign policy of liberal (and 
decent) societies The Law of Peoples can contribute to more stability and justice 
in the international realm and promote a decent peace. 
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1. Introduction 
The “most important problem in international philosophy is the moral status of the state 
and the character of its relationship to other agents in the world” (Beitz 1998: 828). 
 
“To the degree we establish that peace between democracies is a fact, and are able to 
explain it theoretically, we build an alternative view of the world” (Russett 1993: 24). 
 
 In the aftermath of the World War II, the international state system has 
undergone a huge development. Two World Wars in less than 50 years, in 
particular the cruelties of World War II and their dimensions, gave impetus to 
quick and enormous changes: the development of an extensive human rights 
regime, normative limitations to the legitimacy of warfare and the establishment 
of the United Nations (Martin and Reidy 2006: 3). With this, and the decline of 
colonialism too, political theory and practice had to meet numerous challenges. 
“One of the greatest challenges posed by this new international order has been 
that of providing appropriate standards of justice for this emerging system” 
(ibid.). John Rawls, probably the most influential political theorist of the 20th 
century, contributed to this search, in 1993 with his Amnesty Lecture and then in 
1999 with the homonymous monograph The Law of Peoples (LP). Rawls’s 
international theory as presented in his much discussed last monograph, 
however, is not “A Theory of International Justice”. It is first a theory of 
international peace and stability and then of justice, referring to fair terms of 
cooperation between the main subjects of international law: to Rawls the 
peoples of the world. 
 Following Rawls, the world would be more peaceful if there were only 
liberal democratic societies, but this is unrealistic and there are other forms of 
society that deserve respect and can be added to the zone of peace. Rawls 
thinks both within and beyond theoretical boundaries, as calling his theory a 
“realistic utopia” shows. A realistic utopian conception goes beyond the limits of 
what is ordinarily understood as possible by staying within the framework of an 
achievable social world. Again, he turns against dominant concepts, against 
realism as well as strong cosmopolitan claims, as he also did in A Theory of 
Justice (1971) (TJ), where he aimed to present an “alternative to utilitarian 
thought generally” (TJ: 22). Furthermore, LP is based on the same methods and 
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ideas as his domestic theory and the liberal democratic societies of his domestic 
theory provide the main agents and the starting point in LP. As Rawls builds on 
his domestic theory, LP has to be read, understood and interpreted on the basis 
of it. Therefore, and to understand the criticism of LP by scholars close to Rawls, 
it is worth considering his international theory within the framework of his two 
main works, TJ and Political Liberalism (PL). 
 
 
The Law of Peoples – An Extension of Rawls’s Domestic Theory 
 “It is generally agreed that Rawls was the most important political theorist 
within the Anglo-American world since John Stuart Mill, and his masterwork, A 
Theory of Justice, is at the center of modern thinking on its subject“ (Brown 
2010: 311). In TJ, Rawls focused on the question of what the most appropriate 
conception of justice for a liberal democratic society should look like, on the 
basis of which fair terms of cooperation between free and equal citizens can be 
established. In order to guarantee that the procedure to define those principles 
is fair and for this reason that the principles are going to be just, Rawls 
constructs an imaginative original position (OP).1 
“The intuitive idea of justice as fairness is to think of the first principles of justice as 
themselves the object of an original agreement in a suitably defined initial situation. 
These principles are those which rational persons concerned to advance their 
interests would accept in the position of equality to settle the basic terms of their 
association” (TJ: 118f.2).  
 
In Rawls’s favoured “initial situation”, the OP, representatives of citizens of a 
liberal democratic society are to agree on a reasonable proposal of fair 
principles of justice that secure each members interests in the best way (TJ: 
119f.). 
Five familiar conditions underlie the principles to be selected. First, they 
need to be general principles that can in perpetuity function as a public charter 
for a liberal society (TJ: 131). Second, they ought to be universal in application 
and thus hold for everyone within society “in virtue of their being a moral person” 
(TJ: 132). The term “moral person” does not imply that the respective individual 
                                                     
1
 For an in-depth analysis and critique of the OP in LP, see chapter 4. 
2
 Rawls 2005a; hereafter cited as TJ. 
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is morally good and acts accordingly, but merely that he/she is capable of being 
both rational and reasonable. Moral persons are rational in forming, revising and 
pursuing a conception of the good3, and in “choosing between principles each 
tries as best he can to advance his interests” (TJ: 142). They are reasonable as 
they have a capacity for a sense of justice4, including to be able to understand, 
apply and act upon principles of justice, from which it follows that they will 
respect the selected principles (TJ: 145). The capabilities of forming a 
conception of the good and having a sense of justice to Rawls form the two 
moral powers of persons. Only because people have both capacities can they 
be considered capable of identifying and pursuing their interests and of social 
cooperation, and thus, they can be held responsible for their behaviour. That 
representatives possess these capabilities in the OP is essential to Rawls as it 
ensures that they agree on principles they can freely, rationally and reasonably 
agree to (Freeman 2009: n. pag.). In this way, each and every citizen is able to 
understand and apply those principles. Third, the selected conception of justice 
needs to be public, meaning that the citizens are generally aware of the 
principles and regularly follow them. They thus need to be principles that a 
rational being is ready to accept and follow. Fourth, to successfully adjust 
competing claims of members of society, an ordering of conflicting claims must 
be possible (TJ: 132-134). Fifth and last, the principles need to be the “final 
court of appeal in practical reasoning. There are no higher standards” and 
“reasoning successfully from these principles is conclusive” (TJ: 135). The 
principles of justice override demands of law and custom, of prudence and self-
interest as well as social rules (ibid). 
                                                     
3
 The conception of the good is a conception of what is valuable in life and sets the aims that the 
respective person holding it wants to achieve; it inhabits the final aims he or she pursues and is 
connected to his/her relation to the world in general (PL: 19). “The capacity for a conception of 
the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational 
advantage or good” (ibid.). Rational individuals have ideally “carefully thought about these things 
and their relative importance, and they can coherently order their purposes and commitments 
into a ‘rational plan of life,’ which extends over their lifetimes” [emphasis in original] (Freeman 
2009: n. pag.). 
4
 “The sense of justice is a willingness and normally effective desire to comply with duties and 
obligations required by justice. Rawls sees a sense of justice as an attribute people normally 
have. […] He rejects the idea, popular in extensions of economic theory, that people are 
motivated only by self-interest in all that they do” [emphasis in original] (Freeman 2009: n. pag.). 
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 These conditions are, however, not sufficient to ensure that the results of 
the OP are fair and just. To exclude the possibility that private interests are 
considered, Rawls puts the representatives behind a “veil of ignorance” that 
hides certain knowledge from them. The role of the veil is to guarantee 
impartiality and thus fairness of the set of principles that results form the 
procedure (Barry 1975: 13); in order to do so, the veil hides the representatives’ 
knowledge of their character as well as social background and standing 
(Freeman 2009: n. pag.). Of equal importance here is both what the 
representatives know, and what information the veil deprives them of. 
 What they know are general facts that are relevant for the choice of 
principles. The knowledge of general laws and theories is accessible to them. 
They know general facts about human society, politics and economy and 
understand political and economic affairs; they are familiar with laws of human 
psychology and the basis of social cooperation and thus know how social 
organizations work. Why do the representatives need this information? To name 
an example, it would not make sense to select principles that human beings, 
because of their psychology, would never act upon. The principles thus need to 
be practical (TJ: 137f.).  
 What the representatives do not know is a citizen’s place in society, his/her 
wealth, mental and physical abilities, features of psychology, to which 
generation he/she belongs, the conception of the good, or life plans. Whereas 
they know that they have a plan for life, they do not know how it looks and thus 
how to promote their specific personal interest (TJ: 142). They also neither know 
the economic or political circumstances of their society, nor its culture (TJ: 137) 
now and in the past, as that knowledge is not relevant for their decision but 
might nevertheless influence it (Freeman 2009: n. pag.). Under these conditions, 
the representatives cannot select principles to their personal advantage (TJ: 
139). The veil is designed 
“to be a fair and impartial point of view that is to be adopted in our reasoning about 
fundamental principles of justice. In taking up this point of view, we are to imagine 
ourselves in the position of free and equal persons who jointly agree upon and 
commit themselves to principles of social and political justice” (Freeman 2009: n. 
pag.). 
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 Although the representatives are deprived of all this information, they still 
have access to sufficient information to decide between alternative principles, as 
they, for example, still know that they have an interest in securing their liberties, 
generating opportunities and generally enabling members of society to promote 
their individual aims within a reasonable framework (TJ: 143). Consequently, 
they “prefer more primary social goods rather than less” (TJ: 142) as those form 
the “all-purpose social means that are necessary to the exercise and 
development of the moral powers and to pursue a wide variety of conceptions of 
the good” (Freeman 2009: n. pag.). Those primary goods to Rawls not only 
cover income and wealth, but also rights and liberties, powers and opportunities 
as well as a sense of one’s own worth and self-respect. Every rational person 
desires those goods as they are (or at least tend to be) supportive in advancing 
their ends (TJ: 92). 
 Within this framework, the selection process proceeds as follows: To 
identify the best principles, the representatives, symmetrically situated behind 
the veil of ignorance, are provided with a list of traditional and some additional 
conceptions of justice from which they are to unanimously choose one by 
comparing one to the other each in pairs (TJ: 121-123). The agreement situation 
in the OP is fair to all parties in the hypothetical social contract. Rawls assumes 
that in this way the principles agreed upon are fair too. “The evaluation of 
principles must proceed in terms of the general consequences of their public 
recognition and universal application, it being assumed that they will be 
complied with by everyone” (TJ: 138). As everyone has access to the same 
information and is equally reasonable and rational as well as symmetrically 
situated, the representatives would be convinced by the same arguments and 
thus agree to the same principles. Consequently, the result would be accepted 
unanimously (TJ: 139). 
Similar concepts are David Hume’s “judicious spectator” or Adam Smith’s 
“impartial spectator”. Both, however, focus on a single perspective and 
judgment, while Rawls strives for a general agreement that is conceived socially, 
an initial situation, in which the members of society are represented (Freeman 
2009: n. pag.). Behind the veil of ignorance, it does not make a difference if 
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there is one or if there are several representatives; due to the limitations, there 
are no more differences in the representatives’ viewpoints. All have access to 
the same set of information and all have reasonable as well as rational 
capacities (TJ: 139). Consequently, “one or more person can at any time […] 
simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in 
accordance with the appropriate restrictions” (TJ: 138). It does not matter 
whether one or all members of society are represented in the OP. 
 According to Rawls, the representatives would agree on two, or rather 
three, principles of justice: 1) The principle of equal basic rights and liberties, 2a) 
the principle of equal opportunity (positions are open to all) and 2b) the 
difference principle (inequalities are just if they are to the benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society, given the first principle is realized; the position 
of the worst-off needs to be maximized) (TJ: 60). The second principle 
guarantees the basic needs essential for being able to pursue one’s interests 
and to preserve one’s self respect (Freeman 2009: n. pag.). The selected 
conception of justice should be supported by the members of society (TJ: 138). 
 
 Rawls in TJ, in his own opinion, overestimated the possible homogeneity of 
a democratic society (Audard 2007: 186, see also Freeman 2007: 341). In PL, 
he thus reformulates his question: How “is it possible that there may exist over 
time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by 
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines” 
(PL: XViii5)? In TJ, the citizens of a well-ordered society adopt the principles of 
justice on the basis of a shared comprehensive doctrine. However, in a modern 
democratic society, as a result of the free exercise of reason, citizens hold 
different comprehensive moral or religious views that may be considered 
reasonable but are incompatible with one another (PL: XVi). While citizens can 
hold differing reasonable doctrines, they need to share a political conception that 
is founded on and supported by an overlapping consensus between those 
pluralistic doctrines. That conception has to be impartial and to rely on public 
reason, not be judged as true, but as reasonable, as it is part of the political not 
                                                     
5
 Rawls 2005b; hereafter cited as PL. 
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moral sphere (PL: XViii-XX). Whereas in TJ “justice as fairness is presented […] 
as a comprehensive liberal doctrine […] in which all members of its well-ordered 
society affirm that same doctrine […] Political Liberalism regards that society as 
impossible” as it “contradicts the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 2005c: 
489). 
 Major conceptions, relevant for understanding LP and showing a 
development within Rawls’s thinking, are applied in PL, for which some space 
shall be spent here: the understanding of reasonable, comprehensive doctrines 
contrasted with political conceptions, and closely linked to that, of reasonable 
pluralism, the idea of an overlapping consensus as well as that of public reason. 
As citizens are regarded as free and equal, and enjoying basic rights and 
liberties, they may hold diverse, reasonable, comprehensive doctrines, whether 
religious, philosophical or other. The term “doctrine” is used for “comprehensive 
views of all kinds” (ibid.: 441). Comprehensive doctrines inform the individual’s 
fundamental interests and the respective person is free to affirm, revise and 
change those doctrines (ibid.: 483). As David Reidy points out, “fundamental 
interests of human persons are historically, socially, and contingently given, and 
not necessarily universally shared” (Reidy 2004: 310). Since persons are 
understood as rational and reasonable, they (ideally) hold reasonable, 
comprehensive doctrines. Non-ideally, members of society may hold non-
reasonable views, which is unproblematic as long as these views do not gain too 
much weight within society. The limits within which unreasonable views need to 
be tolerated are set by the principles of justice (Rawls 2005c: 441, PL: 39).  
Rawls refers to the fact that different reasonable doctrines exist as the “fact 
of reasonable pluralism”. “[P]olitical liberalism assumes the fact of reasonable 
pluralism as a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines […]. This pluralism is not 
seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human 
reason under enduring free institutions” (PL: XXiV). Pluralism is thus a feature of 
a democratic society. To Rawls, liberalism itself is not to be understood as a 
comprehensive doctrine, but rather as a political conception that allows for 
several comprehensive doctrines to be held by members of society (Gaus and 
Courtland 2011: n. pag.). The political conception, expressed by the principles of 
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justice, is widely shared by members of society. So, comprehensive doctrines 
generally address what is essential for human life, while political conceptions 
only address an individual as citizen (Buchanan 2006: 152). Therefore, the 
conception of justice – that at best all citizens share, affirm and act upon – must 
be limited to the political sphere, freestanding, meaning without a link to any 
specific comprehensive doctrine, and based on an overlapping consensus (PL: 
36-41). It should support toleration and other crucial elements of democracy 
(Wenar 2008: n. pag.). Only then are they to be considered “reasonable 
doctrines” as they, by definition, “do not reject the essentials of a constitutional 
democratic policy” (Rawls 2005c: 488).6 
Reasonable persons can support a diversity of reasonable opinions and 
they can reject the reasonable opinions of others. They do, however, offer fair 
terms of social cooperation and abide to those terms if others equally do so, 
even if this runs against their personal advantage (ibid.). Unreasonable persons, 
however, either do not want to cooperate on fair terms or refuse to accept the 
reasonable pluralism of doctrines held in a democratic society. People who are 
unreasonable or hold unreasonable doctrines are not incorporated in the 
overlapping consensus on justice (Freeman 2007: 371). “In so far as such 
persons and doctrines reject principles of liberal justice, they are to be 
‘contained,’ Rawls says, and not compromised with” (ibid.). Reasonable 
pluralism thus sets the limits of toleration (Audard 2007: 186). 
“Rawls still believes that agreement on liberal justice is possible among reasonable 
people, not because of a compromise or modus vivendi […], but on the basis of 
citizens’ moral sense of justice as grounded in their different reasonable 
comprehensive views. This is the significance of the idea of overlapping 
consensus” (Freeman 2007: 341). 
 
By overlapping consensus, Rawls refers to “a lasting and stable principled 
agreement among reasonable comprehensive doctrines with each endorsing the 
political conception of justice from its own point of view” (Audard 2007: 197). 
Members of society, despite the diverse reasonable doctrines they hold, affirm – 
                                                     
6
 Basically, Rawls argues that either one agrees with his argument, or is categorized as 
unreasonable: “reasonable doctrines are virtually defined as affirming liberal values of justice” 
(Freeman 2007: 350). As Brian Barry argues, the “upshot is, then, that only conceptions of the 
good that are congruent with justice are reasonable. Anyone who holds any other conception of 
the good can legitimately be coerced – and will have to be” (Barry 1995: 889). 
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for diverse reasons – the same political conception of justice (ibid., Rawls 
2005c: 482f., Wenar 2008: n. pag.).7 The overlapping consensus solves the 
stability problem of pluralistic societies (Freeman 2007: 366). The plural society 
is stable because its members can reasonably agree to the political conception 
that constitutes an overlapping consensus between them. 
The concept differs from traditional social contract theory in two mayor 
ways: the agreement of members of society to principles of justice is no more a 
modus vivendi among conflicting interests and doctrines, but rather, it is a 
(reasonable) consensus. It is thus a feasible basis for a stable democratic basic 
structure that is more stable than stability due to a balance of power as power 
relations may shift (Wenar 2008: n. pag.). Also, not all come to the consensus 
for the same reasons; different motives might be deduced from their respective 
comprehensive doctrines (Freeman 2007: 370). 
The principles, ideals and standards that members of society may appeal 
to, that constitute the overlapping consensus are the content of public reason. 
Public reason can be understood as the “citizen’s reasoning in the public forum 
about constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice” (PL: 10). Each 
member can reasonably and with good reason agree to the principles as free 
and autonomous agents and can live up to his individual reasonable normative 
conception within the basic structure established according to those principles 
(Hinsch 2002: 54).  
Public reason is not based on one political conception of justice, but on a 
family of reasonable conceptions, which may be incompatible or change over 
time, thereby causing debate. It is to settle political problems and conflicts and to 
set political rules of action, which members of society can reasonably endorse 
(PL: l-lii). To Rawls, the idea of public reason functions as a shared basis of 
                                                     
7
 Wenar quotes the second Vatican Council to illustrate how a reasonable Catholicism can 
overlap with the liberal conception of individual liberty out of its own perspective: The council 
announced that “the human person has a right to religious freedom […]. The council further 
declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human 
person, as this dignity is known through the revealed Word of God and by reason itself” (Wenar 
2008: n. pag.). 
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justification, which is uncovered by reflection (LP: 198) and thus satisfies the 
criterion of reciprocity9 (Wenar 2008: n. pag.). 
“Political liberalism […] holds that even though our comprehensive doctrines are 
irreconcilable and cannot be compromised, nevertheless citizens who affirm 
reasonable doctrines may share reasons of another kind, namely, public reasons 
given in terms of political conceptions of justice” ( Rawls 2005c: 487). 
 
Again, unreasonable reasoning is possible, for example when asserting that the 
religiously true overrides the politically reasonable. As with reasonable and 
unreasonable doctrines, Rawls excludes these ways of reasoning from being 
relevant for his theory, as long as they remain within certain limits. “We simply 
say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism 
nothing more need be said” (ibid.: 488). 
 Summing up, a well-ordered society is effectively regulated by publicly 
known and justifiable principles of justice that are based on an overlapping 
consensus to which all members reasonably agree to despite of the reasonable 
pluralism of the comprehensive doctrines they hold, and because of that, they 
acknowledge the basic structure established according to those principles. 
 
 There are two major shifts when it comes to LP: First,whereas in Rawls’s 
earlier work, only liberal societies qualified as well-ordered, in LP he claims that 
there are other types that are less just and reasonable but still well-ordered 
(Brown 2010: 312). Second, Rawls no longer searches for a conception of 
justice for social institutions of a liberal democratic society, but “a conception of 
justice that will be most conducive to peaceful institutional cooperation amongst 
peoples” (Kreide 2002: n. pag.). Also, Rawls becomes more concerned with 
practicability, a development that already became visible from TJ to PL (ibid.). 
 In LP, Rawls adopts his method (the OP and the veil of ignorance) and 
ideas (reasonable pluralism and an overlapping consensus). However, he 
arrives at different conclusions. Instead of formulating, for example, an 
international principle of distributive justice, he opts for a duty of assistance. 
                                                     
8
 Rawls 1999; hereafter cited as LP. 
9
 “The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms [fair terms of cooperation] are 
proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also 
think it at least reasonable for others to accept them as free and equal citizens” (LP: 136f.). 
 22 
Why does he do this? In LP, Rawls changed his focus. While TJ and PL look for 
principles of justice for a domestic society, Rawls in LP tries to identify the most 
appropriate set of principles according to which relations between societies can 
be organized as peaceful, as stable and as just as possible. All three are 
necessary and interdependent criteria. The focus shifts from the domestic to the 
interstate sphere – domestic justice is of secondary importance – and from 
justice to peace, stability and justice, in that order. By building on the democratic 
peace thesis, Rawls’s main object is a stable peace, and secondary to this, just, 
domestic and international structures. Justness remains a necessary condition. 
This focus might clarify why LP might not be what philosophers and political 
theorists would have expected from the theorist of justice. Furthermore, although 
LP is Rawls’s “last word”, it is not the last word on his international theory: LP as 
a theory is incomplete. Rather than a “comprehensive theory”, it is a sketch of 
Rawls’s international thought and he is aware of that when leaving room for 
additions or changes on several occasions or when he relativizes his 
statements: the principles of the Law of Peoples may be incomplete; there may 
be other types of decent regimes. So what does Rawls conclude in LP and why? 
Below, a short overview is presented. 
 Rawls differentiates between five types of political regimes: liberal peoples, 
decent peoples, benevolent absolutistic societies, burdened societies and 
outlaw states, without claiming that the set is complete. Peoples in LP are the 
contractual partners, forming the Society of Peoples, whereas societies and 
states are treated as objects, political entities peoples have to deal with. 
 Whereas “society” is used as a general term relating to well-ordered as 
well as to non-well-ordered political units, like “regime” on certain occasions, 
peoples and states have specific meanings. “Peoples”, to give a short idea of 
Rawls’s concept, refers neither to the plural of persons, nor to groups of persons 
forming a cultural, social or political entity, but to countries meeting specific 
criteria. 
“I first chose the name ‘peoples‘ rather than ‘nations‘ or ‘states‘ because I wanted 
to conceive of peoples as having different features from those of states, since the 
idea of states, as traditionally conceived with their two powers of sovereignty [...], 
was unsuitable” (LP: v). 
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They are idealized states, a kind of “states plus” insofar as they limit their 
rational interest according to reasonable principles, for example, by honouring 
the principles of the Law of Peoples even if that puts extensive constraints on 
pursuing their rational national interest. Whereas in the common understanding 
of “peoples” the term refers to “collectivities that do not have a government and 
do not form a state”, to Rawls a people “is a state containing a well-ordered 
society that is either liberal or decent. So, for Rawls, all Peoples are states” 
(Shue 2002: 309). 
 States on the other hand pursue their rational interest by all means 
suitable, violate core human rights and/or pursue an aggressive foreign policy. 
So, neither Rawls’s understanding of “states” nor that of “peoples” corresponds 
to the established definitions.  
 How now do those differentiations correspond to the five types 
distinguished by Rawls? Liberal peoples, the main subjects of LP, have a 
democratic background structure and pursue their rational interests within the 
limits of reasonable principles; they thus honour basic human rights and refrain 
from pursuing aggressive foreign policies. The same holds true for decent 
peoples, with the difference that their basic structure is hierarchically organized. 
Still, members of society can take part in the process of political decision making 
via a consultation system. Benevolent absolutistic regimes honour human rights, 
are pacific but exclude their population from processes of political decision 
making. Burdened societies involuntarily do not comply with the Law of Peoples 
as they are burdened by unfavourable conditions that restrain them from 
establishing a well-ordered regime. Outlaw states deliberately do not comply 
with the principles of the Law of Peoples. By pursuing their rational interest, they 
violate core human rights and/or constitute a threat to other societies. 
 Whereas the first two types, together referred to as well-ordered peoples, 
are the subject of the first two parts of the monograph that Rawls refers to as 
“ideal theory”, the second part – non-ideal-theory – explores how peoples are to 
relate to absolutistic-, burdened- and outlaw regimes. 
 Focusing initially on ideal theory, in a first step, Rawls models a second 
original position (OPII). Representatives of well-ordered liberal democratic 
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peoples are set behind a veil of ignorance to decide on a set of reasonable 
principles that are to govern the relations between them: the principles of the 
Law of Peoples. To ensure that the principles are chosen under fair 
circumstances and that the results are just, as well as that the principles 
constitute an overlapping consensus between peoples holding different 
comprehensive doctrines, the veil hides the knowledge of size, geographical 
position, natural resources, population and economic, political or military power 
of the society they represent, as well as the knowledge of doctrines held on the 
domestic level. The representatives know, however, that they represent liberal 
societies. The principles chosen in OP II according to Rawls are the duties 1. to 
respect other peoples’ freedom and independence and within that to 2. not 
intervene in their domestic affairs, 3. to consider equality between them as 
partners within a fair system of cooperation, 4. to observe treaties and 
undertakings, 5. to honour basic human rights, 6. to observe restrictions in the 
conduct of warfare, 7. to assist burdened societies and last but not least 8. the 
right of self-defence (LP: 37). Rawls restricts core human rights to a minimal set 
of four: the right to life (including that the means of subsistence and security 
have to be granted), to liberty (including freedom from slavery or serfdom, as 
well as a sufficient measure concerning the liberty of conscience, religion and 
thought), to property and to formal equality (LP: 65). War is only legitimate in 
cases of self-defence or in cases of gross violations of the core human rights.  
 In the second part of his ideal theory, Rawls models a third original position 
(OP III) where representatives of decent peoples behind the same veil of 
ignorance select the same set of principles as the representatives of liberal 
societies did in OP II. As a result, the principles of the Law of Peoples are not 
only accepted by liberal democratic societies, but also by decent peoples. 
 Non-ideal theory then focuses on the question of how well-ordered 
peoples, together forming the Society of Peoples, are to relate to non-well-
ordered societies. Leaving benevolent absolutistic societies aside, peoples have 
a right to war against outlaw states, as those by definition are either aggressive 
or grossly violate core human rights (or both) and thereby are a threat towards 
other societies and/or their own people. Towards burdened societies, they have 
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a duty of assistance, insofar as to provide what is needed to enable those 
societies to establish a well-ordered basic structure. 
 Rawls’s claim, that the duty of assistance is a sufficient measure for (fair) 
international re-distribution, his human rights minimalism and his classification of 
decent societies as well-ordered have raised critique, mainly from the 
cosmopolitan camp. Those aspects of LP have thus been the main objects in 
the reception of it. 
 
 
Reviewing The Law of Peoples 
The roots of Rawls’s international theory were laid in TJ (1971) (TJ: 378-
380), where Rawls enlarges his original position to representatives of nations 
“who must choose together the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting 
claims among states” (ibid.: 378).10 Against the ideas Rawls sketched very 
briefly, critics argued, first, that individuals and not states should be represented 
in a global (rather than an international) OP and second, that the set of 
principles Rawls presents are not those that the representatives of nations 
would agree on. A special focus of critique lay on the fact that Rawls did not 
apply his difference principle to the international realm. These two points were 
elaborated, amongst others, by Brian Barry (1975), Charles Beitz (1979) and 
Thomas Pogge (1989). Barry argues that the representatives would probably 
“challenge the rules under which Rawls requires them to operate”, reject his 
minimal set of principles and opt for an international difference principle (Barry 
1975: 129-132). Beitz and Pogge proposed a global OP as well as a principle of 
distributive justice and thus, in extending Rawls’s theory, arrived at different 
conclusions to Rawls himself. 
Despite the criticism, Rawls in his 1993 Amnesty Lecture “The Law of 
Peoples”, in which he presented a more elaborate version of his international 
theory, neither introduced a global original position, nor an international principle 
                                                     
10
 In TJ, the representatives of nations agree on the principles of equality and self-determination, 
the right to self-defence (extended to defensive alliances), that treaties are to be kept, they 
accept limitations in the conduct of war and to prohibit “incorporating the natural duties that 
protect human life” (TJ: 378f.).  
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of distributive justice. He turned even more against cosmopolitan thinking by 
picturing decent hierarchical societies, that – although they are not liberal 
democratic – are categorized as well-ordered members of good standing in the 
international realm and thus need to be tolerated and respected by liberal 
peoples. He also opts for a human rights minimalism that excludes liberal rights 
such as freedom of assembly or a right to equal representation. 
Rawls’s “continued faith in the nominally traditional idea of a Society of 
States was viewed with some disappointment” (Williams 2011: 16). Pogge in 
1994 called for “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples” arguing that even if one 
accepted Rawls’s construction of the two original positions (which he does not), 
a “plausible conception of global justice must be sensitive to international social 
and economic inequalities” (Pogge 1994: 196). He proposes a global resource 
tax (GRT) on which representatives of liberal societies in an OP might agree in 
order to mitigate unjust inequalities on the international level. Darrel Moellendorf 
(1996) argues not only for the addition of a principle of egalitarian distributive 
justice but also of a principle of liberal democracy. Moellendorf accuses Rawls of 
establishing principles that could be accepted instead of principles that should 
be accepted and questions the tolerability of decent regimes from the viewpoint 
of liberal standards.  
Another focus point has been the claim that liberal peoples need to tolerate 
and respect decent peoples as members of good standing in the international 
realm. Kok-Chor Tan in his 1998 article “Liberal Toleration in Rawls's Law of 
Peoples” emphasizes the tension between liberal theory and the toleration of 
hierarchical societies. Fernando Tesón also argues that by tolerating decent 
societies, Rawls does not pay enough attention to forms of oppression and 
covers too few human rights. Tesón on the other hand praises Rawls for 
presenting an alternative to realism and justifying humanitarian intervention and 
supports his non-application of the difference principle to the international realm 
(Tesón 1994: 20). The anthology Global Justice, edited by Pogge and 
Moellendorf (2008), not only includes Rawls’s Amnesty Lecture, but also the 
commenting essays by Pogge, Moellendorf and Tan, which have already been 
introduced. 
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When the final monograph was published in 1999, the disappointment was 
even greater. “With some notable exceptions, the bulk of the initial literature on 
LP seemed to express disappointment that Rawls failed to see the problem of 
international justice from a more cosmopolitan perspective” (Williams 2011: 14). 
The new wave of criticism was accompanied by more positive receptions. 
Theorists such as Chris Brown, who suggests that the “current tendency to 
dismiss it [LP] as fundamentally misconceived is regrettable” (2004: 43), Samuel 
Freeman (2007) and Leif Wenar (2006) explored potentially valuable elements 
of LP. Wenar declares pure cosmopolitanism as impossible and claims Rawls’s 
“liberal statism” to be “the only realized approach to global political morality that 
we have” (Wenar 2006: 111). 
Rawls’s international theory, however, stands in the shadow of his 
domestic theory.11 Nevertheless, when theorizing about international justice it is 
almost impossible not to at least mention Rawls.12 
As indicated earlier, criticism on LP was first and most intensely formulated 
by cosmopolitans close to Rawls, such as Beitz and Pogge. Major points of 
critique are Rawls’s focus on states as actors instead of individuals, his human 
rights minimalism and the lack of distributive justice in the international realm 
(see also Kuper 2000). The critique was mostly combined with alternative 
attempts to suggest principles and measures to solve global moral problems, 
such as extreme economic inequalities. The critics thus not only criticized what 
Rawls did write but also indicated what he should have written instead. 
“Most of his critics within the tradition have, in effect, attempted to save Rawls from 
himself, suggesting ways in which his approach can be modified to cope with the 
problems it allegedly creates, or fails to deal with—most notably the issue of the 
international dimension of justice, which for Rawls cannot involve redistributive 
social justice, a conclusion his critics regard as perverse” (Brown 2010: 311f.). 
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 Introductions to Rawls cover LP at least in one chapter (see for example Audard 2007: 229-
274 or Freeman 2007: 416-456). In the Cambridge Companion to Rawls (2003), LP is hardly 
treated. 
12
 Peter Sutch, to name an example, in his monograph Ethics, Justice and International 
Relations dedicates a chapter on a defence and interpretation of Rawls’s international theory 
(2001: 173-202). More specific works that touch aspects of LP refer to or even discuss LP 
explicitly. Within the anthology Ethics of Assistance (2004), edited by Deen K. Chatterjee, three 
articles are dedicated to LP. 
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The anthology Rawls’s Law of Peoples. A Realistic Utopia, edited by Rex 
Martin and David Reidy, unites many of the voices that made a valuable 
contribution to the discussion of LP and its content. It thereby covers the topics 
that have been central in the discussion of LP: the background and structure 
(including the conception of peoples or the ideal-non-ideal-theory divide); the 
understanding and grasp of human rights, as well as the question of 
international distributive justice. A point on its own is the question of toleration.13 
Concentrating on the background structure, the concept of peoples, 
especially decent hierarchical peoples, have been focused on. The common 
critique on decent peoples is two-headed: first, tolerating decent peoples was 
considered inconsistent with liberal thinking,14 and second, the concept of 
decent peoples is perceived as implausible.15 The toleration of non-liberal 
societies as members of good standing in the international realm has been 
questioned. Bruce Ackerman, on the topic, went as far as to claim that Rawls 
“proposes a disastrous political compromise with authoritarian regimes” (1994: 
381).16 In “Decent Peoples, Outlaw States, Burdened Societies: Conceptual 
Categories in the Law of Peoples”, Chris Brown illuminates Rawls’s typology of 
political regimes and discusses the differentiation between peoples, societies 
and states. He argues that a binary classification (liberal/non-liberal) does not 
correlate to how the world currently is and enhances international tension 
(Brown 2004: 39) instead of peace and stability. Rawls’s critics, however, not 
only rejected Rawls’s duty of assistance as insufficient, but also considered his 
human rights minimalism as incomplete, as Rawls did not cover the whole set of 
liberal rights and liberties.17 
                                                     
13
 The critique of Rawls’s human rights minimalism and the duty of assistance is reviewed in 
more depth in chapter 4, where the principles of the Law of Peoples are analyzed. The question 
of the limits of toleration is dealt with in chapter 3 when focusing on the interaction between the 
first two types of political regimes. 
14
 The argument was put forward, amongst others, by Tan (2006), Beitz (2000), Pogge (2001), 
and Moellendorf (2002). 
15
 See for example Brunkhorst 2002. 
16
 Of minor attention in the discussions around LP have been Rawls’s differentiation between 
ideal and non-ideal theory (see for example Simmons 2010 or Valentini 2009), his Kantian 
inheritance (Becker 2005; Kreide 2009; McCarthy 1996), and the role and position of women in 
LP (Nussbaum 2002). The first two are of relevance for the project at hand. 
17
 See diverse publications by Beitz and Pogge; see also: Tan 2004, Kuper 2000 and Caney 
2002. 
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As more recent publications show, LP’s potential for discussion is not yet 
exhausted. A dissertation by Huw Lloyd Williams (2011) in defense of Rawls 
explores the potential of LP to solve the problem of global poverty that has been 
of major concern for Pogge and others. He concludes that the duty of assistance 
is a far-reaching principle that can meet the challenge of global poverty. Andreas 
Bock (2008) in his dissertation showed that Rawls’s human rights minimalism 
does not diminish but enhance global justice as Rawls guides liberal regimes 
towards creating an international society in which every human being lives in at 
least decent societies.  
With reference to the project at hand, the democratic peace thesis has 
been discussed in relation to LP by Christine Audard (2006a), Michael Becker 
(2005) and targeted by Michael W. Doyle (2006), who in his paper “One World, 
Many Peoples: International Justice in John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples” strives 
to identify decent regimes. An in-depth elaboration on Rawls’s peace-argument 
and the picture of the Society of Peoples as potentially all-embracing “peaceful 
haven” is so far missing, as well as an explicit elaboration on the possible 
enlargement of the democratic peace to a decent peace thesis.  
 
The main critique LP has to meet has been of it not being cosmopolitan or 
at least sufficiently liberal. Rawls’s international philosophy, however, belongs to 
the liberal camp, but he combines elements of different traditions or schools of 
thought in a way which almost seems inconsistent. By extending his domestic 
theory to the international sphere, he breaks with cosmopolitanism, as well as 
with cultural relativism and last but not least realism (Audard 2006a: 59). In LP, 
a weak cosmopolitanism (universal grasp of core human rights)18 is combined 
with communitarian elements.19 Also, his international theory has a constructivist 
character, as it is developed through a procedure of construction (the OP) (Bock 
2008: 5). It is contractualist insofar as the principles of the Law of Peoples 
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 “The Law of Peoples can be described as a weak cosmopolitan position […] in that it 
recognizes the normative force of human rights” (Tan 2006: 87, see also Freeman 2007: 442). 
19
 “Rawls has always defended the intrinsic good of political community […] [and] never really 
held that it makes sense to view individuals as socially unsituated” (Simhony and Weinstein 
2001: 12). 
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constitute a social contract, based on an overlapping consensus between 
peoples (Sutch 2001: 174). Despite all that, the application of the principle of 
reasonable pluralism to the international sphere and the claim for toleration and 
respect of all well-ordered societies, is based on liberal theory and might be 
considered Rawls’s main contribution to it in reference to LP: Although liberal 
democracy is considered the most just and reasonable system, imposing this 
system on other regimes that pass the threshold of what is tolerable is illiberal 
and may cause conflicts, instability and injustice. 
By drawing on and equally rejecting elements of those different ways of 
theorizing, Rawls draws critics on his international theory from a wide variety of 
camps, which leads to misunderstandings of his concepts through focus on 
elements that do not fit into the respective framework. “LP is a richer and more 
formidable philosophical target than typically acknowledged by those who take 
aim at it” (Reidy 2004: 312). Rawls thinks across and between the lines of the 
“isms” and can thus hardly be classified. Nevertheless, he remains a “member of 
good standing” within the family of liberal ideas.  
 
Rawls’s theorizing across and between common lines of thought is not the 
only thing that makes LP distinctively interesting. Although LP might always 
stand in the shadow of his major works, it has a distinct value for international 
relations theory and practice. Rawls does not paint the world in terms of black 
and white, liberal and non-liberal, friend and foe, the West and the rest, but in 
different shades of grey, where no existing regimes escape censure. These 
shades and how they are interwoven are worth being drawn out clearly. Rawls’s 
idea of reasonable pluralism at the international level, obliging liberal peoples to 
tolerate decent regimes as equal cooperation partners, and the principles of the 
Law of Peoples, which can be regarded as an overlapping consensus between 
them, are ideas worth being considered and discussed. Even if there are no 
peoples in the real world, the ideal might help to discern criteria according to 
which one can review state behaviour; it can give additional justification to 
existing or evolving international norms, or, focusing on the Society of Peoples 
as the union of these ideal societies, help to develop or improve international 
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institutions. It can help to avoid illiberal policies that aim at liberalizing other 
societies, to avoid the imposition of liberal values on regimes that maintain their 
own reasonably just system of values. The model can sketch a path to the final 
aim – peace, stability and justice in the international realm – no matter how 
close one might come to actually achieving that aim. Equally, the idea of the 
Society of Peoples as an ideal institution might serve as a model for existing 
institutions. 
 LP has been read as “A Theory of International Justice” and has thus been 
criticized accordingly. However, LP is not about how to establish a just world 
order, at least not primarily. It is rather meant to provide liberal regimes with a 
guideline according to which they shall organize their foreign relations in order to 
enhance a peaceful, stable and just international realm, in order to establish a 
global Society of Peoples.20 This guideline is meant to be applicable to the here 
and now, to present a feasible realistic utopian concept. LP is thus more “A 
Theory of International Peace, Stability and Justice”, developed within a realistic 
utopian framework for existing (and future) liberal societies and it has to be read, 
interpreted and criticized as that. 
 
 
Purpose, Content and Structure of the Thesis 
 Rawls’s conception, being what he calls a realistic utopia, his focus on 
idealized states (peoples) and his idea of decent regimes, clarified by his 
imagined decent model society Kazanistan, pose a question: Is the picture 
Rawls draws of international relations as they should be, applicable to actual 
international relations? Therefore, my overall aim is to provide a clear sketch of 
Rawls’s concept by identifying and discussing ambiguities and weaknesses and 
deliberating on the question of whether LP may meet its task and can function 
as a guideline for more peace, stability and justice in the international realm and 
what that peace might look like. In concrete terms, I want to substantiate 
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 “The aim of the Law of Peoples would be fully achieved when all societies have been able to 
establish either a liberal or a decent regime” (LP: 5). Within the Society of Peoples, “peace and 
justice would be achieved” (LP: 6). LP wants to say how a “world Society of liberal and decent 
Peoples might be possible” (ibid.). 
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whether Rawls does actually sketch the path to a decent peace. Does Rawls’s 
international theory, his typology of regimes and the system of cooperation 
between them, work as a model for international relations? If not, why not and 
can the model be adjusted? And if so, what does LP contribute to international 
political theory and practice? How can LP enhance peace, stability and justice 
on the international level? The combination of realistic and utopian elements as 
well as the divide between his ideal and non-ideal theory pose problems for the 
applicability of Rawls’s model. Rawls relates ideal peoples to non-ideal 
surroundings, sketches an ideal decent society at the same time stating that 
something like that ideal, Kazanistan, “is the best we can realistically – and 
coherently – hope for” (LP: 78). 
 Here, the concept of decent peoples creates an additional problem. Rawls 
models Kazanistan as an exemplary decent society, but does not refer to any 
existing or historic state. Decent societies appear to be constructions. However, 
their moral status as equal cooperation partners to liberal peoples is essential to 
the theory. Although their basic structure is less reasonable and less just than 
that of liberal democracies, they are to be tolerated as equal partners of 
cooperation. Rawls regards this as a result of reasonable pluralism. As Rawls’s 
aim is to sketch a system of cooperation promoting peace, stability and justice 
and as he builds on the assumption of a democratic peace, one would expect 
that Rawls would, ascribing this special moral status to decent societies, include 
them into the assumption of stable and just peace. One would expect Rawls to 
enlarge the scope of democratic peace towards a “decent peace thesis”, which 
he, at least explicitly, does not. So does Rawls take the idea of reasonable 
pluralism and of tolerating decent regimes as equals seriously? Or is it just the 
most effective way towards a society of liberal peoples, as it might be more 
promising to motivate decent societies to reform by cooperation than by 
coercion? All this has to be regarded under the premise that decent societies 
exist at all. If there is nothing corresponding to decent peoples in the real world, 
then Rawls’s arguments of reasonable pluralism and toleration are meaningless. 
LP might even be judged as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”, a way to indirectly 
impose liberal principles on non-liberal regimes. If there are no decent societies, 
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never have been and most probably never will be, the principles of the Law of 
Peoples remain liberal values and do not constitute an overlapping consensus; 
liberal democracy remains the only regime type qualifying as well-ordered. 
Spreading those values by means of intervention or the duty of assistance could 
then be considered liberal imperialism, which is exactly what Rawls aims to 
avoid. If there are decent societies in the real world, why does Rawls not name 
examples and deliberate on a decent peace? Is the assumption of decent peace 
normatively and empirically provable? And if so, how could it be implemented 
within the framework of international relations? 
 
 An in-depth understanding and analysis of Rawls’s theory as presented in 
LP is essential to analysing these questions and problems. Therefore, the next 
chapter focuses on Rawls’s understanding of peoples and states and their 
relation to one another. Why does Rawls use “people” instead of “state” and 
what are the differences? Rawls’s understanding of the terms is analyzed with 
regard to its descriptive and normative content. Also, the relations between 
peoples and their status of existence as political entities are analysed. Is the 
usage of the term “people” itself helpful or does it cause theoretical and/or 
terminological confusion? Are states a negative print of peoples or peoples 
idealized states? Do peoples exist in the real world and on what conception of 
political regimes are Rawls’s definitions based? Here, Rawls’s differentiation 
between ideal and non-ideal theory becomes crucial. If peoples are ideals, how 
come they are actors in non-ideal theory? The analysis of LP is complemented 
by arguments for and against the concept of peoples and an examination of the 
connection of the concept to Rawls’s realistic utopian aspirations. 
 On the basis of the results of the second chapter, chapter 3 introduces 
Rawls’s five types of political regimes. The chapter shall draw a clearer picture 
of the Rawlsian model and clarify ambiguities within his differentiations. As 
pointed out already, essential questions hereby arise from the relation between 
liberal and decent peoples. Is it reasonable to expect liberal regimes to tolerate 
non-democratic but decent societies as equal cooperation partners? Is Rawls’s 
claim based on normative assumptions (reasonable pluralism) or founded on 
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pragmatic motives (democratization via cooperation instead of coercion)? The 
question of toleration is discussed in some depth, as it is not only crucial for 
understanding Rawls and his critics, but also essential for the project pursued in 
this dissertation: If Rawls takes toleration seriously, he would subsequently need 
to extend the democratic peace thesis, which he understands as proven by 
history and on which his theory is based, to a decent peace thesis. It is highly 
important to discover whether something similar to a decent people exists in the 
real world. Rawls uses the decent model society Kazanistan to prove that his 
principles of the Law of Peoples are not liberal, Western ideas but constitute an 
overlapping consensus between at least reasonably just, well-ordered societies. 
If decent societies lack counterparts in the real world, Rawls’s justification for 
imposing the principles of the Law of Peoples on other societies, non-
compliance by non-members of the Society of Peoples is a reason for 
intervention, might be pointless.  
Chapters 4 and 5 then, focus on possible ways of recasting Rawls’s theory 
in the international system. Chapter 4 focuses on the centre of LP: the principles 
of the Law of Peoples. Problems arising from the construction of the 
international OPs are analysed and it is discussed whether one, rather than two 
OPs for the international realm are more convincing. It is questioned, whether 
the principles can be rightly regarded as an overlapping consensus between 
liberal and decent regimes and explored why Rawls chose those eight 
principles. The focus here lies on the most contested principles: the human 
rights minimalism and the duty of assistance, and in reference to the latter, the 
missing principle of distributive justice. Why does Rawls, even within an ideal 
framework, limit his concept of human rights to a minimal set? Why does he not 
opt for an international principle of distributive justice and is the grasp of the duty 
of assistance sufficient? 
Rawls provides hardly any information on how a Society of Peoples may 
be structured, so chapter 5 concentrates on understanding the Society of 
Peoples, developing a sketch of its setup as well as evaluating its position in LP 
and its possible worth for international relations. Is it a mere forum of all regimes 
qualifying as well-ordered, or should it take the shape of an international 
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institution, equipped with a basic structure and clear decision making 
processes? As the duty of assistance and the right to war seem to be 
understood as a combined effort, and as there needs to be an entity controlling, 
and if necessary enforcing, the principles of the Law of Peoples within the 
Society, a basic structure and clear procedures might be necessary. Could the 
European Union serve as an existing model for a “regional Society of Liberal 
Regimes”? Would the concept of a League of Democracies help in gaining a 
clearer picture of how a Society of Peoples may look? Again, decent people are 
focused on. Would hierarchically organized regimes accept democratic 
processes of decision making at an international level? Are there other 
possibilities to organize the basic structure of a Society of Peoples? Additional 
constraints on the international level seem worth discussing. What should the 
Society of Peoples look like? Is it a loose union of all regimes qualifying as 
peoples or is it an international institution that would then have to claim being a 
legitimate authority on the use of force, given that peoples’ right to war, though 
being limited, is not reduced to cases of self-defence? 
After having presented a broad elaboration of Rawls’s theory, drawn a 
picture of it and discussed some of the ambiguities and problems that arise form 
both, chapter 6 focuses more closely on the question of whether decent peoples 
exist in the real world. Identifying decent societies is crucial in two ways. First, 
identifying those regimes proves that Rawls does not merely invent decent 
societies to justify imposing liberal principles on non-liberal regimes but rather 
presents an overlapping consensus between liberal and non-liberal well-ordered 
societies and thus a way for liberal societies to enhance peace, stability and 
justice in the international realm and for avoiding liberal imperialism. Second, it 
is helpful in substantiating the claim that the democratic peace thesis might be 
enlarged to a decent peace. On the basis of the regimes identified, an empirical 
claim for a decent peace proposition is formulated. Peoples are ideals that do 
not have, as such, correspondents in the real world. Therefore, one has to 
reduce the standards, as one would have to reduce the standards for liberal 
peoples to find non-ideal counterparts or identify those regimes closest to the 
criteria for decency. Those are referred to as “aspiring decent regimes”. 
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Based on the identified candidates for aspiring decent societies, chapter 7 
then focuses on the question of how far a decent peace thesis might hold true. 
The normative as well as empirical justifications for a decent peace are 
explored, based on the arguments presented for and against the assumption of 
a democratic peace. These are discussed and transferred onto decent societies. 
Concerning empirical evidence, it is examined whether the identified aspiring 
decent regimes have been involved in violent conflicts against democracies or 
other decent regimes. If there is something like a decent peace that would give 
additional support to Rawls’s idea of toleration, having in mind that the focus is 
on peace, stability and justice on the theoretical level (if it can be substantiated 
that the criteria made responsible for a democratic peace also apply to decent 
societies and can thus be suspected to have a similar effect) as well empirically 
(if it can be displayed that regimes that qualify as aspiring decent do pursue 
peaceful foreign policies in relation to other aspiring decent or liberal regimes). If 
there is not, reasonable pluralism and cooperation, instead of coercion, are 
nonetheless still valid arguments. Would Rawls have supported a decent peace 
thesis and why does he not deliberate on it in LP?  
Finally, the concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings on the 
basis of which the following questions are discussed: How can the concepts of 
the Society of Peoples and the Law of Peoples, and how can Rawls’s theory as 
a whole, contribute to more peace, stability and justice in the international realm 
and/or to a decent peace? How far may LP function as a guideline to realize that 
aim? How can it improve the cooperation between liberal and decent regimes? 
Some continuative aspects are explored: Can LP provide additional justification 
for existing or evolving international norms, or – focusing on the Society of 
Peoples as union of these ideal societies – help to develop or improve 
international institutions? 
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2. Rawls’s Actors in the International Realm 
 In LP, the contractual partners are neither individuals, as in TJ and PL, nor 
states as generally understood and as one would expect from a theory of 
international relations, but rather peoples. Societies and Rawlsian states are 
treated as objects, as political entities peoples have to deal with. 
 But why start with states at all? Rawls justifies his focus on political 
regimes instead of individual persons with reference to Immanuel Kant, to whom 
the existence of separate states is a necessary condition for deliberating on 
international law (LP: 36). A world state to Rawls might, relying on Kant and 
Michael Walzer, be even worse than a Hobbesian war of everyone against 
everyone else. “To tear down the walls of the state is not […] to create a world 
without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses” (Walzer 1983: 
39). As states currently are, and will most probably continue to be, the primary 
actors of international relations and primary subjects of international law,21 any 
theory on international relations that has as one of its aims to deal with or solve 
real world problems should focus on states. Furthermore, Rawls’s system is 
formed on the basis of which principles liberal regimes should organize their 
foreign policies, with the result that liberal (and decent) peoples are the natural 
subjects of his theory. If one does not want a world state, one needs to draw 
borders, both for the establishment of a basic structure, and for social 
cooperation of and within societies (Bock 2008: 55-57). 
As indicated earlier, Rawls uses his idiosyncratic definitions of the terms 
“peoples” and “states” to ascribe distinct characteristics to respective regimes 
(Shue 2002: 308f.); “society” is used as a general term22 and may either refer to 
one of the five types of regimes, or to society as a constituent of a state, the sum 
of its members and the community they constitute (LP: 92). 
                                                     
21
 Recent developments show that the focus has somehow changed, as, for example, individuals 
can now be sued at the International Criminal Court and not states, as at the International Court 
of Justice. However, these developments are not as strong as to suppose that states will, in the 
near future, loose their standing in the international realm. 
22
 See for example “liberal and decent societies” (LP: 5), “unjust societies” (LP: 8), “five types of 
domestic societies” (LP: 4). Therefore, Buchanan is wrong when he understands Rawlsian 
societies as “’peoples’ organized in states” (Buchanan 2000: 700). 
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Rawls’s understanding of peoples (and states) is hard to grasp. Clearly, 
Rawlsian states and peoples are distinct, if not opposite terms. Treating both as 
one and the same (as Buchanan does; 2000: 699) would miss Rawls’s ambition 
to differentiate himself from traditional thinking and to emphasize the moral 
character of peoples (Bock 2008: 9, 37). “The idea of a people is […] not simply 
a redescription of a familiar phenomenon. […] [N]ot all states count as peoples” 
(Beitz 2000: 679). An in-depth analysis of the Rawlsian usage of both terms, as 
well as their relation to one another, is essential to understanding his project. In 
which context and on what forefront does Rawls differentiate between peoples 
and states, and is this delineation well chosen? Why talk about peoples rather 
than states at all? 
 
 
Why Peoples, Not States 
 Relatively early in LP, Rawls devotes a whole paragraph to the question of 
why he uses the term “people” instead of “state”, and he deliberates and 
expatiates on peoples throughout the book. The central arguments for using this 
terminology may be summed up as follows: 1) Rawls wants to clearly distinguish 
his thinking from that about “states as traditionally understood” (LP: 25). 2) The 
traditional idea of states is unsuitable for the theory. 2.1) The idea of peoples 
enables one to attribute moral motives to states and an allegiance to the Law of 
Peoples (LP: 17). As opposed to Rawlsian states, peoples are reasonable and 
rational. Reasonableness is a distinct feature of peoplehood (LP: 27). 2.2) 
Contrary to states, peoples lack the two powers of sovereignty (the unlimited 
right to war and the autonomy in dealing with one’s population). Both are limited 
by the reasonable principles of the Law of Peoples, to which liberal and decent 
peoples are aligned (LP: 25). 
 Is Rawls’s approach of giving a known term a new understanding well 
chosen? The thinking about political states as traditionally conceived 
characterizes international relations as an anarchic struggle for wealth and 
power (LP: 28), a condition he wants to get away from and a way of thinking 
about states he wants to dissociate himself from. So what differentiates states 
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from peoples and thereby Rawls’s thinking from what he conceives of as 
“traditional”? What characteristics and aims are added or subtracted by Rawls 
from the established understanding of “state”? In the following, Rawls’s concept 
of peoples and his understanding of states are presented and clarified by a 
close analysis on the usage of the terms in LP. 
 
 
Rawls’s Concept of Peoples 
 An analysis of Rawls’s usage of the term “peoples” as regarding its 
descriptive (What are peoples?) and normative (Which rights and duties are 
ascribed to them?) content, aims to bring forward a clear understanding of his 
concepts. In a further step, their possible status of existence as political entities 
is discussed. 
 Rawls views peoples as actors in a Society of Peoples, like citizens as 
actors in a domestic society. If a people holds a similar status on the 
international level as citizens on the domestic, there have to be rights and 
duties, criteria for membership and the opportunity to influence processes of 
political decision making on both levels (LP: 23). While these rights and duties 
on the domestic level are codified in a constitution, the Law of Peoples in the 
international realm sets norms for fair terms of cooperation. The criterion for 
membership is well-orderedness. All members agree to the principles codified in 
the Law of Peoples because of the reasonable character of their respective 
societies. Whereas citizens’ interests are specified by their conception of the 
good, peoples’ interests are informed by a political conception of justice as well 
as by the principles of the Law of Peoples (LP: 40), which detaches them from 
moral, religious and philosophical concepts connected to the conceptions of the 
good (PL: 19f.). Rawls does not extend the parallel between citizens and 
peoples to political regimes in general. The reason for this might be the criterion 
of representation; the parallel does not hold for regimes that do not represent 
the interests of their people. 
 The idea of peoples is developed on the basis of liberal democratic states 
(LP: 9f., 23). This is why Rawls often refers only to liberal peoples and leaves 
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decent peoples aside or mentions them in brackets.23 Nevertheless, they equally 
apply to decent peoples. Therefore, the following criteria should be met, if not 
specified otherwise, by both regime types. 
 
 
Descriptive Features of Liberal (and Decent) Peoples 
Three features basically define Rawlsian peoples: 
1) Peoples have their own internal government, being either reasonably just, 
liberal and democratic or decent and putting forward the fundamental 
interests of society (institutional feature).  
2) The individual members of peoples share common sympathies (cultural 
feature). 
3) Peoples have a moral nature arising from an attachment to a reasonable 
conception of right and justice (political/moral feature) (LP: 3, 23f.). 
In addition to these characteristics, a Rawlsian people is a state in the traditional 
sense and possesses a defined territory and citizens, as well as, in some 
regards, the monopoly on legitimately exercising power over both. 
 Reasonable, not full, justness is necessary to meet the first criterion. Rawls 
speaks of a “reasonably just, or decent, nature of their regimes” (LP: 27). 
Reasonable justness and decency are shown as alternatives of more or less 
equal quality. Peoples on most fronts act through their respective government 
whose task is to effectively represent its citizens, pursue their fundamental 
interests, and take responsibility for the territory, its environmental integrity and 
the size of the population (LP: 8). The idea of representation is the single reason 
why benevolent absolutistic regimes do not qualify as peoples. The term under 
discussion stresses that Rawlsian peoples are formed by people and that their 
governments represent those individuals. “Only in well-ordered societies, the 
people – meaning the citizens – are regarded and appear as agents. That is why 
they are being called people.” An unjust government does not represent its 
peoples and “there will be no people present in its action” (Pettit 2006: 43). 
                                                     
23
 See for example “a reasonably just liberal (or decent) polity” (LP: 25) or “reasonable liberal 
constitutional (and decent) regimes” (LP: 30). 
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 The common sympathies may arise from a common language, history and 
political culture etc. and create a feeling of nationality between the citizens. They 
share something with each other, uncommon with foreigners. This feeling 
causes the desire to live under a common (democratic) government (LP: 25). 
Although people with different cultural backgrounds live together in one society, 
some common sympathy is needed for cooperation, no matter what the source 
may be. They thus are not necessarily cultural. Political principles must be 
selected on the basis of which difficult cases can be dealt with, such as people 
living under one government with different languages and historical memories: 
“[W]ithin a reasonably just liberal (or decent) polity it is possible, I believe, to 
satisfy the reasonable cultural interests and needs of groups with diverse ethnic 
and national backgrounds” (LP: 25). The idea of peoples here links with that of a 
nation. “What generates a national cultural character is the fact of participation in 
common public institutions, a shared language, a sense of common belonging 
and destiny, and a sense of a shared history or collective memory among 
individual members“ (Tan 2006: 78). By introducing this idealization of a national 
community, Rawls excludes inter-state-conflicts from his discussion of 
international principles of cooperation (ibid.). The exclusion seems 
comprehensible within ideal theory, but might cause a problem for non-ideal 
theory.  
 Peoples are attributed with moral motives (LP: 17). The moral character is 
manifested in the rational and reasonable capacities of citizens and peoples (LP: 
23f.). Peoples voluntarily limit their sovereignty by following reasonable 
principles, codified in the Law of Peoples (LP: 32). The moral nature of peoples 
comprises a sense of honour and pride in themselves: They “may be proud of 
their history and achievements, as a proper patriotism allows” [emphasis in 
original] (LP: 44). Peoples long to be treated with respect and are willing to 
respect other peoples, as they regard peoples as free and equal agents in 
relation to one another (LP: 32-35) and “are not swayed by the passion for 
power and glory” (LP: 47). 
 Further characteristics can be abstracted from LP. Most important here, 
and in extension to the institutional feature, is that peoples have to offer their 
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members a role in processes of political decision making and guarantee a 
minimal set of human rights. 
 
 As a result of their allegiance to reasonable principles, peoples lack 
absolute sovereignty over their territory and population. Both are, according to 
Rawls, held by states as traditionally conceived, wrongly granted and rightly 
withdrawn (LP: 26). A people’s territory has the potential capacity to support the 
population in perpetuity if well treated, which is under the responsibility of the 
government. A scarcity of resources is forestalled by forward-looking policies 
and peoples assist one another in cases of emergency (LP: 38). There is thus 
hardly any reason for migration (LP: 8f.).24 
 Peoples’ interests are reasonable and congruent with fair equality and 
respect for all peoples (LP: 45). The protection of territory and its environmental 
integrity, insuring the safety and well-being of citizens and their being supplied 
with basic goods, preserving free political institutions, equality and 
independence towards other peoples and their distinct culture, are all examples 
of rational interests (LP: 18, 33). “Beyond these interests, a liberal people tries to 
assure reasonable justice for all its citizens and for all peoples” (LP: 29). 
National interests take priority over international ones.25 
 The equality between peoples does not imply that there are no inequalities 
in international institutions, such as the UN (LP: 35). Peoples accept inequalities 
as long as those serve accepted ends. Financially stronger regimes make larger 
contributions while weaker societies accept smaller returns (LP: 41). The mutual 
political relations between peoples are regulated by the principles of the Law of 
Peoples (LP: 3, 33) and based on reciprocity and reasonable pluralism (LP: 41). 
Concerning political, economic and social trends, relations might shift (LP: 45). 
However, peoples do not wage war against each other and also not against third 
states without good grounds (LP: 47). They keep an army and weapons of mass 
destruction to defend their societies and to frighten outlaw states (LP: 9, 26). 
                                                     
24
 There might of course be other motives for migration, such as economic profit, education or 
personal preference of a different culture, social, political or natural surroundings. 
25
 Therefore, peoples would never accept the principle of utility organizing economic relations 
between them (LP: 40) as no “people will be willing to count the losses to itself as outweighed by 
gains to other peoples” (LP: 60). 
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 As a consequence of different historical and cultural backgrounds of 
societies, diverse varieties of liberalism can be found in democratic peoples (LP: 
11). Extending a liberal conception of justice to the Society of Peoples, where 
even more comprehensive doctrines are found, makes toleration in dealing with 
non-liberal peoples inevitable (LP: 19). Reasonable pluralism, as well as the 
idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, leave 
their mark on peoples (LP: 32). The principles of the Law of Peoples give 
expression to this “international overlapping consensus”. Growing up guided by 
the Law of Peoples leads peoples to voluntarily accept its norms. Before long, 
peoples tend to develop mutual trust and confidence through moral learning; 
over time, peoples see the norms by which their foreign relations are governed 
as advantageous for them and internalize them as an ideal of conduct. Under 
these conditions, stability for the right reason is consolidated (LP: 44f.). “Stability 
for the right reasons means stability brought about by citizens acting correctly 
according to the appropriate principles of their sense of justice, which they have 
acquired by growing up under and participating in just institutions” (LP: 13). 
Rawls contrasts “stability for the right reason” with “stability as a balance of 
forces”. Whereas the first generates even more stability over time, the second is 
a temporary modus vivendi (LP: 45).26 This holds true on a domestic, as well as 
an inter-state level. For Rawls, it is thus essential that people, individuals or 
states, not only comply with rules, but that they do so for the right reason (Barry 
1995: 882). However, the allegiance to the Law of Peoples is not equally strong 
in all peoples (LP: 18). 
 Liberal and decent peoples respectively meet additional criteria. Rawls 
uses chains of adjectives in different combinations to describe what is in short 
referred to as “liberal peoples”, such as reasonably just, constitutional, or 
democratic.27 On the basis of his description of the structure of interests of 
peoples, Rawls develops a set of rights and duties applying to them. 
                                                     
26
 Rawls’s differentiation may rely on Kant’s definition of peace as being not only an absence of 
hostility. Peace is only constituted by a peace treaty aimed at ending all wars, not just a specific 
one. The latter would be a mere cease fire (Kant 2006: 8:356-386), a modus vivendi. 
27
 See for example “reasonably just liberal peoples” (LP: 9), “a reasonably just and well-ordered 
democratic society” (LP: 13), “liberal constitutional regime” (LP: 15), “well-ordered democratic 
peoples” (LP: 16). 
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Rights and Duties of Peoplehood 
 What rights and duties are ascribed to peoples? And what freedoms and 
limitations follow form those rights and obligations? Generally, the governments 
of peoples are not author to all their powers. “It is significant that people’s rights 
and duties in regard to their so-called sovereignty derive from the Law of 
Peoples itself” (LP: 27). As a result of the adherence to the Law of Peoples, 
peoples observe those eight principles. Neither secession, nor subordinating 
another society is endorsed. Peoples are not allowed to gain land by conquest 
or by an unauthorized migration into another people's territory (LP: 8). However, 
peoples hold a right to intervene in other societies, either if they are aggressive 
or in cases of gross violations of human rights (LP: 8, 17). That peoples in such 
cases can not only be condemned by other societies, but also be the object of 
coercive intervention (LP: 38) seems contradictory as peoples, by definition, are 
non-aggressive and honour human rights. It might, however, be a hint towards 
non-ideal theory in which peoples can also be non-ideal agents. It might equally 
be meant as an additional memorial to honour the principles of the Law of 
Peoples and to show that peoples “with somewhat dirty hands” might be 
included into Rawls’s understanding. As members of the Society of Peoples, 
peoples do not become untouchable. In addition, as peoples have to care for the 
size of their population, they have “at least a qualified right to limit immigration” 
(LP: 39). 
 There are special duties referring to liberal and decent peoples. Decent 
regimes have to justify political decisions and actions towards their people (LP: 
72). Liberal peoples are obliged to tolerate decent societies in the Society of 
Peoples and to offer them fair terms of cooperation. Though Rawls does not 
change the perspective to decent peoples, it should be taken for granted that 
decent societies are to tolerate liberal peoples as equals alike.28  
 Supplemental to these duties, there are some characteristics that should 
be complied with. Just institutional processes should be established, in order to 
support members of well-ordered societies to develop a sense of justice and to 
maintain the government in honouring the Law of Peoples. To what degree 
                                                     
28
 For an in-depth discussion of the question of toleration see chapter 3. 
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these aims are realized may differ from society to society (LP: 18). Beyond 
pursuing their own interests, peoples try to assure reasonable justice for their 
citizens and for all people (LP: 29). Promoting human rights should be a fixed 
concern in a peoples’ foreign policy (LP: 48). Institutions and practices are to be 
developed to constrain outlaw states, complying with the principles of the Law of 
Peoples. 
 The amount of positive and negative duties puts forward the question of 
whether a political regime would voluntarily comply with the criteria Rawls sets 
up for peoplehood. Do peoples actually exist, at least for Rawls? Will or might 
they exist in the future, or are they mere models of an idealized well-ordered 
society without counterparts in the real world? 
 
 
Do, Can or Should Peoples Exist? 
“The Law of Peoples does not presuppose the existence of actual decent 
hierarchical peoples any more than it presupposes the existence of actual 
reasonably just constitutional democratic peoples. If we set the standards very 
high, neither exists” (LP: 75). 
 
The question of existence is not only important for understanding Rawls, 
but also for identifying regimes that correspond to Rawls’s idea of peoples as 
undertaken in chapter 6. References to all three possibilities are given. 
There are hardly any references in favour of the existence of peoples. 
“Here again we view peoples as they are (as organized within a reasonably just 
domestic society) and the Law of Peoples as it might be” (LP: 17) can denote 
either as they actually are or as they are modelled. A stronger reference is found 
later in the book: “None of the more famous wars of history was between settled 
liberal democratic peoples” (LP: 53). But again, two interpretations are possible: 
Either this holds true, because peoples did not exist at this stage of history 
(which seems rather unlikely), or Rawls understands existing liberal 
democracies, such as the USA or Great Britain, as liberal democratic peoples. 
Later, in reference to the democracies fighting as allies in World War I and II, 
Rawls favours the second interpretation as well as the link to the democratic 
peace thesis established there. It seems as if Rawls understands France, the 
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US and Great Britain as being liberal peoples (LP: 52). The Law of Peoples shall 
be applicable to “ongoing cooperative political arrangements and relations 
between peoples” (LP: 17). The question of whether Rawls argues from within 
his model or not, arises anew. In the Amnesty Lecture, Rawls writes in favour of 
the existence of peoples that they “as corporate bodies organized by their 
governments now exist in some form all over the world” (Rawls 1993: 43). 
When it comes to the question of whether or not decent peoples exist, the 
“Law of Peoples assumes, however, that decent hierarchical peoples exist, or 
could exist” (LP: 79). On another occasion, Rawls directly questions the 
existence of decent peoples (LP: 61). Kazanistan, serving as a model for decent 
peoples, is an imagined state (LP: 5, 75) and Rawls does not mention any 
existing or historical state meeting the criteria for this second type of political 
regime. Thus, decent societies seem to be a conceptual construct (LP: 99). 
Their existence to Rawls, however, does not seem substantial: “my remarks 
about a decent hierarchical society are conceptual. I ask […] whether we can 
imagine such a society; and, should it exist, whether we would judge that it 
should be tolerated politically” (LP: 75). It is reasonable to expect that 
Kazanistan could exist and Rawls states that it is “not without precedent in the 
world” (LP: 78). Unfortunately, he does not name any precedents. 
Statements against the existence of peoples can be found: peoples remain 
unimportant to political philosophy as long as they do not exist (LP: 19). 
Nevertheless, this statement includes the possibility of their existence in the 
future. The aim of non-ideal theory is to prove that decent, non-liberal peoples 
may exist (LP: 5). A society consisting of liberal and decent peoples is Rawls’s 
hope for the future of international relations. Albeit improbable, it is not 
impossible. Rawls formulates this hope on different occasions (LP: 6, 11, 22, 
30). Peoples can exist in the future insofar as their possibility is consistent with 
the natural order (LP: 19). 
If peoples are an idealization and, as such, non-existent, why then should 
the standards of the ideal be reduced? Rawls sets high standards in ideal theory 
and lowers them in non-ideal theory; if he did not, there would neither be any 
agents to hold the right to resist outlaw states nor any with a duty to assist 
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burdened societies. Ideal standards, set high, are reasonable when referring to 
ideal actors within ideal theory to receive a set of ideal principles that can then 
function as a guideline. Non-ideal theory, however, has to deal with non-ideal 
agents, which is necessary if one wants to apply Rawls’s theory to the existing 
state world. 
 
 
Excursus: Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory 
Rawls’s division between ideal and non-ideal theory has been widely 
accepted and has become commonplace. A positive effect of Rawls’s divide has 
been the bringing together of political philosophy mainly in the realm of ideal 
theory, with political theory being more concerned with questions of non-ideal 
theory (Simmons 2010: 5f.). Though the ideal-non-ideal-theory divide is taken 
for granted by most theorists, some elaboration seems necessary, as problems 
may arise from the differentiation when focusing on the role and characteristics 
of peoples in LP. These are discussed following a short introduction to the ideal-
non-ideal-theory divide. 
 “‘Do you suppose a painter is any less good who draws a pattern of what the 
fairest human being would be like and renders everything in the picture adequately, 
but can’t prove that it’s also possible that such a man come into being?’ 
‘No, by Zeus, I don’t’ he said. 
‘[…] Weren’t we, as we assert, also making a pattern in speech of a good city?’ 
‘Certainly.’ 
‘Do you suppose that what we say is any less good on account of our not being 
able to prove that it is possible to found a city the same as the one in speech?’ 
‘Surely not,’ he said” (Plato 1991: 472d-e). 
 
Ideal theory is no Rawlsian conception as far as its roots are concerned. 
Those go back at least as far as to ancient Greek philosophy, where Socrates in 
Plato’s Republic, as cited above, defends his ideal of the polity towards Glaucon 
(Ypi 2010: 537). However, when discussing ideal and non-ideal theory, it is 
Rawls who generally comes to mind, who in TJ provided a sketch of an ideal, 
well-ordered, just, liberal society (TJ: 245f.). 
The concept of ideal theory may better be understood by means of the 
following comparison: 
“Ideal theory functions as a mythical Paradise Island. We have heard wonderful 
stories about Paradise Island, but no one has ever visited it, and some doubt that it 
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truly exists. […] Yet we dream of going there, and ask ourselves how we could get 
there, and in which direction we should be moving in order to eventually reach 
Paradise Island. […] [R]eaching Paradise Island is our ultimate goal. It gives us the 
direction in which we should be moving to reach a (minimally) just society” 
(Robeyns 2008: 344f.). 
 
By showing us what Paradise Island looks like, how our world or an aspect of it 
may ideally be organized, ideal theory can guide people’s actions and helps us 
to judge reality and assess possible improvements to it. It tells us what the 
ultimate goals are, in the case of theories of justice, how a just society would 
ideally look, but not how to get there or how to cope with non-ideal 
circumstances (Robeyns 2008: 345, Valentini 2009: 337). Therein lies the 
purpose of non-ideal theory. 
Ideal theory idealizes; it thus sketches the world as a better place than it 
actually is (Robeyns 2008: 353). Also, ideal theory simplifies in order to enable 
us “to focus on certain main questions free from distracting details” (Schmidtz 
2011: 776). By means of simplification, the complexity of the theory is reduced 
to a manageable degree as there are less parameters that need to be taken 
care of.29 One can thus focus on the essential aspects of a problem (Robeyns 
2008: 353).  
Focusing on LP, ideal theory covers almost two-thirds of the whole text. 
Rawls makes use of idealizations and simplifications. He constructs liberal and 
decent peoples as ideals and simplifies the analysis by assuming favourable 
conditions and full-compliance within the first part of LP (Ypi 2010: 538, Wenar 
2008: n. pag.), thus excluding, for example, inter-state conflicts (Tan 2006: 
78).30 
 
Non-ideal theory has two main purposes. Firstly, living in an at least not 
fully just society, it shows us how, bearing in mind the picture introduced above, 
to get closer to Paradise Island, even though we might never get there. 
Secondly, it enables us to compare different possibilities of (political) action with 
                                                     
29
 In TJ, for example, Rawls, in order to simplify his analysis, sketches a self-contained society 
whose members are fully capable adults, who generally comply with the principles of justice 
(Valentini 2009: 332). 
30
 The imagined state of Kazanistan serves as an example for an ideal decent people (LP: 75). 
But not only peoples as ideal liberal or decent states are idealized; further examples are the 
ideal of the virtuous statesman (LP: 97f.) and the ideal of public reason (LP: 55f.). 
 49 
regards to which one will bring us further towards that ideal. Non-ideal theory is 
a guideline for our political (and moral) decisions (Robeyns 2008: 346). It “looks 
for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible and politically 
possible as well as likely to be effective” (LP: 89). Whereas real world conditions 
do not affect ideal theory, they do have an impact on non-ideal theory. 
Focusing on LP, non-ideal theory tries to provide an answer to questions of 
transition, of how to work from the world as it is to an all-embracing Society of 
Peoples in which the principles of the Law of Peoples are honoured (LP: 90). It 
has a target and cut-off point: non-ideal theory takes grasp until the ideal is 
reached, which will, most probably, never be the case. Whereas ideal theory 
assumes full compliance and favourable conditions, the first part of non-ideal 
theory deals with regimes that refuse to comply, and the second focuses on 
noncompliance caused by unfavourable conditions (LP: 5, 90, Hsieh 2004: 646). 
 
Although it has been taken for granted by many political theorists and 
philosophers, the ideal-non-ideal-theory divide has been discussed and 
criticized. The most prominent claim is that norms developed under idealized 
and simplified conditions cannot effectively function as guidelines for a non-ideal 
world, with non-ideal conditions and agents. They lack applicability and thus 
relevance. The “more the ideal theory has been built upon idealizations, the 
farther away it will be removed from offering us clear guidance for the nonideal 
world” (Robeyns 2008: 355, see also Valentini 2009: 333). In direct reference to 
LP, Henry Shue argued that a 
“book that deals largely with ideal theory about the principles internal to such a 
society [the USA as potential member of a Society of Peoples] gives almost no 
guidance for the relations between a member (perhaps the USA) and a non-
member (perhaps Iraq), except when they are already descending into hostilities“ 
(2002: 307f.). 
 
Principles resulting from the assumptions of ideal theory cannot, as such, 
serve as principles for a non-ideal world. They need to be developed and 
reinterpreted in order to adapt to the institutional or feasibility constraints the real 
world presents them with (Robeyns 2008: 355). Rawls is aware of institutional 
and feasibility constraints; he not only discusses ideal, but also non-ideal theory 
and develops his ideal theory within the limits of a realistic utopian framework. 
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This framework ensures that the principles selected in the OPs may be applied 
to liberal (and decent) societies and non-ideal theory serves as a guideline to 
how to apply those principles to real world relations and problems. Rawls thus 
considers the feasibility requirement already in ideal theory (Simmons 2010: 29). 
Focusing on the principles of the Law of Peoples, Rawls explicitly states that his 
list is open for interpretation, specification and additions. Shue’s critique 
moreover lacks justification as Rawls very well provides advice on how 
members of the Society of Peoples shall relate to non-members, even beyond 
military intervention or pursuing the duty of assistance (Rawls 1993: 62).31 
Rawls’s ideal theory in LP is not fully ideal. The picture he sketches of a 
realistic utopia, to Rawls, is the “best we can reasonably hope for”. He projects 
elements of the status quo, the less reasonable, decent regimes, into his ideal 
theory. But why should a minimal overlapping consensus be called “ideal” 
(McCarthy 1996: 209)? Even if one accepts Rawls’s realistic utopian framework, 
why should it be unreasonable to hope for a society of liberal peoples, given 
that, following Rawls, via mutual cooperation, decent regimes might recognize 
the advantages of a liberal regime and gradually reform towards it? An ideal LP 
could thus sketch a society of liberal peoples and a law of peoples that includes 
the full set of liberal principles that take hold on the domestic level, especially 
when focusing on human rights. The relations to decent regimes would then 
become a matter of non-ideal theory. Rawls, however, includes decent peoples 
in his ideal theory. Why so? By excluding decent peoples, Rawls believes his 
theory would be in danger of becoming ethnocentric and intolerant, and thus, in 
danger of violating the principle of reasonable pluralism (ibid.: 216). Having said 
this, Rawls does hope that decent peoples may reform into liberal ones, so one 
gets back to the “ideal ideal” of a society of liberal peoples. Is it worth, however, 
formulating such an ideal ideal if it is not attainable, or, according to Rawls, if 
aiming for a society of liberal peoples would violate liberal principles? Following 
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 “Gradually over time, then, the well-ordered peoples may pressure the outlaw regimes to 
change their ways; but by itself this pressure is unlikely to be effective. It needs to be backed up 
by the firm denial of all military aid or of economic and other assistance. Further, well-ordered 
peoples should not admit outlaw regimes as members in good standing into their mutually 
beneficial cooperative practices” (Rawls 1993: 62). 
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Schmidtz, ideal theories must be, if not realistically attainable, at least worth a 
try.  
“Many things are not worth a try. Thus, if we are on the roof of a tall building and I 
say, ‘Ideally, I would fly like Superman’ and you reply, ‘Well, it’s worth a try,’ you 
will be saying something false. Not being worth a try makes my vision of Superman 
a daydream or a throwaway remark, not an ideal. So, where X is not even worth a 
try, X does not imply reasons for action and thus is not an object of aspiration; it is 
instead normatively inert. However, defining an objective that is worth a try, even if 
ultimately unattainable, is not always a mistake” (Schmidtz 2011: 776). 
 
Sketching a liberal society of peoples to Rawls may seem like trying to fly like 
superman, whereas a Society of Peoples may be worth a try. Even ideal theory 
should be based on somewhat realistic assumptions if it does not want to 
become utopian, something Rawls wants to avoid (Simmons 2010: 8). 
Additional arguments against ideal theorizing are put forward by Amartya 
Sen. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the problem of transcendental 
approaches, as Sen understands ideal theory, is the “non-existence of an 
identifiable perfectly just social arrangement” (Sen 2009: 15). The principles 
identified cannot be applied to institutions in actual societies (ibid.: 68). What we 
really do is to compare possible actions to one another rather than to an ideal:  
“if we are trying to choose between a Picasso and a Dali, it is of no help to invoke a 
diagnosis […] that the ideal picture in the world is the Mona Lisa. […] Indeed, it is 
not at all necessary to talk about what may be the greatest or most perfect picture 
in the world, to choose between the two alternatives that we are facing” (ibid.: 16). 
 
One should thus focus on a comparative approach and balance “societies that 
exist or could feasibly emerge” against one another (ibid.: 7, 62). To enhance 
justice, one does not need the picture of a perfectly just society, but measures to 
eliminate or improve injustices (ibid.: 26). Ideal theorizing is “of no direct 
relevance to the problem of choice that has to be faced. What is needed instead 
is an agreement, based on public reasoning, on rankings of alternatives that can 
be realized” (ibid.: 17). What Sen is arguing here is that “pursuing justice is 
actually about making comparisons; we ask ourselves whether this policy will 
make the world a somewhat better place as opposed to that policy, and an ideal 
world contributes very little, if anything, to this process of comparison“ (Brown 
2010: 313f.).  
Freeman defends Rawls against Sen’s critique: idealizations help to 
maintain focus on relevant factors, rather than on irrelevant ones. Ideas of 
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justice can thus be clarified and moral convictions held systemized. Locke’s 
social contract doctrine is adduced, which has informed the US-American 
Declaration of Independence and thus had great practical political impact 
(Freeman 2010: n. pag.): “The Constitution doesn’t say that we are to look at 
available alternatives and do what is best. Instead, the abstract rights and 
principles of justice […] have a fundamental regulative role in American society, 
and also provide a primary basis for public justification and criticism of 
government” (ibid.).32 Sen’s comparative approach seems to be suitable for 
cases in which, for example, legislators need to decide between alternative laws 
or political measures, but ideal theorizing is essential for forming long-term 
perspectives and may inform political reforms. Sen’s comparative approach 
cannot meet this task (ibid.). 
 
Ideal theory is not only defensible against the feasibility constraint and the 
assumption that its results are not applicable and thus relevant for real world 
problems; it has also been shown to be a necessary tool. “How could we 
formulate judgments about the justice and injustice of society, let alone promote 
institutional reform, without having an ideal of what a just society would look 
like?” (Valentini 2009: 333). Non-ideal theory depends on ideal theory: as 
reaching ideal theory, or moving closer to it, is the objective of non-ideal theory, 
the second necessarily presupposes the first (LP: 89f.). “To dive into nonideal 
theory without an ideal theory in hand is simply to dive blind” (Simmons 2010: 
34). Even non-philosophers striving for justice have an ideal of what it may look 
like in mind, and adjust their actions towards it. Furthermore, one would not 
know if one’s actions were just if one did not have an idea or concept of justice 
in mind (Simmons 2010: 34-36). Going back to Socrates’s argument, there is 
basically nothing wrong with an ideal that may not exist, but the question may be 
asked how useful that ideal is. This is why Rawls, by means of his realistic 
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 Another reference Freeman puts forward in favour of Rawls is Martin Luther King’s famous “I 
Have a Dream” speech. “The aspirations King appealed to were grounded in political ideals and 
ideal principles and could not have been conveyed by focusing on practicable alternatives 
offered up by the status quo” (Freeman 2010: n. pag.). 
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utopian framework and non-ideal theory, ensures that his international theory 
can be realized, however unlikely that may be. 
 
Having presented and discussed some of the arguments put forward 
against Rawls’s method of theorizing, the focus now shifts to the specific 
problems arising form the ideal-non-ideal-theory divide in LP. What is 
questioned here is not the divide as such, but the problem of ideal agents in 
non-ideal theory.  
1. There should be no room for peoples as ideals in non-ideal theory. 
“Principles ought to be ideal; agency realistically non-ideal” (Ypi: 2010: 551).33 
Rawls should thus leave non-ideal theory to non-ideal actors. Peoples as ideals 
of liberal and decent societies are not only subjects in ideal theory, but also in 
non-ideal theory. To derive principles of fair international cooperation, sketching 
ideally just societies is reasonable. When it comes to applying them to the real 
world, “our strategies for achieving them must take account of how society 
actually is, its non-ideal agents and its existing political structures” (ibid.: 536). 
Peoples are developed within ideal theory. Non-ideal theory should not only deal 
with non-well-ordered regimes, but also with non-ideal liberal and decent 
societies.  
In OP II the representatives act on behalf of the “peoples whose basic 
institutions satisfy the principles of justice selected at the first level” (Rawls 
1993: 41). The representatives thus do not act for liberal states, but rather, for 
the ideal, liberal, democratic societies that Rawls sketches in his domestic 
theory. This idealization may not have an impact on the outcome of the selection 
process, due to the veil of ignorance and the reasonable and rational capacities 
of the representatives, but does make a difference when focusing on the 
conception, and even more so for the later development of non-ideal theory, in 
which Rawls hardly considers the problems that may arise from non-ideal liberal 
and decent regimes (ibid.). In LP, peoples are thus ideal in ideal and in non-ideal 
theory. At least in non-ideal theory, however, the agents, as well as their objects, 
                                                     
33
 Valentini formulates a similar argument: “there is nothing wrong with ideal theorising per se 
[…]. Whether an ideal theory is good or bad depends on whether it entails a false, idealised, 
account of the subject to which it is meant to apply” (Valentini 2009: 355). 
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should be characterized and evaluated according to their non-ideal character 
and agency. 
While TJ designs “principles telling us what a just background ought to be 
like, […] The Law of Peoples design[s] […] principles surreptitiously assuming 
that such a background is in place” (Valentini 2009: 352). In the real world, 
however, peoples do not exist, at least not as ideals. The idealizations used 
during the construction of the OP II and III are “treated as facts about the agents 
and circumstances to which his [Rawls’s] ‘Law of Peoples’ is meant to apply” 
(ibid.: 353). The transition from ideal to non-ideal theory may not be successful, 
as Rawls’s non-ideal theory is too far away from the status quo, from the world 
as it is, which makes LP hard to apply to real world relations and problems (ibid.: 
351-354).  
To idealize for the reasons presented above is acceptable in the realm of 
ideal theory, but when it comes to non-ideal theory Rawls should be aware that 
liberal and decent societies cannot be expected to meet the criteria for 
peoplehood. Rawls relaxes these criteria time and again, for example by 
accepting “peoples with somewhat dirty hands” or by stating that peoples may 
not meet the duty of assistance properly because sympathy for burdened 
societies might not be as strong as common sympathies towards other peoples. 
However, Rawls never explicitly mentions that peoples of both ideal theory and 
of non-ideal theory meet different standards, which leads to the second problem: 
2. Peoples are not ideal agents in non-ideal theory and should thus not be 
defined as such. The concept of peoples as ideals entails full compliance. The 
concept of peoples that Rawls partly uses in LP does not. Peoples in non-ideal 
theory become ideals with reduced standards. “On the assumption that there 
exist in the world some relatively well-ordered peoples, we ask in non-ideal 
theory how these peoples should act toward non-well-ordered peoples” (LP: 89). 
Institutions are needed to motivate citizens and government to abide by the Law 
of Peoples and remove the temptation of corruption (LP: 24). 
Instead of reducing standards for ideals, Rawls should refer to non-ideal 
agents when it comes to non-ideal theory; in LP he is not only trying to answer 
the question of how ideal peoples should relate to non-ideal societies, but also 
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to sketch how real world liberal and decent regimes should relate to other types 
of societies. One possibility, taken up in chapter 6, would be to refer to “aspiring 
liberal and decent regimes” when it comes to non-ideal theory, to states that 
aspire to meet the criteria Rawls considers as necessary for peoplehood. 
Instead of referring to “peoples with somewhat dirty hands” in non-ideal 
circumstance, the definition of peoples as ideals would remain intact and the 
differentiation between ideal liberal or decent peoples in ideal theory and actual 
aspiring or relatively well-ordered liberal or decent societies or regimes, when 
referring to non-ideal real world conditions, would be clearly made.  
 
The ideal-non-ideal-theory divide in Rawls’s international theory may 
rightfully be defended against applicability and feasibility critiques. Rawls’s 
realistic utopian framework and his non-ideal theory provide advice for the 
navigation to Paradise Island. 
However, an at least methodological problem arises from Rawls’s decision 
to also refer to (ideal) peoples in non-ideal theory, without explicitly reducing the 
standards those peoples have to meet. “In short, the agents to which Rawls’s 
[…] [theory is] meant to apply, namely just liberal societies, do not exist, and this 
is why these theories are irrelevant, if not misleading, when applied to real-world 
circumstances” (Valentini 2009: 354). I do not go as far as Valentini does with 
her critique. Rawls’s usage of ideal agents in non-ideal theory is, in some ways, 
misleading, and again simplifies in order to keep the number of parameters 
manageable, for example by excluding internal conflicts within liberal and decent 
regimes. Problems that may arise from non-ideal circumstances and agents on 
the domestic level of liberal societies are to be dealt with in reference to Rawls’s 
domestic theory. The interconnection between TJ and LP is thus prevalent 
throughout Rawls’s theory. There is, however, no domestic theory for decent 
peoples. 
The question now is “whether despite such omissions The Law of Peoples 
offers a plausible theoretical framework for reasoning about what existing liberal 
societies ought to do in order to exercise their international political power 
legitimately, and whether they actually do so” (Valentini 2009: 347). The 
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idealization of liberal and decent peoples beyond ideal theory is a 
methodological weakness, but the results are still of value, and they help to 
criticize and improve real world foreign policies of liberal societies.  
Even if one cannot assume that there are well-ordered peoples as ideals in 
the real world, one can very well assume that there are relatively well-ordered or 
aspiring liberal regimes. Although the construction of Rawls’s international 
theory may, in a friendly way, be described as somewhat cumbersome, it does 
not necessarily lead to the wrong conclusions. Full compliance is not necessary 
for the realization of the principles of the Law of Peoples as long as one can 
assume that under ordinary circumstances, an allegiance to them is given. 
Therefore, principles can be generally realized, even by non-ideal agents (Ypi 
2010: 538, Robeyns 2008: 347). The principles of the Law of Peoples may also 
serve as a guideline for non-ideal, aspiring, liberal (and decent) regimes. 
 Peoples are sketched as a realistic utopia, i.e., as an ideal that should be 
(utopian) and can be (realistic). It remains unclear, however, whether decent 
peoples are a mere construction, existing, or possibly existing. Going back to 
Plato’s picture of an ideal city state, sketching such a state is worth the 
endeavour as long as it can possibly exist (Plato 1991: 499b-c). If one reduces 
the ideal standards, peoples exist, and they should exist. Peoples are states as 
they should be: all societies should become liberal or decent. As Rawls gives 
the known term “peoples” a new meaning within his theory, his understanding of 
“states” too differs from that of states as traditionally conceived. 
 
 
States in The Law of Peoples 
 Rawls usually refers to states either as “states as traditionally conceived” 
(LP: 25, 27) or as “outlaw states” (LP: 4, 5, 9). Outlaw states, for Rawls, are 
aggressive towards their population and/or other regimes, lack a moral character 
and do not respect the principles of the Law of Peoples (LP: 27-29). Rawls 
defines only these outlaws as states. Just as it is not clear what exactly is meant 
by the term “peoples”, the term “state” is also defined and made use of in a 
specific but unclear way. What general characteristics does Rawls ascribe to 
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states? Are all Rawlsian states outlaw regimes? Which references are given 
towards existing or historical regimes and how do Rawls’s states and peoples 
relate to one another? Does Rawls refer to states according to the Westphalian 
idea or is “state” a mere negative print of “people”? Below, Rawls’s 
understanding of states is introduced and clarified by his references to existing 
or historical regimes. It is then discussed whether Rawls’s definition can be 
deduced from the Westphalian model or if it is a negative print of peoples, 
wherefore the relations between peoples and states are put into perspective. 
 
 
Rawls’s Understanding of States 
“States are actors in many theories of international politics about the cause of war 
and the preservation of peace. They are often seen as rational, anxiously 
concerned with their power – their capacity (military, economic, diplomatic) to 
influence other states – and always guided by their basic interests” (LP: 27f.). 
 
 Although Rawls states that he does not want to be seen in line with what 
has been written on the relations between states, he does not clearly distinguish 
his understanding of state from that of his colleagues, contrary to his stipulation 
of peoples. So the Rawlsian definition might be in line with the general 
understanding of the term in the theories of international relations while the term 
“peoples” is a genuine Rawlsian idea. 
 Rawls’s definition of “state” is based on what is generally and minimally 
understood by state, a political unit, fulfilling the three criteria of statehood. 
States possess absolute sovereignty (LP: V, 25), lack a moral character (LP: 17, 
28, 44, 62), meaning the are detached from moral principles and convictions, 
and are without an allegiance to the Law of Peoples (LP: 5). They are always 
guided by their interests, which are rationally pursued, without reasonable limits 
to means or content, including war as a legitimate means to make progress (LP: 
28, 90). Besides their own economic and military power, states’ interests are 
focused on their diplomatic capacities and their influence on other states, 
enlarging one’s territory, increasing military and economic strength, gaining 
glory, or converting other people to the state’s religion (LP: 28). They can be 
summed up in saving and generating power. If a society asks its citizens to fight 
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in the cause of economic wealth, it turns into an outlaw regime (LP: 91). The 
content of a state’s interests and its rational behaviour does not allow it to be 
stable for the right reason (LP: 29), because it is “reasonable interests […] make 
democratic peace possible and the lack of therefore causes peace between 
states to be at best a modus vivendi, a stable balance of forces only for the time 
being” (LP: 45).  
 Even though states are not members of the Society of Peoples, peoples, 
and their concern for human rights, limit the states’ right to war and internal 
autonomy and thus their absolute sovereignty (LP: 42).34 “No state has a right to 
war in the pursuit of its rational, as opposed to its reasonable, interests” 
[emphasis in original] (LP: 91). The political and moral force, Rawls puts the 
second in brackets, of human rights extends to all societies (LP: 80f.). Moreover, 
pursuing their interests puts Rawlsian states at odds with other regimes because 
they threaten the others’ safety as they strive to influence other societies. This 
pursuit may occur in several possible ways. Within their dealings, they ignore 
the principle of reciprocity. This form of rationality excludes the reasonable (LP: 
28f.).35 The danger that these regimes embody for peace and stability is 
demonstrated by referencing to historical regimes. Those references are 
supportive in understanding Rawls’s concept of states. 
 
 
References to Historical States 
 Rawls makes several references to present and historical regimes, mainly 
to the earlier European (nation) states, either as examples, or to explain his 
understanding of states (as traditionally conceived). In addition, he refers to the 
ancient Greek city-states that destroyed themselves (LP: 28) and the democratic 
states fighting as allies in World Wars I and II (LP: 52). 
                                                     
34
 Rawls also writes about an “alleged right to do as it wills with people within his own borders” 
(LP: 26). As indicated earlier, the autonomy in dealing with one’s people for Rawls is wrongly 
granted (LP: 26f.). However, it is unclear if Rawls means that there is a right, wrongly granted, or 
that there is no right, because it is merely alleged. Either way, the Law of Peoples reigns over 
states that have chosen to accept them.  
35
 Rawls draws out reason and rationality as counterparts. However, they might go together. It 
might, in the long run, be rational to act reasonably, meaning in accordance with accepted terms 
of cooperation. 
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 In modern European history, states may have gone to war for whatever 
reason (LP: 41). The “outlaw states of modern Europe” fought dynastic wars and 
sacrificed the lives and interests of their population to those ends. They tried to 
subject Europe to their will, to spread their religion and culture and to seek 
dominion and glory, wealth and territory (LP: 105f.). The European states were 
well organized and economically advanced. The reasons for their aggressive 
politics lay in the underlying culture, their political traditions, their institutions, 
laws and religious beliefs (LP: 106). Their basic structure supported hostility 
towards other societies (LP: 8). Given that they sacrificed the well being of their 
members to their interests, they are to be classified as outlaw states. More 
recent references point to Nazi-Germany (LP: 100).36 
 Focusing on the international realm, Rawls perceives of world politics as 
still being “marked by the struggles of states for power, prestige, and wealth in a 
condition of global anarchy” (LP: 28).37 However, he observes a development: 
“Since World War II international law has become stricter. It tends to limit a 
state's right to wage war to instances of self-defense” (LP: 27). Still, this finding 
does not influence his account of states. 
 Why does Rawls not consider this development in his theory? “States” as a 
negative print of “peoples” would be an explanation. Or does the cause lie in the 
foundations of Rawls’s understanding of “state” in the modern nation state and 
more specifically the Westphalian model? 
 
 
The Westphalian Model of State – Rawls’s Traditional Understanding? 
 Although Rawls does not refer to the Westphalian system, connections 
between his understanding of states and the Westphalian model are obvious. In 
the following, a short sketch of the Westphalian idea of sovereignty and model of 
state are presented, and discussed in relation to the question in how far Rawls 
leans on these ideas. The results might be supportive in understanding Rawls’s 
                                                     
36
 It might be of interest at this point that Rawls himself had experience of war. He served as an 
infantryman in World War II and “lost his Christian faith on seeing the capriciousness of death in 
combat and learning of the horrors of the Holocaust” (Wenar 2008: n. pag.). 
37
 Rawls here cites from Robert Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics (1981). 
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definition of “state” and within that why referring to “peoples” instead seemed 
necessary to him. 
 In the literature on the Westphalian state, different sets of key terms are 
listed: autonomy and territory (Krasner 1995: 115), authority, sovereignty, 
territoriality and citizenship (Caporaso 2000: 8), economic self-sufficiency, 
political homogeneity and unity (Buchanan 2000: 701). Nevertheless, one can 
find an agreement on central aspects. The Westphalian system is one of 
“sovereign states, that is, legally autonomous, territorial, political entities that are 
‘hard-shelled’ with clear defined and effective borders, but which engage in 
regular, systematized relations one with another” (Brown 2002a: 21).38 This 
picture is helpful to theorists of international relations as it enables one to treat 
states as if they were autonomous, rational and unified actors (Krasner 1995: 
115) even though they might not be. The governments of respective regimes 
symbolize this unity and are the relevant actors in the international arena. By 
presupposing unity, the Westphalian concept “in effect denies the existence of 
distinct ‘peoples’ with different conceptions of public order within states” 
(Buchanan 2000: 703).39 Rawls regards not only states, but all types of regimes 
as unified actors.40 
 A further, common aspect is the concept of sovereignty. The Westphalian 
concept is “a double-headed notion” as “rulers were sovereign in so far as they 
accepted no internal equals and no external superiors” (Brown 2002a: 26). This 
mirrors Rawls’s idea of the two powers of sovereignty. The first power 
(autonomy in dealing with one’s people) stems from the Roman concept of 
property. The Westphalian rulers regarded territory and people as their property, 
as something over which they could reign freely as absolute sovereigns. The 
only restriction in doing as they wished lay in the premise that other “land 
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 In Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, Brown provides an overview on the evolving nation state, 
the relation between economic, political and social changes to the development and reign of the 
nation state in international relations, from the medieval to the Westphalian concept. 
39
 Buchanan here does not refer to the Rawlsian peoples but to peoples as traditionally 
conceived: a group of people sharing a common cultural, historical or whatever background and 
not necessarily living in a fixed nation state but across borders, probably even being scattered all 
over the world. Some of the most bloody and cruel conflicts in history were based on conflicts 
between peoples in and across nation states, a problem totally ignored by Rawls. 
40
 Burdened societies here might constitute an exception, as the lack of unity might be part of 
their burdens. 
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owners” may also do as they like, from which a principle of non-intervention into 
the domestic affairs of other nation states can be deduced. Within the 
Westphalian concept, however, the second power, the jus ad bellum, was not 
absolute. Although pre-emptive attacks were justified, even without an 
immediate cause, they had to be justified in some way. States breaking norms 
have to justify these violations, or they loose their own claim to non-intervention 
from others (ibid: 28f., 36, Kratochwil 1995: 25, 41). “[T]hey cannot simply 
declare that they could and would do anything they could get away with in order 
to further their interests” (Brown 2002a: 36). Conclusively, following the 
Westphalian model, international society is norm-governed. Sovereignty 
necessarily needs a principle of non-intervention. Both or none have to be 
claimed and honoured. International sovereignty “cannot be equated simply to 
power wielded by a self-interested (rational) actor, since part and parcel of 
playing the international game consist in recognizing the sovereignty of others” 
(Kratochwil 1995: 25). While the first power of sovereignty is parallel to the 
Westphalian system, the second does not hold true for the Westphalian model in 
the absolute way Rawls puts it. 
 However, the Westphalian system is one of self-centred units; its primary 
principle is self-help. In this aspect, it is close to Rawls’s idea of states again. 
Self-help implies that as there is anarchy in the international sphere, there is no 
higher authority to the state, so that it may “consider any policy that is in its self-
interest” (Krasner 1999: 53). Self-help can thus override the principle of 
respecting the autonomy of the state. “A state might choose to promote its 
objectives by applying external pressure through military threats and economic 
embargoes” (ibid.). Brown reflects Krasner as follows: 
“Rulers are motivated above all else to preserve themselves and will do whatever 
they need to do to achieve this end, including violating the so-called norm of non-
intervention if this is what self-preservation requires. […] States have always 
intervened in each other’s affairs whenever they have felt the need to do so, 
whether for ‘humanitarian’ or purely selfish reasons” (Brown 2002a: 36).  
 
“What self-preservation requires” is unlike “rationally pursuing one’s interests by 
whatever means necessary”. So one could say that Rawls picks up an empirical 
record or assumption connected to the behaviour of nation states and puts it into 
an absolute negative, from states violating rights and duties in cases of self-
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preservation, to states doing so for whatever reason within their rational interest. 
A second aspect, rejected by Rawls but part of the Westphalian system, is the 
moral character of states. Thinkers around the Westphalian concept very well 
attest moral relations between states, such as the duty of benevolence, 
assuming that there is no moral vacuum between states, as there is none 
between individuals (Brown 2002a: 31, 33). 
 As there are no external superiors to Westphalian states, nation states 
legally have to be equal in relation to one another. In Rawls’s Society of 
Peoples, the peoples tolerate each other as equal members however strong or 
weak their economy or military strength might be, and however big or small their 
territory or number of inhabitants are. Rawls claims and assumes this equality 
only for and between peoples in the international realm.41 
 Recent international politics and understandings of the international realm 
are still informed by the set of norms on which the Westphalian system is 
founded. However, the conception is changing.  
“Breaches of the Westphalian model have been an enduring characteristic of the 
international environment because there is nothing to prevent them. Rulers have 
chosen or been forced to accept other principles, including human rights, minority 
rights, democracy, communism, and fiscal responsibility. There has never been 
some golden age of the Westphalian state” (Krasner 1995: 115). 
 
A development towards assigning individuals a legal status in the international 
realm is given. The right to self-defence is restricted to a reaction on a direct 
attack by the UN Charter (Brown 2002a: 35). International law and convention 
intensify the ties between states. The principle of non-intervention includes that 
intrastate-conflicts within the Westphalian system are not subject to international 
law (Buchanan 2000: 703). They are, however, subject to the Law of Peoples, 
which shows first that Rawls does not base all of his types of societies on the 
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 A claim on equality on the international level is not necessarily linked to an equal treatment of 
people in the domestic realm. The people within peoples are only recognized, insofar as they are 
granted a minimal set of human rights and a possibility towards participating in processes of 
political decision-making. On the international level, equality between nation states is postulated, 
although their internal structure may differ extremely from the concept of equality. Referring to 
decent peoples, according to the state religion, unequal treatment of the people within 
Kazanistan is tolerable. Here, a further, though less relevant, parallel to the Peace of Westphalia 
is evident. Within the contract, the Augsburgian principle (cujus regio ejus religio) was accepted, 
according to which the head of state determined the religion of his/her people. A limited religious 
freedom was granted insofar as private worship was allowed to followers of other religions 
(Buchanan 2000: 703). 
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Westphalian concept of states, and second, that existing states and international 
law are not based (merely) on Westphalian principles. 
 As with Rawls’s peoples, societies and states, the Westphalian state is a 
model according to which existing states and systems of cooperation can be 
measured, and according to which principles held by existing states can be 
evaluated. In cases of external sovereignty, the right to war and moral character, 
Rawls negatively exaggerates the features. The idea of equality between states 
is limited to peoples and not even extended to their domestic realm. So, aspects 
of the Westphalian model are not only found in the definition of the Rawlsian 
state, but also in his understanding of peoples and are mixed with the empirical 
fact that states breach the law and disregard rights and duties when pursuing 
their interests. However, this assumption should be limited, if not to “what self-
preservation requires”, then at least to key interests. Recent developments of 
international law, setting limits to the powers of sovereignty, should be 
considered. Still, the possibility that the Rawlsian state is a mere negative print 
of his concept of peoples remains. 
 
 
States and Peoples – Negative Print or Idealization? 
 If states were a negative print of peoples, they should have opposite 
characteristics: peoples are just, states unjust, peoples are reasonable, states 
unreasonable. On several occasions, Rawls presents states exactly as that. 
Peoples are stable for the right reason. States can be stable, but only as a 
temporary modus vivendi (LP: 29).42 States are (naturally) aggressive and 
hostile, while peoples strive for peace between all societies. However, in most of 
Rawls’s references between peoples and states, it sounds as if peoples have 
certain characteristics states simply do not possess, such as “peoples (as 
opposed to states) have a definite moral nature” (LP: 44, 61f.). Peoples have 
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 It is not obvious, why a state, pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, should not be stable for 
the right reason internally. Aggressive states might be able to realize a fair equality of 
opportunity, a decent distribution of income and wealth, etc.. However, within Rawls’s model, 
societies meeting the criteria for stability for the right reason might be regarded as satisfied 
societies, which, according to Rawls, are neither aggressive nor internally suppressive. 
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singular features when compared to states (LP: 27). 
Peoples, then, might be regarded as an idealization of states. States act 
rationally, but peoples do so as well, with the difference that their policies are 
limited by reasonable principles. If states were a negative print of peoples, 
peoples would act irrationally. Whereas it is unlikely that “state” is a mere 
negative print of “people”, peoples might be an idealization of states, lacking the 
morally questionable characteristics, such as aggressiveness, and possessing 
due positive attributes, such as a moral nature. 
“Peoples are thus states twice idealized. First, peoples are states with a moral 
capacity for compelling with a reasonable law of peoples and treating other states 
justly. Second, peoples also are states that reflect a distinctive national community; 
that is, a people is also a nation-state. The Law of Peoples is thus a law for nation-
states capable of a sense of justice” (Tan 2006: 79). 
 
Assuming that peoples are an ideal of states, it is still to be questioned, to 
which idea of state Rawls refers to. The analysis and the tracing back of Rawls’s 
understanding of state to the Westphalian model has shown that Rawlsian 
peoples are not only more just and reasonable than states, but also that 
Rawlsian states are morally worse than states are usually considered to be. 
Their aggressiveness and total lack of moral character are exaggerated, their 
absolute power of sovereignty practically not given, as peoples and the Law of 
Peoples limit state’s sovereignty. This limited sovereignty is similar to that 
granted by international law and convention. So peoples are positively idealized 
states, states as they should be, while Rawlsian states are “negative 
idealizations” of states, states as they should not be. This again leads back to 
the question of whether either of them exists at all and whether it makes sense 
to work with both terms. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Rawls’s idea of peoples is an ideal. He never claims that there are perfectly 
well-ordered societies (Pettit 2006: 45). Many might “say that it is not possible, 
and that utopian elements may be a serious defect in a society's political culture” 
(LP: 6), and they do so with good reason. But one might also require a bit of a 
utopian spirit in order to bring forward the development of a reasonable, just and 
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enforceable international law and of states as they should be, by guiding existing 
societies towards developing a more peaceful, stable and just system of 
international cooperation with which more and more states can act in 
accordance. The model might help with getting closer to the ideal, states 
pursuing their rational interest in the light of reasonable principles. Rawls 
formulates their existence as a hope for the future.  
 Nevertheless, Rawls’s argument for non-existent types of states is critical 
in the framework of a theory that claims to be applicable, to be realistic. Rawls 
argues that his usage of the term “peoples” instead of “states” is to differentiate 
his theory from the traditional understanding of “state”, which would include 
absolute sovereignty, which is wrongly granted. However, this autonomy is 
actually not given anymore. Taking the development of international law in the 
aftermath of World War II into account, a great deal of limitations exist.43 A given 
states’ struggle for power and wealth does not take place in an anarchical 
surrounding, but is, even if not very effectively, regulated by conventions and 
declarations, controlled by international organizations, such as the UN, and 
judged by international courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Accepting reasonable principles by 
signing and ratifying conventions shows that states are capable of acting, or of 
the will to act, according to reasonable principles, to cooperate in a surrounding 
regulated by bi- and multilateral agreements. Actual state policy might not be as 
bad or rational as Rawls proposes but it cannot be as good and reasonable as 
he would like. 
 However, the rational character of states remains dominant. Although 
states willingly act unreasonably, for example by breaking international law, they 
hardly ever willingly act irrationally if no further interest of those in power is 
involved. In cases of a conflict between core interests and reasonable principles, 
governments will certainly pursue their interests, and if necessary, also by 
violating the rights of their members of society or of other regimes. 
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 Consider, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) or the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (UNCAT) (1984). 
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 Referring to the citizen-people parallel, a reasonable character is found 
with citizens and peoples but, for Rawls, not in non-people societies. Having a 
moral character should not mean that one always acts reasonably, but that one 
has the capacity to act reasonably. Just as with individuals, states can act 
reasonably, but might not do so as a rule. Taking up the parallel, one might say 
that people strongly tend to abide to the rules set out in the Law of Peoples, like 
citizens usually comply with the laws set out by their constitutions and legal 
framework. Therefore, reducing the standards, peoples might consist of those 
regimes that strongly tend to abide by principles setting out fair terms of 
cooperation, because they have good reason to do so.44 Those reasons might 
not be found in outlaw states or burdened societies. At least in non-ideal theory, 
why not talk about states, not as traditionally conceived, but as they are today, 
with limited sovereignty, the potential to act according to reasonable principles, 
but not always acting according to those. Here, the citizen-people parallel might 
work: as individuals have the capacity for rationale and reason and may act on 
both, states may also do so. Ultimately, states act through their governments, 
which are composed of individual persons, who possess both capacities. 
 The usage of ambiguous terminology and models weakens Rawls’s 
concept. Based on the minimal definition, states could be understood as not 
necessarily aggressive or unjust, but capable of acting reasonably as well as 
rationally,45 and as sovereign in most fields of political and social decision-
making, but bound to international law and convention and within that, to human 
rights. On the basis of the analysis of Rawls’s terminology, the Rawlsian 
typology of regimes is reviewed in the following chapter. 
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 For an in-depth discussion of this concept see chapter 6. 
45
 Reasonableness might not be a necessary trait for sticking to the principles of the Law of 
Peoples, as in the long run, compliance might serve the state’s rational interest best. “Liberal 
and decent peoples are likely to follow the Law of Peoples among themselves, since that law 
suits their fundamental interests” (LP: 125). 
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3. Rawls’s Typology of Political Regimes 
As indicated earlier, Rawls introduces five types of political regimes, 
distinguished according to liberal-democratic ideas (Herrera 2005: 337): political 
participation, the recognition of (basic) human rights and non-aggressiveness 
towards other regimes.46 The global political landscape is divided into liberal 
peoples, decent peoples, benevolent absolutistic societies, burdened societies 
and outlaw states, though there is room for other types, two of which are 
introduced later in the chapter. 
In the previous chapter, Rawls’s differentiation between societies, peoples 
and states has been introduced and discussed for the purpose of clarifying and 
criticizing his understanding of the terms. Below, the five types corresponding to 
those terms are introduced, to provide a clearer understanding of them and the 
relations between them: In the following sections they are extracted from LP, 
analyzed and put into context one to another. How exactly are the groups 
characterized? How do they differ from one another and are the consequences 
Rawls draws from these distinctions convincing? Why should liberal peoples 
tolerate decent societies and vice versa? First, the five types are presented, 
second, the respective definitions and differentiations are discussed and third, 
Rawls’s concept for interaction between the respective groups is introduced. 
 
 
Well-Ordered Societies 
The concept of well-ordered societies comes from Rawls’s domestic 
theory, where it functions as a model for an ideal liberal democratic society and 
for a just political order (Hinsch 1997: 69). In PL, a well-ordered society is 
defined as effectively regulated by publicly known and justifiable principles of 
justice that are based on an overlapping consensus to which all members 
reasonably agree to, and because of that, acknowledge the basic structure 
established according to those principles (PL: 35). Rawls’s perspective shifts in 
LP; the term “well-ordered” here is not only used to refer to liberal democratic 
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 The last point is not (genuinely) liberal democratic. 
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peoples, but also to societies (LP: 97, 110), regimes (LP: 5, 90, 105) and to the 
Society of Peoples.47 Not the differentiation between liberal and non-liberal, but 
between well-ordered and non-well-ordered is crucial for being a member of 
good standing in the Society of Peoples. Peoples, by definition, are well-
ordered. 
Compliance to the principles of the Law of Peoples is necessary to qualify 
as well-ordered, equivalent to the compliance with principles of justice on the 
domestic level. Members of well-ordered regimes may participate in processes 
of political decision-making, either as citizens in a liberal democracy or as parts 
of groups in a consultation process in decent regimes. For that reason, the 
leaders and officials of a well-ordered society may speak for their people and 
represent them in relation to other societies (LP: 96). Well-ordered regimes do 
not need to be wealthy but must possess a background culture containing 
reasonable political and cultural traditions, and the human capital and know-how 
to establish just institutions (LP: 106). Members of society support their 
respective governments in honouring the Law of Peoples (LP: 18). 
Just as there exist reasonably just, political regimes, so there are degrees 
of well-orderedness and therefore “(relatively) well-ordered societies” (LP: 89, 
105f.). Thus, just as citizens in the well-ordered societies of Rawls’s domestic 
theory strongly tend to act according to the rules, well-ordered peoples in most 
cases, though not always, act according to reasonable principles. Below, the 
special character of liberal peoples is presented and how a well-ordered basic 
structure influences political decision making on an international level is clarified. 
 
 
Liberal Democratic Peoples 
Liberal peoples are the primary subjects of LP. They form the first type of 
domestic society and meet all the criteria of peoplehood introduced in the 
previous chapter. In addition to the elaborations in the previous chapter, further 
specifications need to be made in order to draw a clear picture of liberal 
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 See for example “a well-ordered Society of Peoples” (LP: 109), “a Society of well-ordered 
Peoples” (LP: 105, 111), also found in lower case (LP: 37). 
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peoples. The first feature, a reasonably just constitutional liberal democratic (or 
decent) government, is met; citizens control government through elections (LP: 
23f.). Liberal peoples’ fundamental interests are given by a liberal conception of 
justice (LP: 33). As specified in their constitution, they have no state religion (LP: 
47). Liberal peoples have a proper self-respect, resting on “the freedom and 
integrity of the citizens and the justice and decency of their domestic political 
and social institutions. It rests also on the achievements of their public and civic 
culture” (LP: 47f.). This mirrors the citizens’ sharing of sympathies (second 
criterion) and the society’s moral nature (third criterion of peoplehood). However, 
even liberal peoples are not modelled as fully moral agents. Institutions are thus 
needed to motivate citizens and government to abide by the Law of Peoples and 
to remove temptations of corruption (LP: 24). 
As they acknowledge reasonable pluralism within society, so on an 
international level they tolerate decent peoples as worthy and equal members of 
the Society of Peoples (LP: 4). In the international realm, “a liberal people can 
live with other peoples of like character in upholding justice and preserving 
peace” (LP: 28). Here, Rawls indirectly (and on other occasions directly) refers 
to the democratic peace thesis, which indicates that democratic states do not 
wage war against each other. Rawls supports this thesis but also presents 
arguments for why it might not work in the real world. On the one hand, 
democratic societies can acquire commodities at favourable prices and more 
easily through commerce rather than war, and therefore are engaged in trade 
with one another. Furthermore, they are liberal democratic, so they do not try to 
convert other people’s beliefs and ways of life, and thus have no intention of 
waging war for these purposes (LP: 46), or more carefully formulated “tend not 
to have occasion to go to war with one another” (ibid.). On the other hand, 
democratic peace is only reachable if the relevant regimes are not purely 
formally constitutional democratic, but rather, satisfy stability criteria for the right 
reasons, which are met by all liberal conceptions (LP: 47, 50f.). Assuming that 
democratic states do not attack other states without good reason and do not 
violate human rights, there is no reason for war between democratic peoples.  
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Nevertheless, war between democratic states is not impossible, despite 
the good reasons that exist against it: first the shared democracy, second the 
engagement in mutual trade, and last but not least, the diplomatic ties and 
memberships in international organizations. If democratic peace were to fail, the 
reasons would lie in the institutions and practices of the relevant democratic 
states (LP: 52f.) and in this vein, Rawls certifies several “great shortcomings of 
actual, allegedly constitutional democratic regimes” (LP: 53). Democratic 
governments might pursue, for example, economic interests by covert action or 
concealed as security interests. An example is the foreign policy of the US, 
which allows intervention in weaker countries and has even supported the 
overturning of democratic systems in favour of dictatorships. Advancing towards 
Rawls’s ideal of democratic peoples, wars between democratic states might 
tend to disappear (LP: 53f.). However, Rawls’s Society of Peoples includes 
decent peoples, excluded by the democratic peace thesis. If “other peoples of 
like character” includes decent peoples, the democratic peace thesis would have 
to be extended to a decent peace thesis. While the discussion of a decent peace 
thesis is postponed until chapter 7, the concept of decent societies is introduced 
below. 
 
 
Decent Hierarchical Peoples 
Rawls leaves room for different kinds of decent peoples, but discusses 
only one type, exemplified by means of the imagined Muslim state Kazanistan. 
Other forms of decent peoples might be possible, which, though they do not 
include a consultation process, must be regarded as worthy members of a 
Society of Peoples (LP: 4, 63). How these and their basic structures might look 
is left open.48 Rawls’s understanding of decency is thus central. Therefore, 
Rawls’s idea of decency is summarized first and then his understanding of 
decent peoples is elaborated on. Finally, the imagined state of Kazanistan is 
described to illustrate both. 
Rawls formulates two conditions for a decent people, each combining 
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 A possible second type of decent peoples is introduced in chapter 6. 
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several aspects: first, the society’s institutions have to meet specified conditions 
of political right and justice. Decent societies pursue no aggressive aims49, but 
gain legitimate ends peacefully, through diplomacy or trade. Their underlying 
doctrine is comprehensive and affects the structure and social policy of 
government. That the basic structure of a decent society, and thus its political 
institutions, may be influenced by comprehensive doctrines (in Rawls’s sketch 
the Islamic faith) marks a major difference to liberal societies (Kreide 2002: n. 
pag.). Furthermore, as the political and social order of other societies is to be 
respected by decent regimes, they may only take such influence as is 
compatible with this condition (LP: 64). Secondly, a decent people has to guide 
its members towards honouring the Law of Peoples (LP: 60). This second 
criterion demands a system of law which operates according to the common 
good conception of justice and guarantees core human rights. Additionally, bona 
fide moral duties in accordance with the people’s common good conception of 
justice are imposed on all persons within the society’s territory. The judges and 
officials administering the legal system should sincerely believe that the law 
represents the society’s common good conception of justice and they must show 
their willingness to defend those laws in public, for example in courts (LP: 67). 
The members of a decent society are understood to be decent, rational, 
responsible, able to take part in social life, capable of moral learning as well as 
knowing the difference between right and wrong. As such, they function as 
responsible and cooperating members within the respective groups they belong 
to as part of the consultation system (LP: 65-67). “In the absence of a better 
name, I call societies that satisfy these conditions decent peoples” [emphasis in 
original] (LP: 60). These criteria are also met by liberal peoples (LP: 63). 
The consultation hierarchy functions as follows: In public life, each member 
of society belongs to a group. These groups form representative bodies. Within 
the consultation process, where the interests of all members of society 
according to the common good conception of justice are considered, the 
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 To Moellendorf it seems questionable why decent peoples should be non-aggressive as they 
do not fulfil the criteria used as arguments for the democratic peace thesis (2002: 14f.). Rawls 
justifies his characterization of decent peoples as non-aggressive by virtue of them being 
satisfied societies with a moral character. 
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representatives put forward the interests of group members to the ruler, who 
takes decisions independently but needs to justify his choices to them. 
Government officials are obliged to hear and react upon critique. “Judges and 
other official […] cannot refuse to listen, charging that the dissenters are 
incompetent and unable to understand” (LP: 72). If the dissenters are not 
satisfied with the officials’ explanations, the critique can be renewed and must 
again be reacted upon as long as it stays within a reasonable frame. In addition, 
a right to emigration is granted (LP: 72-74). Whereas liberal systems focus on 
the individual’s interests, the consultation system can attend to the broader 
interest of political life. By showing that the consultation process is a reasonable 
system with merely another focus, Rawls gives reasons for acknowledging 
reasonable pluralism. It is reasonable to focus on individual interests, but as 
well, to consider the well-being of society. As members of associations, 
individuals take part in the process of political decision-making, most of them by 
(s)electing their group’s representatives. To make sure that certain members are 
not being suppressed, and that the representatives are able to understand their 
group’s needs, the majority of those representing the group should be members 
of it (LP: 71-75). This is, however, not a necessary condition. Contrary to 
benevolent absolutistic regimes, which deny every form of political participation 
by the public, for Rawls, the consultation hierarchy grants “a meaningful role in 
making political decisions” (LP: 92).50 
Decent societies may assume different institutional forms, religious as well 
as secular (LP: 64).51 As there may be a state religion, higher political offices 
might be reserved for followers of this belief. Nevertheless, the liberty of 
conscience is granted as members of society are allowed, and may even be 
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 Rawls does not state this directly, but it can be concluded from the differentiation to 
benevolent absolutistic regimes. On another occasion he testifies to a “substantial political role” 
concerning the members of Kazanistan (LP: 64). 
51
 Though Rawls leaves room for other possibilities, he emphasizes Islam as state religion, 
which gives hints that he has explicit countries in mind but still leaves room for other possible 
concepts of societal organization. “In any event, the emphasis on religion is undesirable – the 
argument is much clearer when a state religion is seen as only one of the possible foundations 
for a decent people, and not necessarily the most important” (Brown 2004: 39f.). However, 
Rawls explicitly leaves room for other conceptions of the good and other possible decent 
regimes. 
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encouraged, to practice their respective religious beliefs (LP: 65). Rawls sums 
up the characteristics of a decent domestic society as follows: 
A “decent society is not aggressive and engages in war only in self-defence. It has 
a common good idea of justice that assigns human rights to all its members; its 
basic structure includes a decent consultation hierarchy that protects these and 
other rights and ensures that all groups in society are decently represented by 
elected bodies in the system of consultation. Finally, there must be a sincere and 
not unreasonable belief on the part of judges and officials who administer the legal 
system that the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice” (LP: 88). 
 
Concerning relations with other societies, decent peoples find the 
principles of foreign policy of liberal peoples reasonable (LP: 10). Their 
representatives, situated in an OP III, would adopt the same principles for the 
Law of Peoples (LP: 5, 63f.). They would respect the civic order and integrity of 
other peoples, strive to protect human rights and the good of the people they 
represent, maintain their security and independence, care about the benefits of 
trade and accept the idea of assistance among peoples (LP: 69). 
 
Characterizing decent peoples reveals the possibility of reasonably just, 
non-liberal conceptions (LP: 67f.). Hierarchical peoples are well-ordered, from 
which it follows that “though they are not liberal democratic societies [they] have 
certain features making them acceptable as members of good standing in a 
reasonable Society of Peoples” (LP: 5). Even if there is no equal liberty for all 
members, the comprehensive doctrines the society is founded upon are not to 
be categorized as unreasonable, but merely as not fully reasonable (LP: 74). 
Equally, Rawls categorizes peoples as necessarily not fully just. As such, decent 
peoples are aligned to certain ideals that, even if not fully reasonable and just, 
are worth being respected by others and defended by a decent society, even if 
the principles they choose to follow are not liberal (LP: 92). 
Whether a decent society exists at all is questioned by Rawls, although, 
that it is imaginable that such a society could exist is all that is necessary for 
him. However, if one did exist, it should be respected as a member of good 
standing within a society of reasonable regimes (LP: 75). To present a clearer 
picture of decent peoples, Rawls introduces an imagined example of a decent 
hierarchical society named Kazanistan. 
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Kazanistan is a non-liberal Muslim people functioning as a model that 
meets the criteria for decent peoples. “The purpose of this example is to suggest 
that a decent government is viable” (LP: 75). In Rawls’s view, Kazanistan is not 
totally just52 but decent (LP: 78). It tries to maximize the achievements of 
consultation, for example, by regularly changing the hierarchy to be more 
sensitive towards the needs of the people (LP: 77). So, Kazanistan is not to be 
regarded as a static system but rather, as one that reforms itself from time to 
time. As characteristic for peoples, Kazanistan’s policy is not guided by its 
rational prudential interest. Government is ready to limit its conduct by 
reasonable principles (LP: 27), which gives expression to its moral nature.  
The Muslim rulers of Kazanistan have sought neither empire nor territory. 
Government can rightfully impose duties and obligations on all members of 
society who are, as they are being treated fairly although not as equals, loyal to 
their government. As Islam is the state religion, only Muslims may hold higher 
political offices and thus, they are the main influencers of political decision-
making. Other religions are tolerated and may be practiced. Non-Muslims are 
encouraged to take part in Kazanistan’s civic culture and to maintain a cultural 
life of their own. To strengthen their loyalty, non-Muslims are allowed into the 
armed forces, even into higher ranks (LP: 75-78). In Kazanistan, “dissent has 
led to important reforms in the rights and role of women, with the judiciary 
agreeing that existing norms could not be squared with society's common good 
idea of justice” (LP: 78). However, although women do not necessarily hold 
equal rights as they would as citizens in a liberal conception, they do have to be 
represented as a possible group within the consultation process.53 The 
acceptance and integration of minorities into Kazanistan’s society enhance 
common sympathies between the people of Kazanistan. 
Kazanistan is well-ordered and not aggressive, as its theologians interpret 
jihad in a spiritual and moral, not military sense (LP: 76). It honours and respects 
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 Rawls also questions whether even existing democracies are reasonably just (LP: 75). 
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 The position of women in LP has been analysed and criticized by Martha Nussbaum, who 
claims that Rawls on the one hand is sensitive to the inequalities that women suffer from, but on 
the other hand his attempt to remedy those injustices is half-hearted (see Nussbaum 2002). 
Although women are represented in the consultation system, hold a right to property and formal 
equality, women in Kazanistan still do not enjoy an equal standing as compared to men. 
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the basic human rights and follows the Law of Peoples (LP: 83). These 
principles do not require changing Kazanistan’s religiously based institutions 
according to liberal principles (LP: 121). Kazanistan meets the three criteria of 
peoplehood: a decent basic structure, a moral nature and common sympathies. 
 
The concept of decent peoples has been criticized as implausible, their 
character as a mere stipulation or construction. Why, for example, should a 
society neglecting equality between its members honour human rights? Also, 
Rawls’s hints towards a possible reform of a decent regime into a liberal one 
seem unconvincing insofar as Islamic states are concerned. A division between 
church and state, necessary for a liberal conception, is almost impossible as 
long as Islam is the state religion and sharia the basis of Islamic law (Padgen 
2003: 199). Realistically, decent peoples are implausible (Brunkhorst 2002: n. 
pag.). Rawls might answer that Kazanistan is not totally just, but is decent in that 
it meets certain standards although remaining less just than liberal regimes. 
These standards suffice for it to be accepted as a member of good standing in a 
Society of Peoples (LP: 78f.), which follows from the principle of reasonable 
pluralism. 
Not being approved of, but merely tolerated, decent peoples are second-
class peoples. Throughout LP liberal democracy is regarded as superior to other 
forms of societal organization (LP: 62): “To repeat, I am not saying that a decent 
hierarchical society is as reasonable and just as a liberal society” (LP: 83). The 
central aim of LP is to determine, how the foreign policy of a liberal people 
should be organized (LP: 83). The concept of LP is developed within the 
framework of political liberalism and extends a liberal conception of justice 
towards non-liberal regimes (LP: 9, 23, 30, 36). The “concern with the foreign 
policy of a liberal people is implicit throughout” (LP: 10). Decent peoples serve 
as a means to show that the principles, selected by representatives of liberal 
peoples, are reasonable also to other, non-liberal (and non-Western) societies 
(LP: 58) and that international peace, stability and justice can be supported by 
avoiding liberal imperialism. 
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Decent peoples might be constructed to confirm that the Law of Peoples 
does not conflict with the liberal assumption of reasonable pluralism, to avoid the 
accusation of formulating liberal principles and enforcing them in non-liberal 
regimes. Decent peoples are idealizations that meet the minimal criteria to 
operate as legitimate cooperation partners beyond liberal regimes (Bock 2008: 
51). They are not equals to liberal societies but are nevertheless granted 
equality; when it comes to reasonableness and justness, decency is (morally) 
inferior to liberal conceptions. Accordingly, Rawls refers to “a reasonably just (or 
at least decent) Society of Peoples” (LP: 39, see also 6, 7, 126). Decent peoples 
are primarily relevant as the objects of liberal peoples’ foreign policy (LP: 10). 
 
 
Non-Well-Ordered Societies 
Non-well-ordered societies for various reasons have neither a well-ordered 
basic structure nor an allegiance to the principles of the Law of Peoples. They 
thus do not qualify as members of the Society of Peoples and are the objects 
peoples have to deal with in the realm of non-ideal theory. 
 
 
Benevolent Absolutistic Societies 
Whereas Rawls intensively elaborates on well-ordered peoples and their 
relations to outlaw regimes and burdened societies, benevolent absolutistic 
societies are mentioned on just three occasions. First, Rawls gives a short 
characterization of this fifth type of society, which, more or less word by word, is 
repeated in the second: “they honor most human rights, but because they deny 
their members a meaningful role in making political decisions, they are not well-
ordered” (LP: 63).54 Last but not least, Rawls grants benevolent absolutistic 
regimes a right to war in self-defence, as they honour human rights and are not 
                                                     
54
 To be compared to: “they honor human rights; but, because their members are denied a 
meaningful role in making political decisions, they are not well-ordered.“ (LP: 4) Although 
sounding much the same, there is a slight difference with perhaps not such a slight impact. In 
the chance, from generally honouring human rights to honouring most human rights, the usage 
of “most” might refer to Rawls’s human rights minimalism. 
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aggressive towards other societies (LP: 92). 
Benevolent absolutistic societies do not qualify as peoples because they 
do not grant their members adequate opportunities to take part in processes of 
political decision making. Nevertheless, they do not pose a threat to international 
peace and stability. There is thus no reason for intervention and also no duty of 
assistance, as benevolent absolutistic societies do not want to establish a well-
ordered basic structure.  
Rawls does not deliberate on the role these societies play in international 
relations and how they are to become members of a Society of Peoples. That he 
leaves them totally aside might serve as an additional hint that his major aim is a 
stable international peace, and that benevolent absolutistic regimes are of no 
further interest as they do not threaten it. Furthermore, this type of society might 
only serve as a category of authoritarian regimes that do honour the core human 
rights but do not offer their members of society some role in processes of 
political decision making, thus closing a possible gap between decent and 
outlaw regimes. Whether regimes corresponding to this type exist and thus the 
plausibility of this regime type seems questionable. A further analysis, however, 
is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis.55 
 
 
Burdened Societies 
Societies burdened by unfavourable conditions form the fourth type of 
political regimes. They are neither expansive nor aggressive towards other 
regimes. However, they are not well-ordered for several possible reasons: a lack 
of cultural and civic resources, a too large or undersized population, historical, 
economic or social deficits or “unfavourable conditions” (LP: 5, 90), but seldom 
because of a lack of resources, as almost every country (Rawls only questions 
this in the case of Eskimos) has the resources to maintain a well-ordered 
regime. “Burdened societies […] lack the political and cultural traditions, the 
human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological 
                                                     
55
 The analysis undertaken in chapter 6 illustrates that the existence of authoritarian regimes 
protecting core human rights but denying political participation is unlikely as those states that do 
not qualify as decent (or liberal democratic) do so due to the regimes’ human rights records. 
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resources needed to be well-ordered” (LP: 106). Furthermore, not all burdened 
societies are poor; their non-well-orderedness is not necessarily caused by 
financial distress (LP: 106-108). Chris Brown names oil-exporting countries in 
the Middle East and elsewhere as examples, which have the material wealth to 
establish well-ordered regimes but lack the human capital, or the structures in 
which this can be made useful for society (Brown 2004: 40). As a result, 
burdened societies involuntarily do not comply with the Law of Peoples. 
 
 
Outlaw States 
 Outlaw regimes form the fifth type of domestic society and are marked by 
their deliberate noncompliance with the Law of Peoples (LP: 4f.). They lack a 
moral character and rationally pursue their interest by whatever means 
necessary, including war. They are aggressive towards other states and/or 
violate the human rights of their population. Non-aggressive states that violate 
human rights are thus categorized as outlaws, in the same way as aggressive 
regimes that perfectly well honour the human rights of their respective 
population. Both may likewise be subject to intervention (LP: 90). There are 
different but related motives for deliberate non-compliance to the Law of 
Peoples. In the case of former imperialistic European nation states, Rawls sees 
the cause of their disorderedness as based in the underlying culture, formed by 
false political traditions, institutions and class structures, as well as in their 
religious beliefs and moral convictions (LP: 106). 
 Whereas Rawls in reference to the other types does not directly 
differentiate between government and members of society, he does when it 
comes to outlaw states. The population is not to be held responsible for the 
regime’s domestic and foreign policy, including waging war, as the common 
people might have been held in ignorance or blinded by state propaganda. 
However, even if they knew better, or should or could have known better, they 
are, according to Rawls, not responsible anyway. Even soldiers, except those of 
higher rank, are not to be held responsible as they might have either been 
forced to fight or their patriotism might have been exploited. Those controlling 
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the state apparatus, political leaders and higher officers, are responsible for the 
domestic and foreign policy of a state (LP: 94f.).  
“The lesson of the Holocaust is, rather, that a charismatic leader of a powerful 
totalitarian and militaristic state can, with incessant and rabid propaganda, incite a 
sufficient number of the population to carry out even enormously and hideously evil 
plans. The Holocaust might have happened anywhere such a state came to be” 
(LP: 100).  
 
Rawls needs this idea to be able to accept former outlaw states as members of 
a Society of Peoples when former leaders are displaced. “They are responsible; 
they willed the war” (LP: 95). Here, the differentiation and opposition between 
peoples and states is crucial. If governments act without being authorized by the 
people, it does not represent those people. Those people thus do not function as 
agents, but merely remain present as potential agents (Pettit 2006: 43). 
 That peoples turn into outlaw states, for example by making their citizens 
go to war for dynastic or economical reasons, is a permanently present danger. 
Charismatic leaders can come to power in democratic regimes, the citizens 
might hold unreasonable doctrines, or governments might act covertly. At least 
in the second case, the citizens seem to be responsible for the war. Democratic 
outlaws are thus possible, even though minor breaches of the Law of Peoples 
would only leave them with “dirty hands”, still being member of the Society of 
Peoples. Those dangers can be constrained by increasing sympathies among 
peoples, establishing reasonable institutions and strengthening the background 
culture. 
 
 
Further Possible Types of Societies 
 Whereas Rawls introduces only five types of regimes, these do not 
(necessarily) constitute all there is in the international realm. Room for further 
types is left, in particular when referring to decent peoples, and a discussion 
about further differentiations can already be found in the literature. 
 Discerning between aggressive and non-aggressive outlaw regimes would 
clarify this type in reference to its characteristics (Shue 2002: 308). The two 
characteristics (aggressiveness and the violation of human rights) are both 
sufficient, but not necessary conditions. Regimes have to fulfil just one of them 
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to be categorized as outlaws. In addition to clarifying Rawls’s typology, this 
further differentiation might have consequences for how people would deal with 
those regimes. It is worth questioning whether there is a priority towards 
intervening in states violating their members’ proper human rights, or in states 
which are aggressive towards other regimes or preparing for war. If there were a 
ranking of necessity of intervention, it would be reasonable to make further 
distinctions (ibid.: 314f.). Henry Shue also argues for a further differentiation 
between non-aggressive and aggressive decent states (ibid.: 310). However, 
this category seems unnecessary as peoples showing aggressive politics 
become outlaw regimes. There are, by definition, no aggressive peoples. 
 Almost nothing is said about burdened societies; their respective burdens 
are scarcely mentioned. They might even lack the criteria for statehood, such as 
a clearly identifiable government claiming sovereignty over territory and people. 
It might not be clear whether the regime violates human rights, tolerates human 
rights violations or is simply not able to prevent or stop them. Subtypes of 
burdened societies, such as burdened outlaw regimes (Brown 2004: 37), might 
be favourable. Within LP, there is one comment hinting towards the possibility of 
a state violating human rights or not being able to guarantee them because of its 
weakness. Rawls classifies them as outlaw regimes and within that, peoples 
have a right to war against them. However, it could be more effective, especially 
when considering that the overall aim here is for a more stable, peaceful and 
just system of cooperation, to provide assistance for instead of using force 
against such regimes, if a certain degree of good will is shown in return. In any 
case, intervention might need to be followed by assistance. 
 
 
Modes of Interaction  
 Rawls’s five types of political regimes engage with one another in different 
ways. He focuses, however, on the ways in which liberal peoples in particular 
relate to non-well-ordered regimes and other well-ordered societies.  
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Within the Society of Peoples:  
Why Should Liberal Peoples Tolerate Decent Societies? 
The question formulated in the subtitle is central for LP, and Rawls 
acknowledges that there might be reasonable pluralism concerning the 
answer.56 Generally understood, toleration implies that one believes that what is 
being tolerated is wrong but that there are, nevertheless, good reasons not to 
take action against it. There is room between something being fully reasonable 
and being unreasonable (Bock 2008: 63). The term stems from Latin: tolerare 
meaning “to put up with” or “suffer”, and “refers to the conditional acceptance of 
or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be 
wrong but still ‘tolerable,’ such that they should not be prohibited or constrained” 
(Forst 2008: n. pag.). There are, however, different conceptions of toleration, of 
which Rawls’s is one.57 
Following Forst’s derivation of the term, Tan observes a paradox in the 
idea of toleration: “When we tolerate certain attitudes or practices, we put up 
with attitudes and practices that we consider not fully acceptable, much less 
respectable. Thus, toleration is a paradoxical virtue in that it enjoins acceptance 
of the unacceptable” (Tan 2006: 81). Toleration in LP, for Tan, is to be 
understood differently, as an institutional virtue. The virtue of toleration in this 
sense refers to individuals who “endorse and support institutional arrangements 
that protect reasonable ways of life or practices or attitudes that they also find 
objectionable according to their particular idea of the good” (ibid.: 82). In 
reference to Rawls’s international theory, it would be peoples that endorse the 
principles of the Law of Peoples and thus the basic structure of the Society of 
Peoples (ibid.). 
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 “lt should be noted here that some writers maintain that full democratic and liberal rights are 
necessary to prevent violations of human rights. This is stated as an empirical fact supported by 
historical experience. I do not argue against this contention and indeed it may be true” (LP: 75). 
57
 Forst in his article differentiates between four conceptions of toleration, the permission 
conception, the coexistence conception, the respect conception and the esteem conception, of 
which the third might be the closest to Rawls’s. Whereas the coexistence conception forms a 
modus vivendi where toleration is a mere means to avoid conflict, with the respect conception, 
the relevant parties respect one another. Although they hold different views on certain issues, 
they respect each other as political equals and organize their shared realm according to 
principles they can both agree to without favouring one of the held views over the other (Forst 
2008: n. pag.). 
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To properly understand Rawls’s conception of toleration and as LP is 
meant as an extension of his domestic theory, it is helpful to go back to PL. 
Here, Rawls elaborates on the question of how “a just and free society [is] 
possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of 
resolution” (PL: XXViii). His answer is that a reasonable conception of justice, 
that is adopted by citizens through reasoned, informed and willing agreement 
and that is independent of philosophical and religious doctrines, needs to be 
found. “In formulating such a conception, political liberalism applies the principle 
of toleration to philosophy itself” (PL: 9f.). The grasp of political liberalism must 
be limited to the political sphere and leave room in which individuals may pursue 
their diverse doctrines within a reasonable framework. They may thus organize 
other aspects of life, such as religion or family life, on the basis of different, non-
liberal values. Political liberalism can hence be supported by all and constitute 
an overlapping consensus between all members of society (Tan 2008: 615). “As 
long as a comprehensive view accepts liberal principles as binding in the public 
political sphere […] it lies within the limits of liberal toleration” (ibid.: 616). Still, 
there may be people who are intolerant towards comprehensive doctrines that 
conflict with their own or who violate the rights of others. These actions, 
following Rawls, are informed by unreasonable doctrines and may not only be 
criticized but also challenged by liberal society (ibid.: 615). The limits of 
toleration are set by the reasonable and reciprocity. 
On the international level, the diversity between doctrines and conceptions 
is even greater and, following Rawls, “not all peoples can reasonably be 
required to be liberal” (LP: 122). As with the domestic level, the reasonable and 
the criterion of reciprocity set limits on which conceptions are to be tolerated and 
which are not. As one can only expect others to accept principles that they can 
reasonably agree to, one cannot expect all others to share liberal ideas. When it 
comes to the question of what is tolerable, one has to build on a common and 
not a liberal human reason (Reidy 2004: 310f.). Liberal societies in their foreign 
relations thus must tolerate other societies that are organized in a reasonably 
just way. Following Rawls, this includes decent peoples (Freeman 2007: 431), 
who constitute an analog to reasonable non-liberal doctrines on the domestic 
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level that need to be tolerated within society; consequently, liberal societies 
need to tolerate nonliberal well-ordered societies on the international level. 
Denying them toleration (and respect) would violate the principle of reasonable 
pluralism and imposing liberal principles on them would constitute a form of 
liberal imperialism, both of which Rawls in LP explicitly strives to avoid. 
When it comes to the question of which states qualify as well-ordered and 
consequently need to be tolerated and respected, “we ask: where are the 
reasonable limits of toleration to be drawn?” (Rawls 1993: 37). Rawls names 
criteria – the recognition, guarantee and protection of human rights, the 
participation of the population in processes of political decision making, a right to 
dissent and a common good conception of justice58 – and identifies decent 
hierarchical societies as candidates meeting those standards (LP: 61). 
Supplemental to these criteria, an allegiance to the principles of the Law of 
Peoples is necessary, but not sufficient, to pass the threshold of what is 
tolerable (Bock 2008: 3).59 Decent peoples, meeting the legal and moral 
requirements, are not to be sanctioned by liberal peoples, because they “have 
certain institutional features that deserve respect, even if their institutions as a 
whole are not sufficiently reasonable from the point of view of political liberalism” 
(LP: 84). Decency sets the minimum condition for tolerance (LP: 67f.). Toleration 
for Rawls implies refraining from taking direct influence on another country in 
order to force it towards reform, and to recognize the society concerned as an 
equal member of the Society of Peoples (LP: 59). Approval is not necessarily 
included. 
Societies that do not pass the threshold of well-orderedness do not need to 
be tolerated and, as on the domestic level, may be criticized and challenged: 
“liberal and decent peoples have the right, under the Law of Peoples, not to 
tolerate outlaw states” as they are “aggressive and dangerous; all peoples are 
safer and more secure if such states change” (LP: 81). Outlaw states exist 
                                                     
58
 Missing here, but mentioned on other occasions, is the non-aggressiveness of well-ordered 
regimes. 
59
 Benevolent absolutistic regimes are “tolerated” as well, but not respected as members of good 
standing within the Society of Peoples. 
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“beyond the bound of toleration” and it is thus “permissible to intervene in their 
affairs” (Hutchings 2010: 114). 
 
Historically, hierarchical regimes tend to be oppressive and deny human 
rights (LP: 79). However, decent societies do not and thus differ from classical 
hierarchical regimes in a decisive way. Rawls offers three main arguments why 
non-democratic decent societies have to be tolerated as members of good 
standing within a Society of Peoples and for why there is no reason to take 
active initiatives in order to turn them into democracies. The first, reasonable 
pluralism, is a normative motive, the second, that of effectiveness and 
practicability, a more pragmatic one, and the last, that of self-determination, is a 
well-established principle of international law. 
The relevance of reasonable pluralism has already been explored. As 
David A. Reidy points out, “fundamental interests of human persons are 
historically, socially, and contingently given, and not necessarily universally 
shared. And for that reason it is not the job of political philosophy to make all the 
world liberal and democratic” (Reidy 2004: 310). From the idea of reasonable 
pluralism it follows that liberal states must observe certain principles in dealing 
with decent societies: the principles of toleration, of mutual respect and of self-
determination. 
Toleration, to Rawls, must include respect. Mutual respect is important, as 
a lack of it would lead to bitterness and contempt between peoples (LP: 122) 
and might inhibit a possible reform process (LP: 61). So, mutual respect is not 
only a normative, but also a pragmatic claim.60 In addition, liberal societies must 
leave room for self-determination as liberalism acknowledges that there is more 
than one reasonable way to establish a just society. 
Focusing on effectiveness and practicability, the “Law of Peoples considers 
this wider background basic structure and the merits of its political climate in 
encouraging reforms in a liberal direction as overriding the lack of liberal justice 
                                                     
60
 Rawls “believes that non-liberal societies often are not yet ready to sustain liberal and 
democratic institutions, […] [but] it is not the role of a liberal society’s government to establish 
liberal justice non-domestically in decent societies. That is to be achieved by their own political 
self-determination” (Freeman 2007: 433). 
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in decent societies” (LP: 62). Although the social world of decent peoples is not 
fully just by liberal principles, toleration is required, again because bitterness and 
resentment between peoples may arise (LP: 61f.). Although it is desirable that 
all states should be liberal democratic, the aim of a more peaceful, stable and 
just system of cooperation between political regimes can more effectively be 
reached by toleration and cooperation than by force. Forcing peoples into 
democracy is neither normatively justifiable, nor effective. It seems absurd to 
reasonably force decent peoples into justness and equality. Resentment might 
not only be directed against liberal peoples but also against their ideals and 
institutions (LP: 61). Cooperation, however, can enhance democratic reform. 
“Liberal peoples must try to encourage decent people and not frustrate their vitality 
by coercively insisting that all societies be liberal. Moreover, if a liberal 
constitutional democracy is, in fact, superior to other forms of society, as I believe it 
to be, a liberal people should have confidence in their convictions and suppose that 
a decent society, when offered due respect by liberal peoples, may be more likely, 
over time, to recognize the advantages of liberal institutions and take steps toward 
becoming more liberal on its own” (LP: 62). 
 
Spreading liberal and democratic ideas is more effectively achieved 
through respect and cooperation, and is more reasonable and in accordance 
with liberal ideas. The alternative would be to draw a line between liberal and 
non-liberal, or Western and non-Western. This not only would enhance 
international tension rather than peace and stability, but also does not mirror the 
state world as it is (Brown 2004: 39). Convictions and values can grow from 
within, as existing liberal societies have demonstrated. Intervention by force 
most probably leads to instability. Also, decent peoples neither pose a threat to 
their people, nor to liberal peoples or to the international order (Freeman 2007: 
434). For these reasons, decent peoples  
“must be free to liberalize and democratize in their own way and […] liberal 
democratic peoples must engage in an international politics of persuasion and 
mutual respect always prepared to accept a world within which decent nonliberal 
and nondemocratic peoples choose to remain as such” (Reidy 2004: 312). 
 
 
Although it is “one of Rawls’s many important achievements in LP that he 
presents powerful considerations against the complacent view that liberal 
democracy is the globally correct and enforceable form of political 
arrangements” (Tan 2006: 76), Rawls’s concept of toleration has been widely 
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criticized, among others by Tan. In LP, Rawls relaxes the principle of toleration 
and leaves room for non-liberal political conceptions and institutions (ibid.). What 
has been considered “unreasonable in the domestic context, becomes 
reasonable in the international” (Tan 2008: 619). It seems that Rawls only 
relaxes toleration to enable non-liberal regimes that meet certain standards to 
embrace his principles of the Law of Peoples (ibid.: 620). 
From a cosmopolitan viewpoint, the threshold Rawls sets for toleration 
needs to include the honouring of liberal rights, such as the right to equal 
political representation. Decent regimes would then not pass the threshold of 
what is tolerable (Tan 2006: 84f.).61 Rawls’s analogy of toleration on the 
domestic and international level is therefore considered flawed. Toleration 
allows a reasonable pluralism on moral, religious or philosophical views, but not 
on political ones. Non-liberal political views would be categorized as 
unreasonable (Tan 2008: 619). Cosmopolitan thinkers reject his minimal 
conception of the reasonable. Citizens within a liberal society that hold non-
liberal non-political doctrines still enjoy the freedom to make use of their rights; 
liberal members of a non-liberal society do not (ibid.: 622). “When a liberal 
regulatory framework recognises a decent hierarchical regime as sufficiently 
just, it participates in the denial of freedom and equality to such individuals” 
(Kuper 2000: 651). Toleration of groups within liberal societies and also outside, 
in the form of non-liberal states, should end where the group or state neglects its 
members the “right and freedom to reevaluate and revise the internal practices 
and traditions of the group” (Tan 2008: 625). Toleration can thus not be 
extended to non-liberal societies.  
For many critics, Rawls’s concept of toleration in LP goes way too far and 
misapplies the principle of reasonable pluralism. Tolerance is important on a 
domestic level, to leave room for other reasonable opinions. The domestic basic 
structure, however, needs to be liberal democratic in order to do so. Equally, the 
international order should be liberal democratic and leave room for non-liberal-
democratic views (McCarthy 1996: 217f., Pogge 1994: 216-218). A liberal theory 
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 The argument in this and similar forms can also be found in Beitz 2000, Pogge 2001 or 
Moellendorf 2002. 
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should support liberal values and principles of international justice (McCarthy 
1996: 218). “A political philosophy cannot accommodate another competing 
political philosophy without undermining itself” (Tan 2008: 619). 
Simon Caney goes as far as to claim that respecting decent peoples might 
include tolerating ethnic cleansing as well as discrimination (Caney 2002: 101). 
To illustrate his argument, Caney sketches “a ‘decent’ patriarchal society”, which 
extensively discriminates against women, who are denied suffrage and may not 
hold responsible positions in political life or in economic institutions. When 
women marry, their property is passed to their husband. They are denied the 
right to leave the house and can be flogged in case of adultery (ibid.: 103). 
Caney also states that Rawls is (too) indifferent to possible levels of decency as 
he does not make a difference between societies that might almost meet 
democratic standards and those that are at the bottom of the threshold of what 
Rawls considers tolerable (ibid.: 105).  
Rawls would agree that there are more and less just, reasonable and 
decent societies. However, these differences do not matter when it comes to 
toleration, as every society passing the threshold needs to be tolerated no 
matter how decent, reasonable and just it is. Furthermore, such a differentiation 
is not made referring to liberal regimes, and also not called for. Regimes can be 
more or less liberal, but the degree of liberalness has no influence on whether 
that society is accepted as a cooperation partner or not. By pointing towards the 
reasonable character of (decent) peoples, Caney’s first claim is also to be 
rejected. Focusing on racial discrimination, Rawls leaves room for denying non-
Muslims access to higher political offices, and only to those, but not for denying 
them medical care or marriage (see Caney 2002: 101). Minorities are not 
excluded but need to be represented within the consultation system, and 
government also needs to justify political decisions towards them. The society 
Caney sketches is far from what Rawls considers to be decent hierarchical. 
Rawls emphasizes that the interests of women must be represented in the 
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consultation system (LP: 75, 78,110). Minorities are not vulnerable to wanton 
prejudice.62 
Caney, like others, thus misunderstands Rawls’s characterization of decent 
peoples and consequently, the threshold for what is tolerable from his liberal 
viewpoint. “By democratic standards, most states throughout human history 
have been oppressive (and illegitimate), but those are not necessarily or usually 
the standards by which they are judged among their own people” (Walzer 1980: 
218). It cannot generally be argued that political choices that are not made 
democratically, cannot be considered as the free choices of a community. Also, 
an authoritarian basic structure it is not necessarily a “sign of some collective 
derangement or radical incapacity for a political community” but might, as a 
consequence of the society’s culture or history, reflect “a widely shared world 
view or way of life” (ibid.: 224f.). From Rawls’s perspective, “tyrannical and 
dictatorial regimes must be outlawed, and also, for basic liberal reasons, 
expansionist states conducting wars of religion” (Rawls 1993: 66). Non-
democratic, well-ordered regimes, however, must be tolerated. 
The main point of critique remains the claim that there is only room for 
reasonable pluralism within a liberal society. Toleration would then mean that 
only liberal societies are tolerated which is not tolerance according to liberal 
thinking (Bock 2008: 39). For Rawls, this argument violates not only the principle 
of self-determination, but also liberal principles. When it comes to human 
persons, there is no globally shared self-understanding or ideal of how just 
relations between persons should operate. That individuals need to be free and 
equal is a liberal idea, but following the principle of reciprocity, one cannot 
expect all human beings, and the societies they live in, to share this 
understanding. “To ground principles of international justice in such a self-
understanding or idea(l) is to sacrifice (out of impatience?) the liberal 
commitment to reciprocity within a common human reason on the altar of one’s 
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 Minorities “are not […] treated as inferior by Muslims in public or social relations. To try to 
strengthen their loyalty, the government allows that non-Muslims may belong to the armed 
forces and serve in the higher ranks of command” (LP: 76); see also: “As I imagine it, this decent 
people is marked by its enlightened treatment of the various non-Islamic religions and other 
minorities” (LP: 67). 
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preferred conception of international justice” (Reidy 2004: 310). If one considers 
the principle of reciprocity and tries to establish a concept of the person that may 
be grounded on a common human reason, one might end up with Rawls’s 
conception of well-ordered liberal and decent societies, within which every 
individual enjoys the social conditions for personhood (ibid.: 310f.); “neither 
history nor a common human reason show decisively that a people must be 
liberal and democratic to secure for its members the social conditions necessary 
to their moral status as persons, not free and equal persons, but just persons” 
(Reidy 2004: 310). 
 Another common argument put forward against the toleration of decent 
societies is the fate of liberal individuals or groups within decent societies.  
“The problem of tolerating decent peoples is that it lets down dissenting individual 
members in these nonliberal societies […]; they [liberal societies] are not even 
permitted to take sides in internal disputes for this would be at odds with the ideal 
of mutual respect and recognition” (Tan 2006: 85). 
 
By tolerating decent societies, Rawls allows hierarchical governments to impose 
their views on others. He allows liberal persons or groups to be denied a voice 
and equal rights. By claiming respect for decent peoples, he denies them 
respect (Caney 2002: 100). In each decent people, there will be individuals that 
hold liberal viewpoints and strive for liberty and equality: “There is no Islamic 
nation without a woman who insists on equal rights; no Confucian society 
without a man who denies the need for deference” (Ackermann 1994: 382). 
These liberals may even constitute the majority of members of society. Liberal 
peoples need to take sides and “why should they choose to betray our own 
principles and side with the oppressors rather than the oppressed” (ibid.: 383)? 
Ackermann rejects the right to resist interference as justification: it is also a 
Western conception and less important than public reason. Liberals should thus 
not give it priority when it comes to liberals in non-liberal states (ibid.).  
Although liberal persons in non-liberal societies are not granted the full set 
of liberal rights, there are certain provisions that ensure that their voice may not 
be silenced. They too are represented within the consultation process and 
granted a “substantial political role […] in making political decisions” (LP: 64). 
They may formulate dissent to the political decisions their government makes, 
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thereby forcing justification of those decisions (LP: 71f.). Also, decent (and 
liberal) peoples are not generally free from being criticized by other peoples; in 
cases of human rights violations or the suppression of minorities, peoples, 
liberal and decent, may very well be criticized (LP: 38). 
A further argument, pointing towards a similar conflict, is that liberal 
peoples should provide incentives to encourage reform of decent regimes in a 
more liberal direction. Rawls rejects this claim concerning liberal governments. 
By providing incentives for reform, liberal governments might raise conflicts 
between members of the Society of Peoples and disturb the climate of mutual 
trust and the growing sympathy between the cooperating members. 
Furthermore, interference would collide with the principle of self-determination. 
International organizations, such as the UN, should also not provide such 
incentives. Incentives are only legitimate if non-liberal peoples ask for funds or 
other forms of assistance in order to be able to reform themselves (LP: 84f.). 
Therefore, liberal governments should not criticise decent practices, as long as 
they do not pass the threshold of the tolerable. Individuals in liberal societies, 
however, are free to use their freedom of expression and criticize decent 
peoples and their practices. They may also promote liberal values in a peaceful 
way and fund democratic reform (LP: 85, Tan 2006: 83). “Liberal citizens and 
associations have full rights (perhaps even duties according to their 
comprehensive views) to publicly criticize the illiberal or undemocratic character 
of other societies, and can boycott them if they choose” (Freeman 2007: 432). 
 
The discussion that has emerged around Rawls’s understanding of 
toleration in LP seems partly mislead by a misunderstanding of Rawls’s idea of 
decent peoples. Rawls’s argument is not that decent peoples are as reasonable 
and as just as liberal societies. “The argument is that decent hierarchical 
societies should be tolerated, and, of course, toleration is not the same as 
approval” (Brown 2004: 38). Rawls is aware of the fact that decent hierarchical 
peoples are not perfectly just (ibid.) and there is “little doubt that Rawls believes 
political liberalism to be the best organizing principle […] but wants to see the 
progressive liberalisation of international society achieved through the more 
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stable procession of consensus between states” (Sutch 2001: 186). Rawls does 
not want to suspend liberal ideas, but to ensure that liberals stand up to their 
own standards when it comes to nonliberal but reasonable conceptions.  
To decide decisively whether liberals should or should not respect non-
liberal societies that meet certain standards very much depends on where the 
line is drawn, where the threshold for toleration is situated. As Rawls is not really 
clear on what kind of actual society he is referring to when talking about decent 
peoples, it is hard to judge whether they should be tolerated. Denying that any 
society that is not organized according to liberal principles might have a right to 
be tolerated and thus to self-determination and non-intervention however, goes 
too far. This claim can, as Rawls does, be rightfully rejected as culturally 
imperialist and intolerant. 
“Sometimes there is simply a plurality of ‘right’ answers. The idea that there is only 
one kind of just society – a liberal society defined by principles set out in Rawls’s 
model – and that all others represent a falling off from this ideal does not seem a 
plausible response to the pluralism that undoubtedly exists in the modern world” 
(Brown 2010: 313). 
 
As Rawls puts it, if “all societies were required to be liberal, then the idea of 
political liberalism would fail to express due toleration for other acceptable ways 
(if such there are as I assume) of ordering society” (LP: 59). When drawing the 
line of the acceptable or tolerable “Kazanistan is the best we can realistically – 
and coherently hope for” (LP: 78). Rawls therefore, does not sketch a liberal 
international order, but instead, one that liberals might accept as tolerable 
(McCarthy 1996: 212). 
 
 
Why Should Decent Peoples Tolerate Liberal Societies? 
 Why should decent peoples, for example, negotiate, sign and honour a 
social contract with countries that to them most likely are represented by 
disbelievers? The addressees of LP are the governments of liberal societies and 
the viewpoints of decent peoples are hardly considered. A convincing answer to 
the question, however, is essential for LP, as well as for the decent peace thesis 
elaborated in chapter 7. Though Rawls does not directly discuss this question, 
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several arguments in favour of toleration of liberal peoples by decents can be 
deduced: decent peoples share interests with liberal societies, minimally that of 
a peaceful and stable international order. Also, they profit from cooperation. As 
they are satisfied with the status quo for the right reason, they do not pursue 
aggressive foreign policies. In summary, if they are respected by liberal regimes, 
they have no reason to reject this cooperation, but plenty of good reasons to 
accept it. Furthermore and more importantly for Rawls, the principles of the Law 
of Peoples constitute an overlapping consensus between liberal and decent 
peoples; representatives of decent peoples reasonably agree to those 
principles. On the basis of these norms, fair terms of cooperation are 
established. 
 
 
Outside the Society of Peoples: The Duty of Assistance and the Right to War 
 In order to convey an idea of how the interaction between well-ordered and 
non-well-ordered societies could be imagined as well as to discuss Rawls’s 
concept, the duty of assistance and the limited right to war are elaborated on.63 
Focusing on the duty of assistance, however, only its content and role within LP 
is introduced to present a complete scheme of the modes of interaction whereas 
the discussion of it is postponed to the next chapter in which the principles of the 
Law of Peoples are analysed. 
 “The Law of Peoples establishes, as a long-term goal of liberal foreign 
policy, the elevation of burdened societies to a point at which they can sustain 
liberal or decent institutions for themselves” (Beitz 2000: 688). The duty of 
assistance is an instrument to expand the “narrow circle of mutually caring 
peoples in the world today” (LP: 113). It aims to provide burdened societies, 
which are willing to but not capable of establishing a well-ordered basic structure 
on their own, with the means necessary to manage their affairs in a reasonable 
                                                     
63
 Rawls never deliberates on the question of how the relations between burdened societies and 
outlaw states should be. Do outlaw states have a duty of assistance towards burdened 
societies? And do burdened societies have a right to war against outlaw regimes? If there were 
no guidelines on how non-peoples are to relate to one another, they would be in a constant 
anarchic state; “most of the actually existing nation-states in the world today are simply in a 
general state of war of all against all” (Shue 2002: 310). 
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manner and eventually become a member of the Society of Peoples (LP: 111). 
The ultimate target is thus to enable burdened societies to establish a politically 
autonomous well-ordered basic structure. To do so, members of society need to 
participate in the social and political life of the community; their basic needs64 
thus need to be met (Freeman 2007: 454). “The force of the duty of assistance 
seems to arise […] from the importance for liberal societies of enlarging the 
Society of Peoples to include, eventually, all societies of the world”, arguing that 
“the chances for peace would be greater in a world in which all societies had 
been lifted out of burdening conditions” (Beitz 2000: 689).  
The duty of assistance is not (only) a humanitarian duty of aid. It is a 
substantial duty of justice that “involves a notion of publicly recognized want that 
gives rise to specific claims of need” [emphasis in original] (Hinsch 2001: 66). 
This want is at hand if a person needs a good, such as clothes, to realize a 
value, such as health or self-respect, which is of morally high importance. To 
withhold such goods from that person is a moral wrong (ibid.: 67). It is, however, 
not a legal duty as that would imply measures (and institutions) to enforce it. It is 
rather a duty of virtue that peoples as moral agents have (Bock 2008: 106). 
Well-ordered peoples with an allegiance to the Law of Peoples should support 
others to establish well-ordered structures on their own (Cavallero 2003: 184). 
The duty of assistance has a target and cut-off point and it does not need 
international institutions that constantly mitigate inequalities. It is thus a principle 
of transition: it only holds until its aim is reached. Given that the attained, well-
ordered basic structure contains a reasonable degree of justness and stability, 
the duty of assistance has no further reach (LP: 119). 
 How the duty of assistance can be best met is a highly difficult question. 
Neither simply throwing in funds nor coercive force are suitable means of 
assistance. Concrete advice and support for the specific burden are needed. As 
the political culture of a society is important, peoples must assist burdened 
societies in changing their political and social culture. In addition, the importance 
of human rights should be emphasized. Honouring core human rights is 
                                                     
64
 “By basic needs I mean roughly those that must be met if citizens are to be in a position to 
take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of their society. These needs include 
economic means as well as institutional rights and freedoms” (LP: 38). 
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necessary for a well-ordered society and supports the well-being of the citizens 
(LP: 108-110). Assistance must also focus on eliminating corruption and 
establishing the rule of law, on providing adequate economic resources as well 
as the capacity to use them and to establish well-ordered institutions (Freeman 
2007: 440f.).  
Simply lifting people out of destitute conditions while leaving them economically or 
culturally impoverished is not sufficient. […] It may require a great deal more 
ongoing developmental assistance from advantaged peoples for education, 
infrastructure, agriculture, technology, cultural development, etc., until a burdened 
people is capable of political, economic, and social independence” (ibid.). 
 
Furthermore, assistance does not have a direct impact on the distribution of 
wealth and income in the society receiving assistance. This is left to the 
responsibility of the respective society (Beitz 2000: 688). The duty of assistance 
might even include humanitarian intervention if one does not regard it as only a 
duty referring to the regime in power, but also as a duty towards the individuals 
living under its reign. It is possible that the burdens impeding the people from 
establishing a well-ordered basic structure are exactly the policies of the regime 
in power. These considerations link back to the possibility of burdened outlaw 
regimes. This possibility is important in another respect. Outlaw regimes, and 
thus also the people living in such states, are excluded from assistance “since 
the leading elite is not interested in establishing a fair or decent social structure” 
(Kreide 2002: n. pag.). It seems unfair to exclude those people that might be 
equally suffering and might be “too exhausted or too oppressed to change the 
situation” (ibid.). Meeting their basic needs seems as pressing as it is for 
individuals in burdened regimes. 
In order not to become burdened themselves, peoples need to follow the 
principle of just saving: its purpose is to establish reasonably just, basic 
institutions and secure the social welfare of the people. If those institutions are 
established, the existing stock must be maintained and no further saving is 
necessary (LP: 106f.). Also, there is a duty of assistance towards other peoples. 
This duty takes grasp in cases of famine or drought or natural catastrophes. 
Provisions for such events have to be taken (LP: 38). 
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 Although LP for Rawls is an extension of his domestic theory to the 
international level, the duty of assistance does not mirror the principle of 
distributive justice Rawls suggests for the domestic structure of a liberal society, 
a fact that has greatly disturbed those who built on Rawlsian thinking. But what 
exactly is the difference? The duty of assistance raises the claim to “Give to 
those who are in need of help.”, whereas the difference principle demands one 
to “Give to the least privileged.” (Hinsch 2001: 66). Whereas the duty of 
assistance is a threshold norm, distributive justice is a maximizing norm (Trujillo 
2004: 83, Hinsch 2001: 68). It is meant to “maximize the income or wealth of the 
least-privileged members of a society” including to a level beyond their basic 
needs (ibid.: 67). 
When looking for a parallel to Rawls’s domestic theory, the duty of 
assistance comes close to the basic needs conception combined with a principle 
of just saving. Whereas on the domestic level, the basic needs of citizens need 
to be met in order to enable them to practice their rights and liberties, on the 
international level, regimes need to possess the means necessary to establish 
and maintain a well-ordered basic structure. Inequalities beyond that do not 
need to be regulated (LP: 114). With respect to the principle of just saving the 
link runs as follow: as societies on a domestic level only need to save resources 
up to the point where they can ensure a decent life for their people and the 
maintenance of just, functioning institutions, there is no further need to save and 
there is no further need for assistance on an international level as soon as the 
cut-off point is reached (Beitz 2000: 688). The role of the duty of assistance as 
the last of Rawls’s eight principles and possible alternatives or additions are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
 
 Though Rawls does not explicitly designate it as a principle, he formulates 
a limited right to war held by well-ordered societies towards outlaw states. As 
indicated earlier, the principles of self-determination and non-intervention are 
overruled in cases of gross violations of human rights, which Rawls does not 
specify any further, and of (unreasonable) aggressive foreign policies (LP: 37). If 
outlaw states show an aggressive character and follow expansionist aims, they 
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become a threat to the security of peoples and their free institutions. Therefore, 
peoples have the right to attack such societies to protect their territory, people 
and culture (LP: 48, 94). War, however, is only the last resort. States violating 
human rights are to be put under pressure through the denial of assistance and 
cooperation (LP: 93).  
 Rawls also formulates a right to attack non-aggressive outlaw regimes 
even without referring to human rights protection and aggressions towards other 
regimes. Intervention might be justified if outlaw states simply do not comply 
with the Law of Peoples. “The Society of Peoples needs to develop new 
institutions and practices under the Law of Peoples to constrain outlaw states 
when they appear” (LP: 48). Outlaw regimes constitute a threat to the Society of 
Peoples. So, even pre-emptive war may be justified. “One strong state 
possessed of military and economic power and embarked on expansion and 
glory is sufficient to perpetuate the cycle of war and preparation for war” (LP: 
48). By legitimizing pre-emptive war, Rawls opens the door to misuse of force. 
However, as peoples, as rights holders, limit their rational interests by the 
reasonable, they are unlikely to misuse this right. Furthermore, Rawls is not far 
from state practice. It is legitimate to ask how “many states have actually waited 
– once they discovered that they were going to be attacked – how many states 
have actually waited until the attack became imminent? The question of course 
answers itself: there is no such practice” (Glennon 2006: 310). 
 In agreement with Walzer, Rawls might argue that “[a]gainst the 
enslavement or massacre of political opponents, national minorities, and 
religious sects, there may well be no help unless help comes from outside” 
(Walzer 2006: 101). The use of force, for Rawls, is justified if it stops intolerable 
circumstances and maintains international stability, to which outlaw states pose 
a threat. It is not legitimate, however, to intervene merely in order to reform a 
society into a well-ordered regime (Beitz 2000: 685).  
According to his critics, Rawls does not properly justify intervention in order 
to stop gross violations of human rights.  
“A people’s motivation to act on the principles Rawls proposes does not spring 
from any ground-level concern for individual welfare. When one people intervenes 
in another people’s affairs […] the intervening country does not do this for the sake 
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of the well-being of the tortured or the starving individuals in the other country […]. 
Rather, the intervening country is trying to bring the other country (back) to 
legitimacy so that it can play its role in the society of peoples” [emphasis in original] 
(Wenar 2001: 90). 
 
Intervention for the sake of international stability does not consider a moral level 
as well as the value of human rights (Beitz 2000: 685):  
“[T]he reason why people have human rights not to be tortured does not seem to 
be that regimes that torture are dangerous to other regimes: although the latter fact 
(if it is a fact) might justify intervention, it does not imply anything about the moral 
situation of the tortured” (ibid.). 
 
Beitz is not wrong when stating that Rawls justifies intervention with 
reference to international peace and stability, and Wenar too is not wrong in 
claiming that intervention is a means to “bring the country (back) to legitimacy”, 
but this is not the whole truth. A limited right to war exists within the Rawlsian 
framework, justified in cases of self-defence and to protect human rights, for the 
sake of international peace and stability and for the sake of the people suffering 
from these gross violations. The limited right to war gives peoples the means to 
stop policies that are beneath the threshold of what is reasonable and tolerable. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Rawls’s typology of political regimes functions on the basis of models. Are 
the lines between these five types well drawn? What about, for example, liberal 
regimes with reasonably just basic structures waging wars of aggression? Within 
Rawls’s model, these regimes would clearly fall into the category of outlaw 
states.  
 Further to the three criteria for peoplehood, more characteristics are 
needed to differentiate between liberal and decent regimes, such as the concept 
of citizenship and formal equality of the members, and the democratic or 
hierarchical structure of the political regime. Additional differentiations of regime 
types and modes of interaction may be reasonable and advantageous when 
applying Rawls’s model to the international realm, for example burdened outlaw 
regimes. The people there might be equally suffering from malnutrition and 
poverty, but the regime by which they are ruled not willing to establish a well-
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ordered basic structure. How shall the people there be assisted? Assistance 
might imply intervention, or it might follow intervention to reform a system that 
has been ruled by an outlaw regime. As a model, however, and for the sake of 
limiting the variables to a manageable degree, Rawls’s typology constitutes a 
fruitful basis for understanding his concept and for discussing other elements of 
his theory. The principles of the Law of Peoples, to take an example, may 
equally apply to five as to seven regime types (the extra two coming from 
including burdened outlaw regimes and differentiating between aggressive and 
non-aggressive outlaws). 
 For now, reasonable pluralism and the possibility of enhancing democratic 
reform via cooperation, as an alternative to liberal imperialism, are strong 
reasons for accepting decent societies as members of good standing in the 
international realm and for offering them fair terms of cooperation. Equally, there 
are good reasons for decent peoples to cooperate fairly with liberal regimes. 
“Rawls surely hopes for a world within which all peoples are liberal and 
democratic. But he hopes even more deeply that we can find our way to that 
world without violating the demands of reciprocity within a shared human 
reason” (Reidy 2004: 305). If this is the case, Rawls is not too far from the 
cosmopolitans, as, after all, he would wish for an all-embracing society of liberal 
peoples. However, he wants to show that a realistic (utopian) path to get there, 
while remaining true to liberal principles such as reasonable pluralism is 
possible. The principles of the Law of Peoples explored in the following chapter 
constitute a central element of this path. 
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4. The Principles of the Law of Peoples 
“The possibility of a peaceful international life, in which liberal societies can 
flourish, depends upon finding a basis on which reasonable and decent peoples 
can cooperate willingly given the international analog of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism” (Beitz 2000: 672). In LP, Rawls tries to identify the most appropriate 
set of principles according to which relations between societies can be 
organized in an as peaceful, stable and just manner as possible, in short, the 
principles of the Law of Peoples. These are the general and basic norms of 
political justice that regulate the relations between peoples and non-well-ordered 
regimes, and they “can and should be accepted” by peoples (LP: VI, 3, 35, 37). 
They form the “Charter of the Society of Peoples” (LP: 85, see also Beitz 2000: 
673). Rawls does not aim at a multilateral contract between sovereign states, 
but at peace, built on general norms, which also allows for intervention into the 
domestic policies of states (Becker 2005: 52). 
The principles of the Law of Peoples are not only central, but also 
eponymous to Rawls’s international theory. Whereas particular principles, such 
as the human rights minimalism, have been broadly discussed, a detailed 
elaboration covering the complete set of principles is, as yet, absent in the 
secondary literature. Furthermore, Rawls does not present much justification for 
the selection of the relevant principles. Such an analysis is, however, worth 
pursuing as it not only clarifies this element of Rawls’s international theory, but 
also provides theoretical support for evolving and existing norms of international 
conduct. How does Rawls arrive at this particular set of principles? What is their 
precise character and how are they to be understood within the Rawlsian 
framework as well as within the sphere of international relations? 
In the previous two chapters, the subjects and objects of LP have been 
explored and reviewed. The present and subsequent chapter shall clarify and 
discuss central elements of Rawls’s international theory (the principles of the 
Law of Peoples and the Society of Peoples) as well as suggest fruitful 
amendments to it. Possible contributions to more peaceful, stable and just 
international relations shall be highlighted. The chapter at hand examines the 
nature of the principles of the Law of Peoples. Therefore, first, the theoretical 
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background is explored. In a second step, the content of the principles is fleshed 
out and analyzed. What the chapter is not intended to be is a general inquiry into 
the nature and content of international law. Therefore, a general discussion of 
questions about the justness of war or the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention shall be avoided. An exploration of Rawls’s principles and their 
content and relation to international law shows how Rawls’s realistic utopian 
ideal corresponds to existing international norms, and whether it may serve as a 
guideline for future international relations. 
 
 
The Second and Third Original Position –  
How the Principles of the Law of Peoples Are Selected 
Laying out the principles of the Law of Peoples, Rawls begins with a 
second OP, thereby relying on a method set out in TJ. On the domestic level, 
the principles of justice provide a content of public reason; within the Society of 
Peoples, this is provided by the principles of the Law of Peoples (LP: 18). The 
moral character and fair terms of cooperation between members in the domestic 
case lead to the principles of justice, and on an international level, to the 
principles of the Law of Peoples (LP: 25). 
 In the OP II, representatives of liberal peoples are put behind a veil of 
ignorance. As in the OP for democratic societies, the representatives are 
modeled as rational and reasonable agents (LP: 32). Basic fairness is 
guaranteed by equal representation (LP: 41, 60, 115). Furthermore, the 
representatives have access to general information and theories they need to 
select reasonable principles, but the veil hides specific knowledge of the society 
they represent to ensure that the principles are going to be fair. The 
representatives, for example, know neither the size of their territory and 
population, their military capacities, the extent of their natural resources, nor 
their level of economic development. They know, however, that they represent 
liberal democratic societies and that “reasonable conditions obtain that make 
constitutional democracy possible” (LP: 32f.). 
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 Just as with the domestic OP, one should assume that the representatives 
of liberal peoples also know some “general facts”, such as “the facts that, 
historically, political and social unity do not depend on religious unity, and that 
well-ordered democratic peoples do not engage in war with one another” (LP: 
16). Rawls claims that there are four basic facts, four truisms that can be 
identified by reflecting on history and political experience, namely reasonable 
pluralism, democratic unity in diversity (“This is the fact that in a constitutional 
democratic society, political and social unity does not require that the citizen’s 
be unified by one comprehensive doctrine”; LP: 124), public reason and liberal 
democratic peace (LP: 124f.). Nevertheless, Rawls also turns against a claim 
that is supported by history, that is, the fact that hierarchical regimes tend to be 
oppressive. Against this fact, Rawls, without any further justification, assumes 
that decent peoples at least could exist (LP: 79). 
 By constructing what the representatives know and what they do not know, 
Rawls tailors his OP II, as he did in TJ, in a way that does not leave much room 
for anything other than the designated results. A second hint to this conclusion is 
the fact that the representatives are to select principles from an available set 
(LP: 32). “These familiar and largely traditional principles I take from the history 
and usage of international law and practice” (LP: 41). Representatives of well-
ordered peoples have no menu of alternative principles and ideals to select 
from. They “simply reflect on the advantage of these principles of equality 
among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose 
alternatives” (ibid.). In TJ and PL, the representatives may choose between 
different conceptions of justice, such as utilitarianism, liberalism or 
perfectionism. In LP, possible rival principles are not even considered (Tasioulas 
2002: 377f.). The “absence of rival principles in the second original position 
contributes to an overwhelming sense of argumentative deficit” (ibid.). 
The selection process and the principles must meet certain standards. 
They must serve the society’s fundamental interests; they have to make the 
society’s relations stable for the right reasons and meet the criterion of 
reciprocity (LP: 41, 45). The principles selected in the OP II are autonomous 
from the principles of justice, meaning they also apply to well-ordered peoples 
 102
that do not maintain a basic structure organized on the basis of the principles of 
justice (LP: 86). The Law of Peoples thus must not only be reasonable from the 
viewpoint of liberal societies, but also from the perspective of other reasonable 
peoples (LP: 57). 
The parties in the OP II would adopt the same principles that “you and I”65 
would consider as fair when referring to specifying terms for mutual cooperation 
(LP: 45), which, according to Rawls, would be the following: 1. a duty to respect 
other peoples’ freedom and independence, 2. a duty to observe treaties, 3. a 
duty to consider equality between all parties, 4. a duty of non-intervention, 5. a 
right to self-defence, 6. a duty to honour human rights, 7. a duty to observe 
restrictions in the conduct of war and 8. a duty to assist burdened societies (LP: 
37).66 
Rawls states that the list is incomplete. If the Law of Peoples were 
complete, it would contain principles for all politically relevant subjects and 
consider governments and citizens. It would include guidelines to set up 
institutions that organize cooperation and specify the content of each principle 
(LP: 86). That Rawls here leaves room in this manner also hints towards his 
international theory not being complete, not being the last word on international 
justice. The principles are superior to any other principles (LP: 41), yet more 
norms hold for relations between well-ordered regimes and non-well-ordered 
societies. Principles for fair trade need to be agreed upon, provisions for 
assistance be made and guidelines for shared organizations must be formulated 
(LP: 42).67 
Also, as Rawls argues, the principles require explanation and 
interpretation. Some might even become superfluous within a Society of 
Peoples, such as the sixth and seventh (LP: 37f.). Restrictions in the conduct of 
                                                     
65
 “You and I” here are representatives of different decent peoples (Rawls 1993: 54). 
66
 “Readers of A Theory of Justice will recognize that principles 1-5 and 7 recapitulate ‘the law of 
nations’ as it was interpreted there” (Beitz 2000: 672). In TJ, Rawls states that if one enlarged 
the OP to include representatives of different nations who shall agree on a set of principles on 
the basis of which, they fix their mutual rights and duties behind a veil of ignorance, Rawls 
concludes that they would select common principles of international law; the principle of equality, 
self-determination, self-defence, the duty to observe treaties as well as principles for the right to 
go to war and for the conduct of war (TJ: 377ff.). 
67
 Here, Rawls might refer to such principles as principles of just saving, or principles for forming 
associations and a system of fair trade. 
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war become superfluous within a Society of Peoples as there is no war between 
members and thus no object for the restriction to apply to. Focusing on the sixth 
principle (to honour human rights), it is questionable why Rawls considers it 
redundant. One could imagine that peoples, because of their nature, honour 
human rights and therefore do not need the principle. That, however, would also 
hold true for the other principles (except maybe for the duty of assistance). 
 In the same way that citizens on a domestic level develop a sense of 
justice by taking part in the social world of their respective societies, a parallel 
process leads peoples to act on the legal norms prescribed by the Law of 
Peoples (LP: 44). Moral learning over time leads to more stability and, as a 
result, improves the chances of a lasting peace. 
 
 In the third OP, Rawls puts representatives of decent societies behind the 
veil of ignorance used in OP II. The representatives of decent societies are, 
parallel to OP II, fairly situated, modeled as rational and moved by reasonable 
motives (LP: 63). Although they might not realize equality between their 
members of society on a domestic level, representatives of decent societies are 
positioned equal to one another due to the principle of reasonable pluralism and 
for the OP III to be fair. There is no domestic OP for decent societies, as 
representatives have to be positioned symmetrically, a criterion not met by the 
domestic structure of decent societies (LP: 70). 
 Rawls stipulates that decent peoples, due to their fundamental interests, 
would agree on the same set of principles for their foreign policy as liberal 
societies, thereby establishing an overlapping consensus between liberal and 
decent societies (LP: 63f.). The overlapping consensus is of special importance 
as it ensures that relations established on the basis of those principles are not a 
modus vivendi, but supported by the people that are part of this extended social 
contract (McCarthy 1996: 206). 
 The decent viewpoint is taken to guarantee that the principles selected by 
representatives of liberal societies are also reasonable to non-liberal well-
ordered societies, necessary due to the principle of reasonable pluralism and 
the criterion of reciprocity (LP: 58). “The desire to achieve this assurance is 
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intrinsic to the liberal conception” (ibid.). Decent peoples again are second class. 
It seems as if decent societies are a construction to show that liberal principles 
may also be reasonable to non-liberal, well-ordered regimes, and that they are 
thus universal in grasp and can be enforced also against non-well-ordered 
regimes (see LP: 121f.). This impression, however, runs against one of the 
central elements of LP: the argument that the principle of reasonable pluralism 
involves avoiding liberal imperialism and the imposition of liberal values, in 
favour of a support of principles that constitute an overlapping consensus 
between all well-ordered regimes. 
 That Rawls more or less stipulates that decent societies would select the 
same set of principles (LP: 85) is a clear weakness of his theory. As indicated in 
the previous chapter, tolerating decent peoples might simply be a more effective 
way to push them towards liberal democratic reform than coercive force. “The 
claim that liberal democracy is or will become universally appealing is 
characteristic of cultural imperialism, which leads to imposing that model as a 
norm, even if only in a ‘soft’ version, based on respect and persuasion, rather 
than on force” (Audard 2006b: 310). To forego this critique, it is necessary to 
prove that decent peoples have reasonable motives for agreeing to the same set 
of principles as liberal peoples. Decent peoples have a moral character and 
should thus be ready to consent to reasonable principles. The liberal 
representatives agreed on a minimal set, on what to them is within the limits of 
the tolerable, and decent peoples, though less reasonable and just than liberal 
societies, should be sufficiently reasonable and just to accept those norms. 
 In addition to the question of why decent peoples should agree to the same 
set of principles, it seems even more pressing to understand why liberal peoples 
do not agree on a broader normative basis for their foreign policy, also covering 
what Rawls calls “liberal aspirations”. That Rawls here also refers to article 1 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (LP: 80) is irritating. 
Freedom of expression and association, and the right to democratic political 
participation, rights that differentiate liberal from other (also from decent 
hierarchical) societies, similarly seem to belong to these aspirations (Beitz 2000: 
684, Hinsch and Stepanians 2006: 126). The principle of non-discrimination 
 105
seems a further suitable candidate for this category. Furthermore, there seems 
to be no reason why liberal representatives would not include “a transnational 
difference principle, a human rights charter that embraces political rights and 
that guarantees a more far-reaching right to free speech as well as a notion of 
equality that demands that everybody be treated equally” (Kreide 2002: n. pag.). 
So why should liberal peoples in an OP on their own not consider those 
principles as reasonable and essential for toleration? 
 Rawls might answer that liberals, due to the principle of reasonable 
pluralism, need to respect other reasonably just conceptions and thus reduce 
the principles to what is minimally tolerable, and for Rawls, this does not include 
“liberal aspirations”. Both the justification for why decent peoples choose the 
same principles and for why liberals select a minimal set, seem unsatisfactory 
and based on Rawls’s definitions or stipulations of decent peoples and the setup 
of the international OPs. Cosmopolitans claim that instead of Rawls’s OP II and 
III, a global original position should be constructed in which, equal to the 
domestic OP, individuals are represented. Then, liberal aspirations would surely 
be covered by the principles of the Law of Peoples. Possible answers to the 
questions of why decent peoples should accept the principles of the Law of 
Peoples and why liberals should not agree on a broader set might be carved out 
more clearly by a close analysis of Rawls’s OPs as well as possible alternatives 
to it. 
 
 
One Rather Than Two Original Positions 
 Why not construct a single global original position in which individuals, 
rather than states, are represented (see for example Beitz 1979, Pogge 1989 or 
Kuper 2000)? Additional alternatives seem to be worth discussing. Why not one 
international OP where all well-ordered societies (liberal and decent) are 
represented? Why are the non-well-ordered regimes not represented given that 
the principles of the Law of Peoples also concern them? There are further 
alternative constructions, such as Smith’s impartial spectator, or to move from 
Rawls’s premises, such as fairness or the criterion of reciprocity, straight to 
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arguing for a set of suitable principles (Barry 1995: 894). Closeness to the 
Rawlsian framework, however, is essential for answering the questions at hand, 
and shall thus be preserved. Conclusively, there are four different options:  
a) Rawls’s second and third OP,  
b) a global OP (where individuals are represented),  
c) an international OP (all states are represented) and  
d) a well-ordered OP (liberal and decent peoples are represented). 
 Options a) and b) are best discussed in relation to one another as there 
has been a vivid debate between Rawls and his critics. Rawls’s argument for 
two international OPs proceeds as follows: Liberal societies are the major 
subjects and addressees of his theory. As LP is meant as an extension of the 
domestic case, representatives of liberal societies are the parties in the first 
international OP. OP III is then constructed to test, whether non-liberal but well-
ordered societies would accept the (same) principles. This test is necessary to 
ensure that the principles of reasonable pluralism, reciprocity and self-
determination are honoured. Being accepted by all reasonable societies, the 
principles may then be enforced towards other societies. 
 Option b) is favoured by cosmopolitans, who doubt that liberal societies, or 
societies in general, are the right starting point for an international theory of 
justice. Rather, individuals should be represented in a global OP that neither 
considers state boundaries nor societal communities. “It aims at identifying 
principles that are acceptable when each person’s prospects, rather than the 
prospects of each society or people, are taken fairly into account” (Beitz 1999: 
519). Referring to Rawls’s concept of the social contract, whereas for Rawls 
well-ordered societies are the contractors, for cosmopolitans, “the whole world 
should be regarded as a ‘society’ for the purposes of this social contract” (Brown 
2010: 313). In a global OP, representatives of individuals would agree on very 
different principles. Surely, they would reject the toleration of decent societies, 
as they would not want to find themselves “as lowly placed members of a 
hierarchical society when the veil is lifted” (Tan 2008: 622f.). Also, the 
“legitimation of the principles of law would be much stronger if it were the 
individual citizens […] who agree on the law of peoples” (Kreide 2009: 97) as the 
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pluralism between the forms of life they choose to live disappears when focusing 
on the state level (ibid.). 
 Additionally, the outcome of a global OP would be more legitimate as the 
principles would be an expression of individuals’ political self-determination 
(Kreide 2002: n. pag.). The interests of peoples do not coincide with the 
interests of persons and “even if a confederation of peoples secures rights, it 
may well do so in a less than optimal way” (Kuper 2000: 646). As 
representatives in a global OP could, after lifting the veil of ignorance, end up as 
dissenters in a decent regime, they would opt for a more extensive set of 
(liberal) rights (ibid.: 651).  
 The main problem here seems to be one of different objectives. The 
question Rawls tries to answer in LP is according to which principles liberal 
societies should organize their foreign relations. He is addressing liberal regimes 
as independent agents (Sutch 2001: 176, Freeman 2007: 418). Cosmopolitans 
focus on the prospects of the individual on the basis of which institutions and 
practices should be justified and/or criticized (Beitz 1999: 519). There are thus 
two different objectives at play. 
“Rawls is not attempting to construct a general theory of international justice (one 
that aims to be universal in the cosmopolitan sense). Rather, Rawls is attempting 
to show what liberals should be committed to in world politics and thereafter to 
show what needs to be done to make such principles universalisable in the sense 
that they could be the object of consensus for a more heterogeneous group of 
agents” (Sutch 2001: 175f.).  
 
Rawls is searching for a minimal realistic utopian (not maximal ideal) conception 
that can have “legitimate purchase on international politics in the here and now” 
(ibid.: 177). In the here and now, it is “peoples, not citizens that international 
political institutions regard as free and equal” (Wenar 2001: 87, see also 
Williams 2011: 20) and they most probably will continue to be in the near future.  
“History may bring us to a point at which all decent peoples are liberal and 
democratic and thus all individuals worldwide think of themselves in their political 
relations as free equals. But if so, I suspect that individuals will still think of 
themselves as free and equal members of distinct and diverse corporate moral 
agents or peoples […]. And thus the question of international justice will continue to 
present itself as one fundamentally concerned with the relations between peoples” 
(Reidy 2004: 311). 
 
Taking liberalism as a threshold for what is tolerable on the international level for 
Rawls is illiberal. 
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 Nevertheless, although focusing on societies, Rawls does take the 
interests and prospects of individuals into account. His human rights minimalism 
and the duty of assistance aim to ensure that every individual’s basic needs are 
met and that every person enjoys a sufficient amount of liberty (LP: 74). His 
scope is thus not, as cosmopolitans argue, “limited to principles for societies – or 
more accurately, for their political embodiment as states” [emphasis in original] 
(Beitz 1999: 520). Whereas Rawls’s OPs are state-centric, the principles the 
representatives agree upon are not. Also, testing the principles liberal societies 
would agree upon in the OPIII is essential to Rawls. Leaving out this test – and a 
global OP would leave no room for that – would imply enforcing liberal principles 
on non-liberal regimes, which would not only be ethnocentric, but also violate 
liberal principles (LP: 82f.). The claim here is not that a cosmopolitan framework 
is generally to be rejected, but that when focusing on the here and now and 
when aiming to present a guideline for liberal regimes, when theorizing within a 
realistic utopian framework, the focus on states, rather than individuals, when it 
comes to international politics, seems reasonable. 
 c) When Rawls elaborates on an international OP in TJ, he extends his 
thought experiment to representatives of nations, rather than limiting it to liberal 
societies (TJ: 378). So why not construct an international OP where all states 
are represented? Also, one could argue that by excluding non-well-ordered 
regimes from the OPs, these societies have never agreed to the principles of the 
Law of Peoples. The social contract upon which the Society of Peoples is built, 
as a treaty, might not be considered to “create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent” (VCLT: art. 3468); the principles of the Law of 
Peoples thus cannot legitimately claim universal grasp (Beitz 2000: 686).  
 The reason why Rawls excludes non-well-ordered societies from his 
international OP is that, as explored in chapter 3, his conception of decent 
societies sets the threshold for which political basic structures are reasonable, 
and thus tolerable, from a liberal viewpoint. Accordingly, his exclusion of non-
well-ordered regimes “should not be surprising; it is simply a reflection of the fact 
that the liberal notion of reciprocity does not require us to show that our 
                                                     
68
 United Nations (1969): “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”; hereafter cited as VCLT. 
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principles would be acceptable to those holding fundamentally unreasonable 
points of view” (ibid.: 676). Non-reasonable regimes are not expected to agree 
to reasonable principles and are therefore excluded from the selection process. 
 The principles of the Law of Peoples thus do not constitute a jus gentium; 
they do not form “a body of principles universally accepted by states, nor is it 
intended necessarily to constitute a reasonable basis for the cooperation (or for 
that matter the peaceful co-existence) of all existing states” (ibid.). Following 
Rawls, the principles only need to be acceptable for reasonable conceptions. 
Taking unreasonable points of view into consideration – and just as liberal and 
decent peoples know that they represent liberal and decent peoples, outlaws 
would know that they represent (the interests of) outlaws – would be 
unreasonable when striving to identify reasonable principles for international 
cooperation. 
 d) Whereas it seems reasonable to exclude non-reasonable regimes from 
representation, why not construct one international OP where all well-ordered 
societies, liberal and decent, are represented? This construct would have 
several advantages. It is hard to justify why liberal societies in an OP on their 
own would limit the principles, especially when it comes to the human rights 
minimalism, to the set Rawls proposes, instead of incorporating more liberal 
rights. Rawls should have included as least a discussion on why his four core 
human rights are included and others, such as the principle of non-
discrimination, are excluded. Rawls leaves out principles from the list decent 
peoples would not accept, such as constitutional democratic rights (McCarthy 
1996: 210, Kuper 2000: 643). The eight principles seem more like a compromise 
between liberal and decent peoples. Pogge, however, argued against this 
perception: 
“This picture is not at all that of a negotiated compromise in which the liberal 
delegates agree to surrender their egalitarian concerns and some human rights in 
exchange for the hierarchical delegates accepting the remainder. […] The 
toleration model is more noble than this: The liberal delegates, informed that their 
societies share a world with many hierarchical societies, seek to design a law of 
peoples that hierarchical societies, on the basis of their values and interests as 
such, can reasonably accept” (Pogge 1994: 216). 
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 In a single, international OP for all well-ordered societies, representatives 
might opt for a set of principles that leaves room for as much self-determination 
and pluralism as the reasonable allows. One could object that Rawls focuses on 
liberal societies, that they are of major concern and that the OPIII is only a test. 
As decent societies do not add anything to the principles (Kreide 2002: n. pag.), 
the OPIII does not seem to be any more than a simple construction to justify the 
principles. A shared international OP would appear to be more convincing: first, 
it can easily explain why liberal peoples do not propose a more elaborate, more 
liberal set of principles, and second, the argument for the consent of decent 
peoples to the set becomes stronger than in the case of two separate OPs. 
 
 
Outside the Original Positions, or: Non-Ideal Theory 
 As indicated earlier, benevolent absolutistic regimes, burdened societies 
and outlaw states are not represented in the OPs and “there is no effort to justify 
the Law of Peoples to representatives of either” (Beitz 2000: 676). Beitz 
therefore argues that the principles of the Law of Peoples are not intended as a 
basis for cooperation and peaceful co-existence within international society and 
are not universally accepted (ibid.). Beitz’s conclusion seems convincing, but 
does not hold true for a possible future international society consisting of well-
ordered regimes. In a future, where the international community is made up 
exclusively of well-ordered regimes, the principles of the Law of Peoples serve 
as a “basis for cooperation and peaceful co-existence within the international 
society” and are “universally accepted”. They are thus intended as general 
principles of this kind, and are trivially not accepted by non-well-ordered 
societies. 
 Though peoples generally honour the principles of the Law of Peoples, 
violations might occur. “I believe that in a society of liberal and decent peoples 
the Law of Peoples would be honored, if not at all times, then most of the time, 
so that it would be recognized as governing the relations among them” (LP: 
125). In relations with one another, well-ordered societies are likely to comply 
with the principles as it serves their interests to do so. In reference to the right to 
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war and the duty of assistance, however, things are different. The limited right to 
war might be used in an extended way. The duty of assistance needs foresight. 
Furthermore, because of social distance and anxiety about the unknown 
towards a foreign society, peoples might not be easily convinced of the 
importance of supporting other societies (LP: 124-126).  
Allegiance to the Law of Peoples serves as a fundamental basis for 
stability for the right reason between peoples, thereby realizing Rawls’s major 
aim: stable, peaceful and just international relations, at least as far as peoples 
are concerned. The principles, their content, link to and possible impact on real 
world international relations are therefore introduced and discussed within and 
beyond a Rawlsian framework. 
 
 
The Principles of the Law of Peoples 
 
1. The Duty to Respect a People’s Freedom and Independence 
The first of Rawls’s eight principles is a well-established international norm. 
The idea of free and independent states implies that “each state enjoys a certain 
right to be immune from the scrutiny and intervention of other states in its 
internal affairs”, as well as that “an independent political community is free to 
make and amend its own laws and to enjoy its own religious and cultural life, 
subject only to those limitations that are necessary to reconcile the liberty of one 
community with the other” (Nardin 1983: 53). In short, communities can “take 
many forms, and [self-government] is not limited to constitutional or democratic 
rule” (ibid.). This mirrors Rawls’s idea of a reasonable pluralism of well-ordered 
societies. The international legal system provides that states have a freedom of 
action as long as there is no rule constraining it. International law thus 
constitutes the framework and sets limits on a state’s independence. Political or 
economic interdependence between states does not erode the independence of 
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states (Shaw 2003: 190). International law prescribes that all states hold the 
right to independence (DRDS 1949: art. 169). 
 Mutual respect between peoples is an essential part of the basic structure 
and political climate of the Society of Peoples (LP: 35, 62, 122). Therefore, 
“[d]enying respect to other peoples and their members requires strong reason to 
be justified” (LP: 61) and no sufficient reason exists when it comes to decent 
peoples. The right to freedom and independence within LP is thus bound to 
reasonable policies. Audard summarizes Rawls’s first principle as follows:  
“Peoples are free and independent within limits, and should be treated as such. 
Sovereignty is replaced by self-determination and is restricted by precise 
conditions. The Law of Peoples limits permissible domestic and international 
policies, that is, the right to war and the right to non-interference with the treatment 
of its own people” (Audard 2006b: 307). 
 
As the quotation exemplifies, terms that usually occur in relation to 
freedom and independence of states are that of sovereignty and self-
determination. Occasionally, Rawls refers to self-determination (LP: 38, 61, 85, 
111). Sovereignty is mostly connected to the two powers of sovereignty. Within 
the Society of Peoples, room for self-determination must be left for its members, 
within limits specified by the principles of the Law of Peoples (LP: 38). This runs 
parallel to Kant’s understanding of freedom: for Kant, external freedom is the 
“authority to obey no external laws than those to which I have been able to give 
consent” (Kant 2006: 8:350).70 A peoples’ freedom therefore may be limited by 
the principles their representatives agreed on. “Thus no people has the right to 
self-determination, or a right to secession, at the expense of subjugating another 
people” (LP: 38). Furthermore, independence is no shield from condemnation 
should a people violate the Law of Peoples (ibid.). Freedom and independence 
only hold within the limits set by the other reasonable principles, foremost the 
duty to honour human rights.  
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 This principle is also found in the fifth preliminary article for a perpetual peace: “No state shall 
forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state” (Kant 2006: 8:346). 
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2. The Duty to Observe Treaties 
Except for when presenting the list of principles, Rawls does not again 
refer to the duty to observe treaties, most likely because it is considered self-
explanatory. Meeting the terms of any agreements one has made is a necessary 
basis for cooperation, as well as fundamental for the process of moral learning 
leading to the generation of mutual trust and respect. 
 
3. The Duty to Consider Equality Between Peoples 
Although states may differ in size of territory or population, in terms of 
economic and military capacities, they are formally considered equals. Their 
equality is based on the independence of states from any superior, and their 
claim to sovereignty (Nardin 1983: 54). This formal equality entails a legal one 
(equality before the law71), both of which are prominent and generally accepted 
principles of international law.72 Regimes have a vital interest in their 
independence, security and territorial integrity as well as an interest in seeing 
that all these aspects are respected by other states. No state would willingly 
agree to a less-than-equal position in its international relations towards other 
states (Hinsch 2001: 63). A “people sincerely affirming a nonliberal idea of 
justice may still reasonably think its society should be treated equally […]. 
Although full equality may be lacking within a society, equality may be 
reasonably put forward in making claims against other societies” (LP: 70). 
The norm may be traced back to Natural Law thinking. Equality here is 
understood as a natural condition of states as well as the essence of man. “By 
nature all nations are equal the one to the other. For nations are considered as 
individual free persons living in a state of nature. Therefore, since by nature all 
men are equal, all nations too are equal one to the other” (Wolff 1934: §16). The 
idea is also found in Kant, who stated that external equality incorporates that “no 
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one can place another under a legal obligation without similarly submitting 
himself to […] a similar obligation” (Kant 2006: 8:350). 
The duty to consider equality between peoples has a strong link with 
Rawls’s first principle (see Nardin 1983: 54). In OP II and III, representatives are 
modelled as equals and will strive to preserve this equality (LP: 41, 60). Peoples 
thus mutually consider and treat each other as equals (LP: 48). This seems 
comprehensible, but does not explain why liberal peoples should respect well-
ordered regimes as equal cooperation partners given that they do not grant the 
same respect to their own members of society. Rawls’s central argument is, as 
elaborated in the previous chapter, reasonable pluralism. 
“Thus, they may accord a less-than-equal status to women in the sphere of political 
decision making, as is the case in many Islamic countries. Yet in the absence of 
any globally shared nonegalitarian comprehensive doctrine like Islam, no people 
can reasonably expect other peoples who are willing to cooperate fairly to accept 
anything but an equal status in the envisaged scheme of intersocietal cooperation. 
Therefore, when the terms of global cooperation are specified, the interests and 
claims of the peoples involved have to be given equal weight” (Hinsch 2001: 63). 
 
Even though liberal and decent peoples are not equally just and reasonable, 
they both legitimately claim and respect equality in relation with one another as 
they are both sufficiently reasonable and just.  
 
 
4. The Principle of Non-Intervention 
“The state is presumptively […] the arena within which self-determination is 
worked out and from which, therefore, foreign armies have to be excluded“ 
(Walzer 1980: 210). The principle of non-intervention is closely related to the 
first and third of Rawls’s principles: because of the fact that peoples (and states 
in general when referring to international law) are free and independent as well 
as of equal standing, other societies may not intervene into their internal 
matters. Intervening into the domestic affairs of another state is thus not only a 
breach of the fourth, but also of the first and third of Rawls’s principles. “The 
equality and liberty of states are embodied in the idea of sovereignty, their 
security in the idea of territorial integrity. Therefore states must respect each 
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other’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity, unless by its conduct a state 
forfeits its right to this respect” (Nardin 1983: 285). 
Furthermore, the principle of non-intervention is well established in 
international law. It does not only imply that “[e]very state has the duty to refrain 
from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other state” (DRDS: art. 
3), but also refraining from “fomenting civil strife in the territory of another State, 
and to prevent the organization within its territory of activities calculated to 
foment such civil strife” (ibid.: art. 4).73 
Though its content is generally quite clear, the principle needs further 
qualification: Intervention is legitimate not only in cases of gross human rights 
violations and self-defence, but also, as outlaw states are not to be tolerated, in 
case of violations of the principles of the Law of Peoples. Focusing on 
international law, the principle is binding for all states, while leaving room, as 
Rawls does, for the use of force in cases of self-defence (or collective self-
defence).  
Rawls’s understanding of the principle may be highlighted in reference to 
two other theorists: Terry Nardin and Michael Walzer. Following Nardin, the 
“rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity are not absolute, and 
therefore the ban on intervention is not absolute either” (Nardin 1983: 287). The 
limits are constituted by the right to self-defence and “in certain circumstances 
[to] come to the aid of those who are the victims of aggression” (ibid.). Those 
victims can either be other states or individuals within states. “The limits of 
sovereignty on the one hand and of intervention on the other are determined by 
the standards of international law and morality, and these include an 
international minimum standard of conduct according to which the relation 
between a government and its own subjects may be judged” (ibid.). These 
elaborations mirror well the cases in which Rawls allows for intervention. 
From Walzer, on whose thinking Rawls partly relies, one can deduce why 
Rawls argues that the principle of non-intervention generally does not hold in 
relation to outlaw regimes. According to Walzer, a community relying upon a 
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contract requires a government to which its members are bound and which 
defends them against foreigners. In effect, the citizens defend themselves and 
the government only constitutes a means to do so. “Foreigners are in no position 
to deny the reality of that union” (Walzer 1980: 212) and thus owe other 
societies a presumption that the people are ruled according to their will and that 
the form of government relies on their historic development and specific internal 
life which outsiders need to respect. If such a state were attacked, one would 
expect that at least (great) parts of the members of the community would defend 
it “because they value their own community in the same way that we value ours” 
(ibid.). A state is legitimate to the degree it represents the will and interest of its 
people and the people have a right to rebel if it fails to do so (ibid.: 214). If they 
do not, they might consider the “government to be tolerable, or they are 
accustomed to it, or they are personally loyal to its leader” (ibid.). Even if the “fit” 
between governments and the people is not democratic, there might be a “‘fit’ of 
some sort, which foreigners are bound to respect” (ibid.: 216). Intervention is 
only legitimate if it is obvious that there is no “fit” between government and 
people (ibid.: 214), when the instruments that should protect the community are 
then turned against it (or part of it), which is clearly the case if “a government is 
engaged in the massacre or enslavement of its own citizens or subjects” (ibid.: 
217). One could conclude that those governments are outlaw governments that, 
as they have no standing domestically, have no standing in the international 
arena (ibid.: 211f.). Intervening in outlaw regimes is, thus, justified by Rawls and 
Walzer. 
 
 
5. The Right to Self-Defence 
Any “society that is nonaggressive and that honors human rights has the 
right to self-defense” (LP: 91f.). Here, the right is limited to defence against the 
invasion of one’s territory. The right to self-defence held by peoples seems to be 
more specific and extensive. Liberal peoples may use military force to protect 
and preserve the basic freedoms of their citizens and their constitutional 
democratic political institutions. Decent governments may rightly defend their 
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decent (hierarchical) basic structure. Peoples hold a right to self-defence and an 
extended right to defend an ally. Self-defence here does not only apply to 
defence against an immediate military attack (LP: 91f.), but generally against the 
threat constituted by outlaw regimes (LP: 81). The right to self-defence ensures 
collective security (LP: 42). It goes beyond the understanding of self-defence 
prevalent in international law. 
Focusing on international law, every state holds “the right of individual or 
collective self-defence against armed attack” (DRDS: art. 12, see also UN 
Charter: art. 51). Collective self-defence thereby refers to the assistance of third 
party states for an attacked state, presupposing that the assisted state agrees to 
the assistance. For a case of self-defence to exist, three conditions need to 
prevail: necessity, proportionality and immediacy (Ago 1980: 68f.). Necessity 
implies that an “armed attack that has occurred or is reasonably believed to be 
imminent requires the response that is proposed” (Shaw 2003: 1031). There 
must be no other means by which the attack can be stopped: “Self-defence will 
be valid as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the conduct of the 
State only if that State was unable to achieve the desired result by different 
conduct involving either no use of armed forces at all or merely its use on a 
lesser scale” (Ago 1980: 69). This criterion is of particular interest when focusing 
on preventive self-defence (ibid.). The latter point connects to the criterion of 
proportionality, which requires considering the type of weapons that may be 
used as a response, as well as staying within the limits of law relating to the 
conduct of war (Shaw 2003: 1031). Proportionality refers to the “relationship 
between the action and its purpose, […] that of halting and repelling the attack 
or even, in so far as preventive self-defence is recognized, of preventing it from 
occurring” (Ago 1980: 69). It does not refer to the relation between the attack 
and the armed force used against it. A certain degree of flexibility is necessary 
at this point, as the attacked state cannot be expected to measure precisely and 
accurately the amount of force needed (ibid.). Last but not least, the criterion of 
immediacy means that the defensive use of armed force needs to occur “while 
the attack is still going on, and not after it has ended” (ibid.: 70). If the attacking 
country has withdrawn its troops and the armed raid has ended, the right to self-
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defence expires. The “objective to be achieved by the conduct in question, its 
raison d’être, is necessarily that of repelling an attack and preventing it from 
succeeding, and nothing else” (ibid.: 69). 
For Rawls, self-defence does not only cover “repelling an attack and 
preventing it from succeeding”. As indicated earlier, peoples may generally fight 
outlaw states because they pose a threat to international peace and stability. 
Rawls here follows Walzer, who stated that the  
“victim of aggression fights in self-defense […]. Other states can rightfully join the 
victim’s resistance; their war has the same character as his own, which is to say, 
they are entitled not only to repel the attack but also to punish it. All resistance is 
also law enforcement” (Walzer 2006: 59). 
 
Defence and punishment, however, are clearly two different things. The wider 
understanding of self-defence put forward by Walzer and taken on by Rawls, 
would more suitably be referred to as a “limited right to war” as has been 
explored in chapter 3. 
Rawls’s exclusion of outlaw regimes from the right to self-defense seems 
peculiar, as self-defence is an inherent right, not only to individuals, but also for 
states (UN Charter: art. 51). When it comes to self-defence, the nature of the 
regime becomes crucial. “If a state does not act in accordance with […] moral 
principles, then it is doubtful whether its self-defence matters at all […]. This 
might mean in some cases states had no right to self-defence if their members 
would actually be better off (in utilitarian or deontological terms) if the state were 
invaded” (Hutchings 2010: 147). A similar reasoning is found in Walzer:  
“Self-defense seems the primary and indisputable right of any political community, 
merely because it is there and whatever the circumstance under which it achieved 
statehood. […]The only limitation on this right has to do with internal, not external 
legitimacy: a state (or government) established against the will of its own people, 
ruling violently, may well forfeit its right to defend itself” [emphasis in original] 
(Walzer 2006: 82). 
 
Additionally, if outlaw states had a right to self-defence, they could legitimately 
strike back in cases of intervention by well-ordered regimes. 
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6. The Duty to Honour Human Rights 
“Among the human rights are the right to life (to the means of subsistence and 
security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and 
to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and 
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality” (LP: 65). 
 
These rights constitute “necessary conditions of any system of social 
cooperation” and are accounted for by liberal and decent regimes (LP: 68). The 
reach of human rights norms, for Rawls, is universal (LP: 80). Rawls’s 
formulation “among the human rights are” indicates that the list is open for 
additions and Rawls, later in LP, expands his list, claiming that articles 3-18 of 
the UDHR may be considered as “human rights proper” (LP: 80f., see also Riker 
2009: 626). Whereas the principles discussed thus far constitute the more 
traditional principles of international law, the principle to honour human rights 
and the universal claim clash with those principles and limit them. 
As with LP in general, the Rawlsian account of human rights “in many 
respects […] stands in need of further elaboration” (Hinsch and Stepanians 
2006: 117). First, it needs to be clarified what Rawls means when he is talking 
about human rights. The natural rights approach, going back to Locke and 
others, assumes that there are natural, inalienable rights that govern all human 
beings no matter when and where they live. Those principles stand above man-
made positive law. “Clearly, Rawls’s account of the human rights […] ultimately 
has to rely on some such non-institutional understanding of human rights in 
order to make good on the claim that these rights are universal” (ibid.: 122). 
Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians suggest that Rawls’s human rights 
are to be understood as “universally valid moral claim rights”. Claim rights 
incorporate a right holder, in the case of human rights a human being, and a 
duty bearer, a natural or a non-natural person, such as a state. A human right is 
a moral right insofar as it is “justified with exclusive reference to the value basis 
at its center, the […] autonomy and well-being as human persons” (ibid.: 121). 
From the right to liberty proclaimed in article 3 UDHR held by every human 
being follows the duty not to enslave people in article 4. They are universal 
rights in that every human being holds them, but they are not to be understood 
as necessarily constitutional or legal rights. Central to human rights as claim 
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rights is the social recognition of the duties they imply, not the existence of 
enforcement mechanisms (ibid.: 119-121). This might also explain why Rawls 
does not deliberate on such mechanisms, but how does the protection of human 
rights as moral claim rights become a matter of international relations? 
According to Hinsch and Stepanians, the  
“duties following from human rights do not only involve primary duties of direct 
compliance with the requirements of the right in question but also secondary, 
auxiliary duties of assistance or protection. The latter have to be discharged if the 
primary duties go unfulfilled or can be expected to go unfulfilled. […] It follows from 
the fact that human rights do not only involve correlative primary but also 
secondary auxiliary duties that not only primary duty bearers can violate a person’s 
human rights but also auxiliary duty bearers […]. If they fail to discharge their 
duties of protection or assistance towards those whose rights are not respected” 
(ibid.: 120f.).  
 
Rawls goes as far as to say that human rights are not merely a domestic issue 
to justify intervention. He does not, however, go as far as to say that the 
international community, as a secondary duty bearer, would violate human rights 
if it does not react properly on human rights violations. They constitute a right 
but not a duty to intervene. However, the promotion of human rights “should be 
a fixed concern of the foreign policy of all just and decent regimes” (LP: 48). 
 
In LP, the significance of human rights is threefold: first, they limit the 
autonomy of governments in dealing with its people, second, they set a limit for 
reasonable pluralism among peoples because honouring core human rights is a 
necessary criterion for well-orderedness, and third, their violation justifies 
intervention (LP: 80). When specifying which human rights are considered as 
core human rights by Rawls, he turns against (most) liberal thinking. For Rawls, 
the class of human rights does not include all the rights that are guaranteed by 
liberal governments. Instead, he formulates a minimal set, constituting a special 
class of urgent rights (LP: 78f.) including those rights and freedoms that are 
minimally necessary for the development and exercise of the two moral powers 
of human beings (a sense of justice and a conception of the good). Enabling 
one’s citizens to possess these powers is, thus, a threshold for decency 
(Freeman 2007: 436f.). Human rights set out the “necessary conditions to be 
met by any genuine scheme of cooperation among persons” (Reidy 2004: 311) 
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and constitute a line between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines and conceptions of justice. As with the duty of assistance, the 
conception of human rights has a target and cut-off point. Intervention is justified 
to ensure that the core human rights are generally honoured. Beyond that 
(leaving self-defence aside) the principle of non-intervention takes hold (Audard 
2006a: 72). 
 Rawls in LP is aware of the fact that the Western conception of persons as 
free and equal is not shared by all, and that this is also not the only reasonable 
understanding of this particular concept. He thus needs to identify a “conception 
of human and international right that can appeal both to liberal and what he 
terms hierarchical societies” (Sutch 2001: 184). A cross-cultural acceptability of 
human rights presupposes a narrow understanding of those norms (Kelly 2004: 
179). 
 
Rawls’s human rights minimalism has been criticized for falling short of 
what a liberal theory should incorporate. “The short list of human rights 
enumerated by his ‘law of peoples’ is embarrassingly impoverished when 
contrasted to the pronouncements of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” (Ackermann 1994: 382). Rawls’s minimalism has to be perceived from 
within his realistic utopian framework. His aim is not ideological in the first place 
as he merely claims to present a realistic utopia. With his human rights 
minimalism, Rawls wants to secure first that the principles are not founded on 
ethnocentrism, and second, that they are realistic. “The first requirement 
demands that the principles of international justice are not limited in their range 
of acceptability to Western societies, exclusively reflecting their political values. 
The second is the demand that principles of international justice set a feasible 
political ideal” (Tasioulas 2002: 391). As Rawls’s core human rights set a 
threshold for what is tolerable from a liberal viewpoint, they might still be 
ethnocentric in the sense that they are traditionally Western ideas. Even if they 
are, they need to be protected. Following Rawls, however, they are shared by 
other societies, by decent as well as benevolent absolutistic regimes, and 
maybe even by burdened societies. 
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Rawls’s human rights minimalism also follows from his connecting human 
rights to intervention. To add a principle to the list, such as the freedom of 
association, would imply a right to war in order to stop gross violations of those 
norms. As Audard puts it more provocatively: “[A]re we ready to go to war to 
protect […] the full list of human rights, everywhere, anytime, or do we have to 
restrict that list […]?” (Audard 2006a: 72). Walzer formulated a similar claim: “It 
is not the case that one can simply proclaim a list of rights and then look around 
for armed men to enforce it” (Walzer 1980: 226). Liberal states would not go to 
war for even gross violations of the whole set of human rights. That is 
unrealistic. So Rawls might have aimed to put together a set of human rights 
that a Society of Peoples could realistically be expect to enforce, even by means 
of war, and this set might have been left open with good reason, as, if the 
human rights regime undergoes further development, other human rights might 
be added. If the core human rights are those that liberal and decent societies 
might go to war for, then gross violations, not further qualified by Rawls, might 
be those circumstances, under which members of a Society of Peoples might 
feel obliged to intervene. A right to war in any case of human rights violations, 
referring to the whole set as enlisted in the UDHR, would give a Society of 
Peoples the right to intervene in almost any society. Limiting the right to war to 
gross violations and to a set of urgent human rights seems reasonable in order 
to establish a framework for a realistic foreign policy of a Society of Peoples. 
The link between human rights and intervention, however, does not seem 
to be a necessary one, but merely a “stipulative redefinition of ‘human rights’” 
(Buchanan 2006: 165). To forego the risk of over-interventionism, Buchanan 
suggests differentiating human rights into those whose violations may trigger 
intervention and others that do not (ibid.: 166). The reason why Rawls links 
human rights with intervention lies in them being the threshold of what is 
tolerable. The set is minimal because it needs to be limited to those rights the 
violations of which are intolerable and the regimes that do not enforce them 
deemed unreasonable and thus outside the cooperative scheme of the Society 
of Peoples. Because human rights set this threshold, their violation is connected 
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to intervention, as violations go beyond what is tolerable and thus need to be 
stopped. 
Frequent non-compliance with these norms, as well as the problem of 
enforcement and sanctions, stand against the many human rights norms 
prevalent in international law and declarations. This leads back to understanding 
human rights as primarily moral instead of positive rights: they are not 
enforceable but one may assume compliance, as they are accepted values of 
the international community. The assumption that the core human rights are 
shared norms is backed by Nardin, according to whom international law has 
traditionally “included the idea of an ‘international minimum standard’ regarding 
the treatment of aliens by the government of the country within which they 
reside. More recently it has come to embody minimum standards governing the 
relations between a government and its own citizens” (Nardin 1983: 239). Next 
to these minimal standards, Nardin also ascertains that there are diverse moral 
traditions that articulate moralities of personal conduct; these have been applied 
internationally and thus, have also become “international moralities” that 
accordingly articulate standards of international conduct (ibid.: 241).74 Nardin 
claims that there are human rights that “are implicit in the idea of persons as 
members of a community” (ibid.: 276) and others that are less fundamental as 
they pertain to forms of arrangements of some but not all communities, amongst 
others the right to vote. Then, there are social and economic rights that are also 
secondary to the first. In the first set belong the rights not to be tortured, 
enslaved, arbitrarily arrested or detained, as well as exiled (ibid.: 276f.). This 
differentiation might harmonize with Buchanan’s proposal. 
 
Many arguments that have been put forward against Rawls’s claim for the 
toleration of decent regimes also apply to his human rights minimalism. His 
threshold for toleration is too low; the set of human rights should also include the 
principles Rawls refers to as “liberal aspirations”. Buchanan even goes as far as 
                                                     
74
 The natural law tradition of the Catholic church, or “the tradition of Islam, which despite its 
militant origin has worked out an elaborate morality of mutual accommodation among separate 
peoples both within and outside the Moslem faith” (Nardin 1983: 241) are examples for such 
moralities. 
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to argue that “it appears that for Rawls a society in which there is a permanent 
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender underclass, hovering above subsistence […] 
would not be a society in which those who were thus disadvantaged could 
complain that their human rights were violated” (Buchanan 2006: 151). Further, 
by limiting the set, Rawls withdraws justification and possible support from those 
who strive for a more extensive set. Last but not least, his rather narrow 
conception of human rights does not only put limits on military intervention, but 
also on intervention as a whole. Rawls’s minimalism thereby forbids liberal 
governments the opportunity to assist groups within decent societies striving for 
a more expansive set of human rights (Tasioulas 2002: 387). Decent regimes 
may prohibit assemblies with political content, such as peaceful protest, they 
may control the media and use it for state propaganda and much more as long 
as they do not (grossly) violate the human rights Rawls deems to be inevitable 
(Cavallero 2003: 191). Rawls thereby not only limits the possibilities of liberal 
states to motivate non-liberal regimes towards reform; he also weakens the 
(legitimate) demands of members of non-liberal societies. Beitz suggests that 
human rights should not only function as a threshold for international 
recognition, but also as a standard for government policies and for the conduct 
of political institutions and agencies. Their protection may serve as a target for 
reform in non-well-ordered societies (Beitz 2000: 687). 
 From within the Rawlsian framework, however, it has to be considered that 
decent societies do have a moral character. They do not honour human rights in 
order not to become subject to intervention, but rather, because they are ready 
to limit their rational interests by reasonable principles. They do not suppress 
minorities and leave them “hovering above subsistence” but grant them a place 
in society and a role in processes of political decision making. Securing human 
rights in burdened societies is clearly one of the aims of assistance as it is a 
necessary criterion for well-orderedness. Also, Rawls’s minimalism is supported 
by international practice: there “seems to be wide agreement now that the 
international declarations and covenants […] have more entries for human rights 
than could be reasonably recognized as universal moral standards generally 
binding irrespective of local institutions, traditions, and circumstances” (Hinsch 
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and Stepanians 2006: 126).75 In addition, all “the major human rights 
instruments of contemporary international law are subject to extensive 
reservations by state parties” (ibid.). 
 Summing up, within the limits of Rawls’s realistic utopia, Rawls’s 
minimalism may not be satisfactory from a liberal viewpoint, but in practice, it 
represents a feasible set of human rights that can and should be protected and 
ensured by well-ordered regimes and that can serve as a threshold for toleration 
and non-intervention. Rawls, thus, does not present an ideological claim, but 
rather, a feasible one, consistent with his concept of reasonable pluralism. 
 
 
7. The Duty to Observe Restrictions in the Conduct of War 
 In TJ, Rawls comments on the (rightful) conduct of warfare from the 
viewpoint of a liberal society: “The aim of war is a just peace, and […] [the] 
conduct of war is to be constrained and adjusted to this end” (TJ: 379, see also 
LP: 94).76 Wars fought by well-ordered peoples not only need to be just. 
Reasonable principles must also be considered in the conduct of war. Following 
Rawls, in warfare, three groups need to be differentiated: leaders and state 
officials, soldiers and civilians. The first group (leaders, officials and elites) 
controls the state apparatus and is responsible for the war, as opposed to the 
other two groups. Soldiers, except for the upper ranks that might be counted 
under the first category, might be forced into war or their patriotism might be 
exploited. Attacks on soldiers are nevertheless justified if necessary under self-
defence. Attacks on civilians are great wrongs.77 Rawls’s ideas here run parallel 
to Walzer, on whose thoughts Rawls draws when it comes to the reasons for 
and conduct of war (Brown 2000: 129). Walzer states that “our ideas about war 
in general and about the conduct of soldiers depend very much on how people 
get killed and on who those people are” (Walzer 2006: 22). War is to be 
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 Article 24 of the UDHR (the right to periodic paid holidays) may serve as a prime example. 
76
 Again, a reference to Kant’s preliminary articles may be established, as the sixth refers to the 
conduct of war: “No state shall allow itself such hostilities in wartime as would make mutual trust 
in a future period of peace impossible” (Kant 2006: 8:346). The aim of warfare is a lasting peace. 
77
 Rawls here directly refers to the bombing of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II 
(LP: 95). 
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considered as a “combat between combatants” [emphasis in original] (ibid.: 42), 
which generates immunities for non-combatants that hold for people, who are 
not trained and prepared for war, such as children, elderly or neutral persons, 
and those who cannot take part in combat, such as wounded or captured 
soldiers (ibid.: 42f.). The differentiation between groups in an armed conflict and 
a respective treatment of those groups therefore constitutes the first restriction 
on warfare.  
 A second restriction, connected to the first, is set by the universal grasp of 
human rights, which extends to the enemy’s members of society; fundamental 
human rights need to be secured in armed conflicts for all participants.78 In 
addition, well-ordered societies should indicate the aim of their attack and the 
kind of relation they seek to establish with the regime they have attacked (LP: 
96).  
 The principles presented above constitute the framework within which 
means-end reasoning may be practiced. Again, however, Rawls weakens the 
rather strong restrictions and offers room for interpretation: exceptions are 
possible in cases of supreme emergency (LP: 94-97). Here, Rawls might refer to 
Walzer, who in Just and Unjust Wars elaborates on the question of supreme 
emergency. The rules of war can only become subject to calculation if a “defeat 
likely to bring disaster to a political community” (Walzer 2006: 268) is at risk. 
“Whenever that conflict is absent, calculation is stopped short by the rules of war 
and the rights they are designed to protect” (ibid.). 
 Rawls’s conception here is rather narrow. The criteria put forward for self-
defence, necessity and proportionality, should apply to each and every military 
conflict: the use of force is only legitimate if it is the only means available and 
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 Walzer here goes further than Rawls: “I propose to call the set of articulated norms, customs, 
professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and reciprocal 
arrangements that shape our judgements of military conduct the war convention” [emphasis in 
original] (2006: 44). This development found an expression in the Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 3 states that violations of “the laws or customs of war 
[…] shall include, but not be limited to: (a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, 
of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of, destruction or willful 
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, 
historic monuments and works of art and science; (e) plunder of public or private property.” 
 127
the amount of force should be as little as possible and proportionate to the aim 
that shall be reached. The right to self-defence indirectly includes a limitation on 
the conduct of war: only those means that are necessary to stop an attack are 
legitimate. This, however, is not as relevant for Rawls, as he seems to 
understand self-defence in a wider sense: outlaw states pose a constant threat 
to international peace and stability, no matter if an attack is imminent or not, and 
therefore may be fought by peoples.  
 
 
8. The Duty to Assist Burdened Societies  
As indicated earlier, Rawls does not leave the representatives in the OP 
alternative principles to choose or reject; missing, liberal aspirations aside, 
seems to be an international maximin principle when it comes to the distribution 
of goods. It thus remains questionable first, if the representatives would select 
the duty of assistance if they were provided with alternatives, and second, if the 
duty of assistance is sufficient or needs to be supplemented with other 
principles. Whereas the duty of assistance has already been elaborated upon in 
the previous chapter, those questions are discussed below. 
Brian Barry, in reaction to Rawls’s elaborations on international justice in 
TJ, argued that although the representatives in the international OP do not know 
whether their society is rich or poor, they might know that in the 20th century, the 
majority of societies are poor and can barely meet the basic needs of their 
people. Even if one leaves Barry’s time reference aside, as after all, the OPs are 
meant to have timeless force, the representatives may at least anticipate that 
the chances of representing an affluent society are rather poor. For the same 
reasons as individuals within liberal societies, the representatives would opt for 
“maximizing the wealth of the worst-off within any given community” arguing that 
“what this minimum is should not depend capriciously upon the good luck of 
being born into a rich society or the ill luck of being born into a poor one” (Barry 
1975: 129). As the representatives in LP, however, know that they represent 
liberal societies, which tend to be economically advanced, and as Rawls 
assumes favourable conditions, the likelihood of representing a wealthy society 
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is rather high (Kreide 2002: n. pag.). Whereas it is not in the rational interest of 
liberal peoples to “maximize the wealth of the worst-off” beyond their community, 
they might reasonably agree to the fact that a minimum should be guaranteed 
for everyone, no matter into which society he/she has been born. A principle of 
distributive justice seems reasonable, also for other reasons. 
Parallel to the discussion of the different versions of the OP, is the question 
of whether peoples or individuals are the right starting point. Whereas Rawls 
presupposes that peoples, considering themselves as independent and equal, 
are the relevant subjects, utilitarian thinkers may start from a different viewpoint, 
most likely one similar to the cosmopolitan liberalism suggested by Beitz. The 
focus then would lie on individual human beings (Tasioulas 2002: 377). 
“Cosmopolitanism is a moral individualism that states that individual persons, not 
states, are to be recognized as the primary objects for concern in international 
relations. […] As a consequence, cosmopolitanism claims that a global difference 
principle that allows not only redistribution between richer and poorer members, but 
also a correction of an unjust global structure, should be applied beyond national 
borders to counteract the arbitrariness of the territorial distribution of natural 
resources and to fight poverty” [emphasis in original] (Audard 2006b: 320).79 
 
According to Rawls, representatives in OP II and III would reject a 
utilitarian principle regulating the distribution of goods between them: “Well-
ordered peoples insist on an equality among themselves as peoples, and 
insistence rules out any form of the principle of utility” [emphasis in original] (LP: 
40). As indicated earlier, Rawls’s decision to focus on states rather than 
individuals as the primary subjects of international political theory (or 
international political philosophy) is accepted here. If one does not want a world 
state, one needs to draw borders. For a basic structure and societal 
cooperation, borders are necessary (Bock 2008: 55-57).80 
 An argument that can and should be discussed is that of the co-
responsibility of affluent societies towards poor conditions in other states. The 
unfavourable conditions under which burdened societies suffer not only result 
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 For an in depth discussion of Rawls from a cosmopolitan viewpoint see Beitz 2000: 678-683 
and Kuper 2000, who suggests a global original position (647); see also Buchanan 2000 and 
Pogge 2004. 
80
 International law, however, shows a development towards more consideration of the 
individual. The European Declaration of Human Rights, for example, considers that an individual 
can sue its state before the European Court of Justice (Becker 2005: 56f.). 
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from their own actions, but also from external factors. Rawls in LP ignores that 
“national economic policy is shaped by international economic institutions and 
powerful states” (Hurrell 2001: 48) and that those states have co-responsibility 
for the fate of poor societies (ibid.). International economic interaction is 
organized by treaties and conventions about trade. Those can be shaped more 
or less favourably for poor countries. Had the economic order been friendlier to 
poorer countries, much of today’s poverty would have been avoided (Pogge 
2004: 263f.). Moreover, historically, “existing peoples have arrived at their 
present levels of social, economic and cultural development through an 
historical process that was pervaded by enslavement, colonialism, even 
genocide” (ibid.: 262). Our economic advantage towards poor countries is thus 
also to be seen as a consequence of a historical process that devastated those 
societies. The legacy of those injustices continues today (ibid.). 
 Pogge illustrates the argument in reference to Peter Singer’s “drowning 
child in the pond” example.81 Other than Singer, Pogge does not consider the 
addressee – in the case in hand, rich societies – as bystanders, who have no 
responsibility for the child who has fallen into the pond. From Pogge’s 
perspective, affluent societies have pushed the child into the pond (ibid.: 261-
265).  
 Next to the positive duty to assist, he deems two negative duties as 
necessary: the duty not to harm as well as the duty not to take advantage of 
injustices at the expense of victims (ibid.: 278, Pogge 2001: 22). As with 
assistance, these negative duties are not only limited to the economic sphere: 
“there are plenty of poor-country governments that came to power or stay in 
power only thanks to foreign support” (Pogge 2004: 269). From this, it follows 
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 Imagine you pass by a pond and recognize that a child fell in and is in danger of drowning. 
You can easily save the child but will get your clothes wet and dirty. All (or at least almost all) 
would agree that you have a duty to safe the child from drowning and that there is no excuse for 
not doing so. Also, the fact that there are other people around who could save the child does not 
make a difference to your moral duty (Singer 1997: n. pag.). Now, “would it make any difference 
if the child were far away, in another country perhaps, but similarly in danger of death, and 
equally within your means to save, at no great cost – and absolutely no danger – to yourself? 
[…] [W]e are all in that situation of the person passing the shallow pond: we can all save lives of 
people, both children and adults, who would otherwise die, and we can do so at a very small 
cost to us: the cost of a new CD, a shirt or a night out at a restaurant or concert, can mean the 
difference between life and death to more than one person somewhere in the world” (ibid.). 
 
 130
that governments may not pursue benefits that enhance poverty abroad as that 
would harm the poor. Governments need to compensate poor people abroad for 
the benefits they gain from them and not only assist, but also reduce the unfair 
rules that generate unfair gains for them. “We are not ‘redistributing’ from the 
rich to the poor, but offsetting an unjust institutional redistribution from the poor 
to the rich – re-redistributing, if you like” [emphasis in original] (ibid.: 278). 
 Pogge draws an instructive picture to illustrate the claim: Imagine you drive 
past a child that has been hurt and must be brought to a hospital to be saved. If 
you drive on, you can morally be judged for not attending to the child’s needs. 
This may be similar to not meeting the duty of assistance. Imagine then, that you 
are the driver that hurt the child. Your inaction would then be judged more 
harshly. Upholding unjust rules that contribute to severe poverty and ignoring it 
should be counted as the second type of failure (ibid.). Following this picture, 
“our failure to make a serious effort toward poverty reduction may constitute not 
merely a lack of beneficence, but our active impoverishing, starving, and killing 
of millions of innocent people by economic means” (Pogge 2001: 15). So, next 
to the positive duty to protect persons form great harms at little cost (ibid.: 14f.) 
that derives from the child-in-the-pond example, we also have a duty to reduce 
the unfair rules of the international (economic) system, as well as a negative 
duty not to benefit from an unjust order. 
 These duties, for Pogge, are more important than the duty to assist. They 
also have an advantage as compared to assistance in that they are not sensitive 
to variations in regime type or distance, while duties to assist seem stronger 
towards societies that are culturally and territorially closer to one’s own (Pogge 
2004: 279). Next to these additional duties, Pogge also considers the duty of 
assistance as insufficient when it comes to global redistribution and develops a 
model of a global resource tax (GRT), one of many alternative principles that 
have been developed when it comes to the duty of assistance. 
“Clearly, we could eradicate severe poverty – through a reform of the 
global order or through other initiatives designed to compensate for its effects on 
the global poor – without ‘sacrificing’ the fulfilment of our own needs or even 
mildly serious interests” (Pogge 2004: 279). Following Pogge’s scheme of global 
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redistribution via global taxation, it might need only 1.13 per cent of the incomes 
of the people in high-income economies to lift those, who live below the 
international poverty line above it. In 2001, 0.22 per cent was actually provided 
for official development assistance (ibid.). 
“The basic idea is that, while each people owns and fully controls all resources 
within its national territory, it must pay a tax on any resources it chooses to extract. 
[…]The burdens of the GRT would not be borne by the owners of resources alone. 
The tax would lead to higher prices for crude oil, minerals, and so forth. […]The 
GRT is then a tax on consumption. But it taxes different kinds of consumption 
differentially. The cost of gasoline will contain a much higher portion of GRT than 
the cost of a ticket to an art museum. The tax falls on goods and services roughly 
in proportion to their resource content: in proportion to how much value each takes 
from our planet” (Pogge 1994: 200). 
 
 As the distribution of natural resources around the globe is arbitrary, 
Charles Beitz opts for a scheme of global redistribution of resources. “Citizens of 
a nation that finds itself on top of a gold mine do not gain a right to the wealth 
that might be derived from it simply because their nation is self-sufficient” (Beitz 
1999: 140). In an international OP, representatives would know that resources 
are unequally distributed as well as that they are scarce and necessary for a 
functioning domestic cooperative scheme. They would select a principle that 
provides them with the resources necessary to have a fair chance to establish a 
well-ordered basic structure and to satisfy the needs of the members of their 
society: an international resource redistribution principle (ibid.: 141-143).  
 Rainer Forst, with his conception of a principle of minimal transnational 
justice, to a certain extent tries to reconcile Rawls with Pogge.  
“According to this principle, members of societies of multiple domination have a 
legitimate claim to the resources necessary to establish a (minimally) justified 
democratic order within their political community and that this community be a 
participant of (roughly) equal standing in the global economic and political system. 
And the citizens of the societies benefiting from the present global system do have 
a collective ‘duty of assistance’, to use Rawls’s term, to provide those necessary 
resources (ranging from food, housing, and medical care to a basic education, 
information, the possibility of effective participation, and so on) to attain self-
government” [emphasis in original] (Forst 2001: 174). 
 
The principle does accept Rawls’s claim of a duty of assistance, but rejects a 
general separation of internal from external factors when it comes to economy 
and political responsibility. Unfavourable conditions, such as a lack of basic 
goods, are not generally homemade but at least in part result from the global 
system. Societies that are disadvantaged by that system have a claim to a 
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minimally fair system of discourse and cooperation in the international sphere 
and advantaged states have a duty of justice to establish those. Suitable means 
to realize the principle of minimal transnational justice are, parallel to Pogge, a 
reformation of the global economic system by giving states equal influence and 
thus power to take influence, as well as ending support of dictatorial regimes 
(Forst 2001: 174).  
 Wilfried Hinsch argues for a global difference principle, but from another 
perspective than the cosmopolitans. The duty of assistance cannot be denied, 
but it does not cover the whole ground of distributive justice in the international 
realm (Hinsch 2001: 76). In a joint scheme of production, a person that is more 
productive deserves a higher reward. Given a fixed total product, he/she 
receives a share in accordance with his/her productivity. The more productive 
thus ends up with a higher share so that the incentives argument – the bigger 
share in goods as an incentive to be more productive – holds. This may not only 
be applied to domestic, but also to international cooperation. More productive 
societies have a legitimate claim on a bigger share of the fixed total product. 
This presupposes that there is a “sufficiently dense economic cooperation”, the 
“value of this product is largely determined by economic factors beyond the 
agent’s control” (ibid.: 74). The more-productive states have a collective claim of 
deservingness and thus, access to a bigger share of their domestic product. 
They do not, however, have a claim to the whole of it (ibid.: 75). 
 
 Although the alternatives introduced seem to be in line with Rawls’s theory, 
he rejects them when it comes to the international arena, for four main reasons. 
1. Global distributive justice has no target or cut-off point. With reference to 
Beitz’s model, Rawls criticizes that redistributing resources neither has a target 
nor an end. Thereby, states are no longer autarkic (LP: 116). The duty of 
assistance, however, aims towards enabling burdened societies to manage their 
own affairs in an at least decent way. Further, without a cut-off point, 
redistribution might even create injustices; “poorer societies could claim a 
revenue sharing from richer societies, even if they had the same starting 
conditions but failed to establish a fair and efficient institutional structure and 
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ended up in a worse position” (Kreide 2002: n. pag., see also LP: 17). However, 
following the difference principle, members of the productive society would still 
have more than the poorer one; the first would only have to provide the latter 
with a share of its benefits. Rejecting an international difference principle would 
also, for the same reasons, lead to a rejection of the domestic one (Kreide 2002: 
n. pag.). The reason why there is redistribution on a domestic level is due to 
combined effort, the cooperation that is necessary to gain those benefits. As 
Rawls in LP considers states as self-sufficient and sovereign entities, an 
international scheme of cooperation does not exist within his framework. The 
claim that whereas the duty of assistance has an aim, redistribution does not 
have a clear target is not true for all approaches. The reduction of poverty and 
the satisfaction of basic needs are two possible examples (ibid.). A duty of 
assistance can also meet these demands, perhaps even more effectively by 
ensuring that basic needs are met. If taken seriously, poverty could be 
eradicated. 
 2. There are not sufficient common sympathies on the international level. 
The ties between societies are weaker than within them as they are more distant 
to one another. Whereas there is a scheme of cooperation within society, where 
people share common sympathies, these ties are lacking on an international 
level. From within a realistic utopian framework, one thus has to assume that 
representatives of peoples would not opt for global redistribution as the ties and 
sympathies are too weak. In Rawls’s view, no people “will be willing to count the 
losses to itself as outweighed by gains to other peoples; and therefore the 
principle of utility, and other moral principles discussed in moral philosophy, are 
not even candidates for a Law of Peoples” (LP: 60). Peoples are not expected to 
act paternalistically (LP: 111). The difference principle relies on social 
cooperation and reciprocity among the members of society, neither of which 
exist in the international realm (Freeman 2007: 446). 
 In opposition to this, cosmopolitans hold that membership in a society 
does not imply an automatic claim on a share of the benefits it produces from 
which foreigners are generally excluded. “Shared political membership does not 
justify giving distributive priority to fellow citizens” (Ypi 2010: 542). Membership, 
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however, seems to be relevant. Taking the family as a parallel example, siblings 
should be cared for by their parents, irrelevant of their natural endowments or 
character, which does not expand to children born into other families. It thus 
does make a difference to which society one belongs, as it does make a 
difference into which family one is born (Freeman 2007: 443). The difference 
principle applies to the cooperative relations existent due to the basic structure 
and institutions of a democratic society. It does not extend to the “more fluid and 
inchoate collaborative relations among world inhabitants” (ibid.). Freeman’s 
argument might lose its force if international cooperation and communication 
increase over time, which is a likely tendency. While the difference principle in 
the here and now is not applicable to the international sphere, it might become 
adequate in a future where cooperative relations and institutions exist on a 
global level (Freeman 2003: 50). 
 3. Central is the well-ordered character of peoples, which does not 
depend on wealth. Following Rawls, every society is generally capable of 
establishing a well-ordered regime on the basis of the resources it has and thus 
does not need to be wealthy. That well-ordered societies tend to be wealthy or 
at least able to acquire the means necessary to uphold a well-ordered basic 
structure is linked to their political culture and the productivity it enhances. 
Instead of direct economic assistance, addressing the burdens that keep 
societies from maintaining a well-ordered basic structure is therefore crucial 
(Hutchings 2010: 115). Redistribution might relax the problem of global poverty. 
Establishing well-ordered societies that effectively manage their own affairs 
might solve it. 
4. Societies hold a right to self-determination. The right to self-
determination implies that societies are also self-responsible. If equal societies 
by choice develop differently, why should the more industrialized, wealthier one 
pay for the other? They might have approached and solved problems differently 
and therefore ended up on different economic levels. Redistribution is not 
necessary (LP: 116f.). If they cannot manage their own affairs in a reasonable 
way, but are willing to, they need to be assisted until they are able to, and no 
further than that. In addition, following Rawls, cosmopolitanism does not 
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consider and respect the diversity of different cultures and national identities as 
well as the principle of reasonable pluralism. This carries the risk of imperialism 
(Audard 2006b: 320f.). 
  
Rawls rejects a global difference principle in favour of the duty of 
assistance and he does so for several convincing reasons: instead of mitigating 
inequalities, the duty of assistance strives to enable societies to manage their 
own affairs in an at least decent way out of their own powers and with their own 
resources. If taken seriously, it could solve the problem of malnutrition and 
severe poverty. As peoples are moral agents, they would not, arguing from 
within the Rawlsian framework, maintain a global economic system that does 
not allow their assistance to be effective. 
 Against the claim that the duty of assistance is insufficient, one can argue 
that it requires from peoples “an increase in their development aid as well as the 
creation of food and educational programs. In the long run, this would lead to an 
improvement in the living situation of a huge number of people” (Kreide 2009: 
108, see also Hurrell 2001: 50, Wenar 2001: 88). Following Charles Beitz, the 
duty of assistance “imposes a significant international distributive requirement in 
the nonideal world – though it may require less than the most plausible 
cosmopolitan theory, it almost certainly requires substantially more of the 
wealthy countries than they do now or are likely to do in the near future” (Beitz 
2000: 694). This assessment fits well into Rawls’s realistic utopian framework, 
sketching a feasible ideal. 
Although the duty of assistance incorporates much more than most of 
Rawls’s critics give credit for and might even be a concept able to commit 
(extreme) poverty to history, the negative duties Pogge puts forward seem 
worthy as additional criteria: peoples may not harm others in pursuing their 
economic interests and they may not benefit from injustices by directly or 
indirectly supporting the exploitation of humans abroad. Peoples should agree to 
those negative duties due to their moral character. 
Reducing poverty, also in reference to regimes that would not fall into the 
category of burdened societies or that could be classified as burdened outlaws, 
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might also prevent human rights violations or aggressive foreign policies. If 
possible, “we”, to use Pogge’s claim, should thus “provide a path out of poverty 
to that great majority of all poor peoples whom we can reach without the use of 
force” (Pogge 2001: 14). 
With his concern for an at least decent living standard, Rawls’s duty of 
assistance poses a weak cosmopolitan argument, as compared to the strong 
version of a principle of international distributive justice (Freeman 2007: 439). 
This weak cosmopolitanism, also evident in his human rights minimalism, 
however, seems to “be stronger than his cosmopolitan critics allow” (ibid.: 442). 
 
 
Conclusion 
The principles of the Law of Peoples (except for the duty of assistance) are 
well-established principles of international law. It therefore is not surprising that 
Rawls’s representatives in OP II and III select these principles as an overlapping 
consensus between them. The reach of the principles and the justification 
thereof, however, are somewhat unclear. The principle of equality only holds for 
members of the Society of Peoples, whereas the right to self-defence extends to 
all societies that are non-aggressive and honour core human rights, which in 
turn are universal. That Rawls partly limits the grasp to well-ordered members of 
the Society of Peoples seems reasonable, considering that only those take part 
in the selection process. That he extends the grasp towards non-members, 
thereby establishing a right to war against them, is in need of some justification. 
Rawls does not present explicit justification for universal human rights, which 
may be considered as a weakness of his theory.  
A problem resulting from Rawls’s inclusion of decent regimes emerges 
when focusing on “liberal minds” within illiberal decent societies. The duty to 
respect the freedom and independence of such regimes bans liberal 
governments from supporting liberal groups within that society, for example by 
funding their activities or arguing in favour of their demands. As Rawls at least 
hopes that decent peoples may willingly reform towards liberal ideas, this ban 
may hinder democratic development within decent societies. The principle of 
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reasonable pluralism and the danger that involvement in the domestic affairs of 
decent societies may cause bitterness and resentment are convincing 
arguments against the criticism. 
A weakness (occurring at different points of Rawls’s international theory) is 
Rawls’s practice of formulating strong claims or positions and then, in a further 
step, weakening them. The restrictions on the conduct of war, for example, are 
first presented as “lines we must not cross” and then relativized in cases of 
“supreme emergency” (LP: 97). 
As Rawls states, “there is no single possible Law of Peoples, but rather a 
family of reasonable such laws” (LP: 4). Rawls indirectly establishes a right to 
war. Restrictions on the war conduct should include the criteria of proportionality 
and necessity (and of course many other specifications). There may be more 
existent and/or evolving norms in the ongoing process of the development of 
customary international law. The Law of Peoples does not need to be static. The 
more the international community develops towards peace, stability and justice 
in the international realm, the more (reasonable) principles may be added to the 
overlapping consensus and be established as norms of customary international 
law. For now, Rawls presents a set he considers as feasible, such as a minimal 
set of human rights that may be accepted and honoured by all well-ordered 
societies and that may be enforced if necessary. 
“[T]he Law of Peoples exists within ideal theory” (Brown 2004: 36). 
Nevertheless, the principles can be understood as normative claims. In addition, 
Rawls partly refers to “a Law of Peoples”, so other sets of just principles of 
cooperation are possible, perhaps like the UN Charter or Kant’s principles as 
presented in Towards Perpetual Peace. Thus, existing democracies might be on 
the right track and keep these sets of principles as guidelines for their foreign 
policy. Rawls’s claim that the two powers of sovereignty must be limited has 
already happened through the development of a net of international conventions 
and declarations. Still, this net often lacks efficiency in enforcing the principles 
covered by those conventions. The large amount of international treaties 
praising cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution, prohibiting the use of force 
and proclaiming the protection of human rights time and again, have proven to 
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be, at best, good intentions. They pose, with exceptions, moral, rather than 
legal, enforceable claims. Rawls presents a set of principles that is likely to be 
supported (not only) by well-ordered regimes. His elaborations on the principles 
of the Law of Peoples offer theoretical support for these customary principles of 
international law, thereby potentially contributing to their future development, 
and within that, to more peaceful, stable and just international relations. 
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5. Rawls’s Society of Peoples – Peaceful, Stable and Just 
Yet we must not allow these great evils of the past and present to undermine our hope for the 
future of our society as belonging to a Society of liberal and decent Peoples around the world” 
(LP: 22). 
 
As Rawls´s international theory is meant as a realistic utopia, so the 
Society of Peoples is also realistically utopian. LP shall illustrate the conditions 
under which all liberal and decent regimes could be members of the Society of 
Peoples (LP: 126). “By showing how the social world may realize the features of 
a realistic utopia, political philosophy provides a long-term goal of political 
endeavor, and in working towards it gives meaning to what we can do today” 
(LP: 128). To investigate how such an institution could ideally be constituted 
within the limits of the international system can be helpful in two ways. The 
Society of Peoples could serve as a model either for a new international 
institution, or for reforming existing institutions, thereby providing the “long-term 
goal of political endeavor” that Rawls seeks. In undertaking this task, one has to 
keep in mind Rawls’s overall aim, which is to set out the terms of a lasting and 
stable peace, to be reached via a stable and fair system of international 
cooperation. 
Rawls uses the term “Society of Peoples” more than a hundred times in his 
monograph without providing a detailed account of what it might look in practice. 
As Rawls leaves this question more or less open, it could be argued that a 
clearer sketch of the Society of Peoples is not essential for understanding his 
theory. It may be merely a way to refer to “all those peoples who follow the 
ideals and principles of the Law of Peoples in their mutual relations” (LP: 3). So, 
why is it worth pursuing this matter? In fact, the Society of Peoples within 
Rawls’s theory serves as a focus for the establishment of peaceful, stable and 
just relations between peoples, uniting well-ordered societies under the Law of 
Peoples. It is, therefore, crucial to his project. 
In this chapter, Rawls’s concept of the Society of Peoples is investigated in 
order to eventually be able to provide a more detailed picture of the notion and 
to assess its potential contribution to a more stable international realm as a 
constitutive element of the pathway to a decent peace. For this purpose, the 
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information provided by Rawls is summarized, and the basic aspects he leaves 
open are identified by deliberating on the following questions: Is the Society of 
Peoples more than a loose federation of liberal and decent societies? Who 
would be its members and who decide on membership? Can membership be 
lost and if so, under what circumstances? What rights and duties would 
members of the Society of Peoples hold? In a further step, two sources, the 
concept of a League of Democracies and the reality of the European Union 
(EU), are introduced and leaned on to formulate reasonable suggestions on how 
to fill the gaps. The League of Democracies is a concept with a similar aim to 
that of the Society of Peoples in that it strives to unite capable actors that share 
values and common sympathies to tackle the problems the world has to meet in 
the 21st century, which has not been realized; the European Union, were it not 
limited to Europe, could be considered as an existing model for a society of 
liberal peoples. The EU is built on normative values and makes the regime type 
(democracy) an essential precondition for membership, in both cases following 
Rawls. The level of integration reached by the EU is, however, far beyond 
Rawls’s vision of a Society of Peoples, as economic relations are irrelevant to 
his theory. As the EU is a complex institution, only those aspects relevant for the 
analysis are introduced and discussed. The hope is that by connecting Rawls’s 
ideas to these other conceptions, a deeper understanding of his theory can be 
generated by providing theoretical and practical reference points for his realistic 
utopia. Some conclusions concerning what can be learnt from Rawls’s concept 
in relation to existing institutions are drawn, thus showing both the gains and the 
problems that the idea of a Society of Peoples may pose to the international 
system. 
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Relations Between Peoples, or: The Society of Peoples 
What is the Society of Peoples? At a first glance it seems to be merely a 
collective term, embracing all those societies that qualify as well-ordered. Rawls 
uses capital letters for the term (as he does with the Law of Peoples), which 
indicates that the concept might be of importance.82 So what else may it be? 
The social contract on the domestic level serves as a foundation for a 
society’s basic structure, which goes beyond the territorial context of a group of 
people living within the same area. The Society of Peoples should also be more 
than a mere group of well-ordered but unconnected societies. As the social 
contract on the domestic level serves to establish a state, one could argue that 
the Law of Peoples might constitute the foundations of a world state. However, 
following Kant, Rawls rejects the idea of a world state, as it could either lead to 
the emergence of a fragile empire, to despotism or to anarchy (LP: 36, Kant 
2006: 8:367). For Rawls, the Society of Peoples must leave room for the self-
determination of its members in “some kind of loose or confederative form” (LP: 
61). The principles of the Law of Peoples thus do not constitute a blueprint for 
the basic structure of a (world) state; they rather inform the organisation of 
relations between states. The Society of Peoples, for Rawls, should be a loose 
federation of well-ordered societies, built on the principles of reasonable and fair 
modes of cooperation, regulating the internal and external relations of member 
states in terms of the principles of the Law of Peoples. 
 
 
Tasks to Be Met 
Some of the tasks and duties of the Society of Peoples have been 
introduced and discussed previously: a limited right to war, the duty of 
assistance and to honour human rights. It is also part of the responsibility of the 
Society of Peoples to establish institutions or cooperative organizations to take 
                                                     
82
 Rawls uses the term “society of” in different forms and variations thereby referring to all those 
states that possess of the named quality: the “society of democratic peoples” (LP: 53), the 
“society of liberal peoples” (LP: 45f., 84), “society of disordered peoples” (LP: 37f.). Those are, 
however, not written in capital letters. Another reasonable explanation for capitalizing the Society 
of Peoples, while referring to a “society of well-ordered peoples” (LP: 36) on other occasions, 
may be that the former is part of ideal theory. 
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provisions for mutual assistance and set standards of fairness also for trade. 
These institutions should be designed for mutual benefits and to deal with non-
well-ordered societies (LP: 89, 115). The aim of these responsibilities is the 
establishment and maintenance of peaceful and stable relations within the 
Society of Peoples, the widening a zone of peace towards as many regimes as 
possible, and constraining outlaw states (LP: 48). Rawls conceives of these 
institutions as follows: 
“For well-ordered peoples to achieve this long-run aim [to bring all societies to 
honour the Law of Peoples], they should establish new institutions and practices to 
serve as a kind of confederative centre and public forum of their common opinion 
and policy towards non-well-ordered regimes. They can do this within institutions 
such as the United Nations or by forming separate alliances of well-ordered 
peoples on certain issues. This confederative center may be used both to formulate 
and to express the opinion of the well-ordered societies. There they may expose to 
public view the unjust and cruel institutions of oppressive and expansionist regimes 
and their violations of human rights” (LP: 93). 
 
Such institutions may also be used to put pressure on outlaw states by 
jointly denying them economic or other assistance and benefits gained by 
cooperative efforts (LP: 93). This task does not derive directly from the principles 
of the Law of Peoples, but rather is a consequence of those principles, as 
meeting them effectively makes shared institutions almost inevitable. “The 
institutional structure of the Society of Peoples does not include an international 
analog of the state – there is no ‘world government’ or superstate – but rather a 
network of cooperative organizations” (Beitz 2000: 673). Members of a Society 
of Peoples may use institutions, such as the “United Nations ideally conceived”, 
as a mouthpiece to criticize “unjust domestic institutions in other countries and 
clear cases of the violation of human rights” (LP: 36). 
Even if we conceive of the Society of Peoples as a loose federation, 
membership into this cooperative scheme must somehow be decided. Who is a 
member of good standing and who qualifies as well-ordered? This decision is 
crucial as it changes the foreign relations to other well-ordered regimes and 
grants the state a limited right to war and a duty of assistance. As shown above, 
cooperative organisations are crucial for coordinating mutual assistance, 
guaranteeing fair trade relations and to effectively meeting the additional tasks. 
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Central questions concerning the Society of Peoples remain open in LP, 
one of which is the form of its basic structure. Which institutions and means are 
needed to meet the tasks effectively and to support the aim of stability, peace 
and justice internally and externally? How would processes of political decision 
making work? Closely connected to these questions is one of membership. Who 
is a member and who decides on membership? Can it be lost? A related 
question is who decides on whether circumstances constitute a right to (military) 
intervention? As Rawls provides only very little information on these important 
questions, two related concepts, one a set of ideas that might never be realized, 
the other a complex supranational institution, are leaned on: the League of 
Democracies and the EU. With respect to the EU, the chapter does not engage 
into a discussion of politics but focuses instead on the basic structure. Below, 
both concepts are introduced and then used to explore the questions formulated 
above, thereby concentrating on questions of membership, rights and duties as 
well as the basic structure, and in particular, the institutions needed to meet the 
tasks. 
 
 
The League of Democracies 
Both the idea of a League of Democracies, and Rawls’s LP, build on the 
same assumption: democratic peace. If one understands the Society of Peoples 
as an organization as it should be, the League of Democracies might be a more 
realistic concept for such an institution, which is limited to democratic societies, 
and a step towards Rawls’s realistically utopian ambition, a Society of Peoples 
that would be open for all regimes that qualify as decent, or maybe even what 
Rawls ultimately aims at: a society of liberal peoples. 
The globalized world has to face problems its actual institutions cannot 
cope with, such as international terrorism, pandemics or climate change, 
because the only universal organization currently in existence lacks efficiency 
and is unlikely to reform to better this deficiency in time (Stedman 2008: 2). A 
new actor is needed, especially when it comes to questions of humanitarian 
intervention. “The most likely and morally defensible version of this alternative 
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would be a coalition of democratic, human rights-respecting states, bound 
together by a treaty” (Buchanan 2007: 450). An organization uniting the 
democracies of the world could be able to face the problems of the 21st century, 
if equipped with the power to do so: a League of Democracies.83 Such an 
organization could legitimately – though currently illegally – intervene in the 
absence of Security Council authorization in cases where human rights 
violations make intervention necessary (ibid.: 450f.). There is a family of both 
more and less precise ideas around the League. In the following, a composite, 
that might as such not enjoy the full support of the individual proponents of the 
League, is presented. 
 The advocated new institution should unite the forces of the most capable 
agents sharing common interests and therefore able to act in unison (Daalder 
and Lindsay 2007: n. pag.). 
“Democracies share the most important value of all—a common dedication to 
ensuring the life, liberty and happiness of free peoples. And democracies constitute 
the world’s most capable states in terms of military potential, economic capability 
and political weight. A Concert that brings the established democracies together 
into a single institution will be best able to meet the many challenges that beset the 
new age of global politics” (ibid.). 
 
Democracies already function well, possess approved procedures to overcome 
disagreement and trust one another’s commitments. That NATO and the EU 
work well according to their specific roles shows that cooperation between 
democracies can be managed peacefully and effectively (ibid.). 
 
 
Basic Structure 
According to its proponents, the League of Democracies shall organize 
“the world’s democratic governments in a framework of binding mutual 
obligations” (ibid.) and work alongside the UN, using its joint voice to push 
towards reform. “Binding” might include law, constituting duties states are 
                                                     
83
 The concept has been promoted by the Republican John McCain in his 2008 presidential 
election campaign in the US. A similar institution, already realized though hardly recognized or 
capable of action, is the Community of Democracies, a global intergovernmental coalition of 
democratic countries, instituted to promote democracy and to strengthen democratic norms and 
institutions around the world, founded in 2000 (Community of Democracies 2009: n. pag.). 
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obliged to meet and recommending punishment should they not do so. It should 
not be a “debating club”, but a legitimate and capable institution. 
Such a League, one could assume, would have a democratic structure. 
Decisions would thus be made by majority or supermajority voting, either in 
terms of “one country one vote”, or according to the respective countries’ 
population. As there would be states with proportionally larger populations, such 
as India, and others with smaller ones, such as the Netherlands, which would 
hardly be able to wield any influence if the latter form of voting were in place, a 
“one country one vote” decision-making process would be more likely. 
Cooperation should be based on trust and respect. Therefore, the collective will 
of the League’s members must be respected (McCain 2008: n. pag.). 
 
 
Tasks and Means 
The purpose of a League is first to meet the challenges of the 21st century, 
second to make the world a safer place by spreading democracy and promoting 
human rights, and third to give underrepresented democracies a stronger voice 
in the international arena. Promoting democracies and pushing non-democratic 
regimes towards reform would be for the benefit of all. By coordinating the 
diverse initiatives of the world’s democracies to promote the spread of 
democracy, this might be done more effectively. In addition, the League might 
offer incentives, to candidates looking for membership, to reform democratically, 
as does the EU. The League would be an international institution representing 
global realities. Non-Western democracies, such as India or Brazil, could be 
integrated into the global democratic order and be given a stronger voice. It 
might even serve as the institutional embodiment of democratic peace 
(Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006: 25f.). 
To act efficiently, the League would need an independent budget and at 
best, forces that it could command. As it is unlikely that it would have forces of 
its own, a structure similar to and in close cooperation with NATO, could be 
maintained. If, for example, the League decided that a humanitarian intervention 
was justified, member states should not have the possibility to block the 
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intervention by not providing money or troops. To be able to act quickly, the 
League would need permanent institutions and representatives, such as a full-
time secretariat as well as regular ministerial meetings and summits (ibid.). 
 
 
Membership 
There is a rough consensus on what the criteria for membership should 
approximately be. Member states should hold regular, free and fair elections, 
guarantee basic civil and political, as well as individual, rights by law. The 
League ought to be open towards all states meeting the required criteria. As 
such, it would be a potentially universal alliance, composed of diverse countries 
from all around the globe (Daalder and Lindsay 2007: n. pag.).84 As the criteria 
for membership within the Society of Peoples are rather clear – a reasonably 
just liberal or decent basic structure offering a meaningful role in the processes 
of political decision-making and the protection of core human rights – the 
question of “who decides how” is of greater interest but has neither been clearly 
articulated by Rawls for his Society of Peoples, nor by proponents of such a 
League of Democracies.85 
 
 
The European Union – A Regional Society of Liberal Peoples? 
The European Union emphasizes that its foreign relations are guided by 
normative principles, amongst others peace, democracy, human rights, equality, 
social solidarity and sustainable development. These values are articulated in 
several documents, such as the consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
European Union (CVTEU), the European Consensus on Development and the 
                                                     
84
 Daalder and Lindsay consider around 60 societies as possible candidates (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2007: n. pag.) whereas McCain refers to 100 (McCain 2008: n. pag.). The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy in 2008 counted only 30 full democracies (as well as 50 
flawed democracies) (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008g: 2). 
85
 Neither allowing the membership of non-democratic regimes, as has been done in reference 
to the Community of Democracies, nor a “coalition of the willing”, both spearheaded by the US 
as is the concept of a League, seem to be suitable models (Hechtl 2010: 326).  
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Treaty of Lisbon86. The principle of solidarity not only applies to inner-EU 
relations but also shapes development and trade policies (Manners 2008: 23-
25). 
The Treaty on the European Union names, amongst others, the same 
values that are promoted by Rawls’s Society of Peoples: a respect for human 
rights, pluralism, and tolerance. Below, the focus lies on those aspects of the EU 
that might help in drawing a clearer picture of a Society of Peoples. 
 
 
Basic Structure 
“The European Union (EU) is not a federation like the United States. Nor is it 
simply an organisation for co-operation between governments, like the United 
Nations. It is, in fact, unique. The countries that make up the EU (its ‘member 
states’) remain independent sovereign nations but they pool their sovereignty in 
order to gain a strength and world influence none of them could have on their own” 
(ECinst: n. pag.87). 
 
The EU possesses a broad institutional framework, embracing, next to the core 
institutions such as the Parliament, the Commission and the Council, 
consultative, financial and other specialized bodies. The focus hereafter lies on 
the core institutions, as they are central to the basic structure. 
The European Parliament (EP) is directly elected every five years by the 
citizens of the EU in order to represent their interests and democratic will. Every 
EU citizen is entitled to vote and stand as candidate. The EP’s main purpose is 
to pass European law (partly in cooperation with the Council), to democratically 
supervision other institutions and additionally, it has authority over the budget 
(shared with the Council) (ECep: n. pag.88). 
The Council of the European Union “shall provide the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political 
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 “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and 
fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the 
child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter” (European Union 2007b: art. 4,5). 
87
 European Commission (Ed.): EU institutions and other bodies; hereafter cited as ECinst. 
88
 European Commission (Ed.): The European Parliament; hereafter cited as ECep. 
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directions and priorities thereof” (CVTEU: art. 15,189). Operating on an 
intergovernmental basis, the Council accommodates the individual preferences 
of each member state around a common position. It is the EU’s main decision-
making body. Its responsibilities comprise the passing of European laws (shared 
with the EP), the coordination of the broad economic policies of member states, 
the signing of international agreements between the EU and other states or 
organizations, the approval of the budget, and the development of the EU’s joint 
foreign and security policy (ECceu: n. pag.90). 
The European Council, made up of the heads of government of the 
member states and the President of the European Commission, meets four 
times a year and sets general guidelines for integration. Decisions on specific 
issue-areas are taken during ministerial meetings.91 The presidency rotates 
every six months. The country hosting the presidency takes charge of the 
Council agenda and decision making processes vary from consensus to 
qualified majority votes (ECceu).92 
The European Commission represents the EU as a whole and acts 
independently from the national governments. Amongst its tasks is to propose 
European law to Parliament and Council93, implement decisions taken by 
Council and Parliament, manage daily business, run programmes (such as the 
Erasmus program for student exchange within the EU), spend funds, apply and 
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 European Union (2007a): Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union; hereafter 
cited as CVTEU. 
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 European Commission (Ed.): The Council of the European Union; hereafter cited as ECceu. 
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 One of each member’s ministers attends the meetings depending on the subject matter. They 
constitute a specialised council of which there are nine: General Affairs and External Relations; 
Economic and Financial Affairs; Justice and Home Affairs; Employment, Social Policy, Health 
and Consumer Affairs, Competitiveness; Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; 
Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment; Education, Youth and Culture. The ministers sign for 
their governments and are answerable to their national parliaments and citizens. Thereby, the 
democratic legitimacy of the Council is ensured (ECceu). 
92
 On most issues, the Council takes decisions by qualified majority voting; countries with lager 
populations have more weight, though less populous countries are attributed more weight than 
they would have proportionately. In sensitive areas, such as foreign and security policy, 
decisions have to be unanimous. To reach a qualified majority, the majority of members, in some 
cases two-thirds, have to approve, and a minimum of 255 votes have to be cast in favour of the 
proposal, constituting 73.9 per cent of the total. In addition, a member state may ask for 
confirmation that the votes in favour represent at least 62 per cent of the total population of the 
Union (ECceu). 
93
 The Commission is the sole institution holding the right to initiate EU law in accordance with 
the principle of subsidiarity (ECec). 
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enforce European law (in cooperation with the Court of Justice), negotiate 
agreements with non-members (ECec: n. pag.94), execute the budget, and 
represent the Union externally, except for matters relating to its foreign and 
security policy (CVTEU: art. 17,1). Decisions are taken on a majority voting 
system: at least 14 of the 27 commissioners must opt in favour of a proposal 
(ECec). 
 
 
Tasks and Means 
The first main purpose of the EU was the pursuit of interests via economic 
integration (European Commission 2007: 4), but it has significantly broadened 
its scope since. Amongst others, a duty to common defence, as well as a 
command of assistance to societies in need, can be identified. Assisting 
societies that suffer from “natural or man-made disasters”, fighting world 
poverty, promoting global development and ensuring fair rules for world trade 
are all aspects of the EU’s common policies (CVTEU: art. 21,2, European 
Commission 2007: 53). The EU as a whole is the world’s biggest donor of official 
development assistance (ibid.). Furthermore, the Union acts as an exporter of its 
values; principles of human rights and democracy are part of the EU’s bilateral 
relations with countries receiving support.95 While there is at least a directive to 
assist societies in need, there is a clear duty to defend allied states “by all the 
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter” (CVTEU: art. 42,7). Aside from joint defence, the EU covers provisions 
for economic and military intervention into other states, also in harmony with the 
UN Charter, including peace keeping or conflict prevention programmes (ibid.: 
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 European Commission (Ed.): The European Commission; hereafter cited as ECec. 
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 Reconciling development assistance with normative values promoted by the EU, as done in 
the Cotonou Agreement (democracy and human rights), is difficult from a Rawlsian perspective, 
as a right to self-determination is granted to burdened societies. Security concerns also seem to 
motivate EU development assistance, given the extensive bilateral aid EU-members granted to 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Manners 2008: 25-27). 
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art. 24,1). Competences within the EU are organized according to the principle 
of subsidiarity.96 
To meet its tasks, the EU uses its power and voice jointly to exert influence 
at international organisations and forums. Generally, members are to represent 
EU interests and positions in international organisations and at conferences. 
Members shall consult one another on questions of security and foreign policy 
touching EU interests, and show mutual solidarity (CVTEU: art. 32, 34). 
Within the frame of a common foreign and security policy, the EU may 
draw on national civilian and military assets and use them for missions outside 
its territory in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Members shall 
make those assets available to the EU (CVTEU: art. 42). There is, however, no 
joint European foreign policy when it comes to security and defence. These 
areas fall in the domain of the Council, and member states are very reluctant to 
create a common policy. The EU does not maintain an army. Personnel belong 
to member states, which maintain command over them (ECceu). The differing 
national positions on these sensitive matters are negotiated and coordinated by 
the Council. The EU operates in peace missions abroad, in many cases in 
association with the UN. The Council may entrust a group of member states with 
the fulfilment of one of the tasks if they are willing and capable to do so (CVTEU: 
art. 44,1). 
 
 
Membership 
The EU “welcomes membership applications from any democratic 
European country” (European Commission 2007: 3). Next to economic 
demands, criteria for membership include normative claims: “Membership 
requires […] stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Council 
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 “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Union level” (CVTEU: art. 5,3). 
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1993: 13). The EU offers candidates aid in reaching the criteria needed for 
membership, for example through economic assistance or by providing training 
in EU law and practice (ibid.: 14f., 32f.). If the conditions for membership are 
met, the application has to be welcomed by a majority within Parliament, and the 
European Council, after consultation with the Commission, must vote 
unanimously for the membership to take effect (CVTEU: art. 49). 
Members have the option to withdraw from the Union, in which case they 
have to negotiate the terms of their withdrawal with the Council.97 There is, 
however, no provision for expelling a member state (Athanassiou 2009: 32). If a 
member state breaches EU principles, its representatives can be deprived of 
some of the rights granted to them under the Treaty of the European Union, 
including the right to vote. For that to happen, a complex procedure has to be 
passed, starting with a minimum of one third of the member states proposing to 
Parliament or Council that a serious breach is at hand or at risk of occurring, and 
ending with the European Council determining a violation and thereon acting 
unanimously. The Commission, functioning as a safeguard for EU law, can also 
take action in cases of non-compliance of member states by launching an 
infringement procedure: the respective government is officially notified of its 
infringement of EU law and a timeframe for a response is set. If the matter 
cannot be settled, the Commission passes the case to the Court of Justice, 
which may then impose penalties (ECec). 
 
 
How a Society of Peoples Might Be Constituted 
Although the level of integration within the EU is more advanced than it 
might be within a Society of Peoples, it can function as a model for the basic 
structure of the Society of Peoples, because member states remain independent 
and sovereign actors. As does the EU, the Society might need similar structures 
to pool its member states’ power and influence and gain strength in the 
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 Though it seems more than unlikely that a current member would wish to withdraw, if so, a 
unilateral withdrawal would not be possible; to legally withdraw, a negotiated agreement with the 
other members is a precondition, for which the Treaty has to be amended, wherefore consensus 
between the member states is needed (Athanassiou 2009: 30). 
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promotion of shared aims and the realisation of joint obligations under the 
principle of subsidiarity. Complying with the duty of assistance and intervening in 
order to stop gross violations of human rights is more effectively practiced 
jointly, coordinated by an interstate institution, which makes institutions, such as 
the European Council and the European Commission, necessary. 
The basic structure of the Society of Peoples could be established on the 
basis of the EU model. As a liberal democratic background structure is not 
shared by all member states, and as democratic procedures might therefore not 
be accepted, an elected parliament is unlikely. The Council and Commission, 
however, seem suitable candidates for reasonable and effective institutions 
within the Society of Peoples. 
The Council would be in charge of decisions concerning the right to go to 
war and the general scope of foreign aid programmes or other forms in which 
the duty of assistance might be realized. As processes of political decision-
making cannot be expected to be decided through democratic procedures, one 
would anticipate a necessary consensus, maybe including the possibility to 
abstain from voting, thereby being excluded from the programme or action any 
given decision entails. Modelled on the basis of a similar procedure by the EU, 
when 
“abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by 
making a formal declaration [...]. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the 
decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual 
solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to 
conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member 
States shall respect its position” (CVTEU: art. 31,1). 
 
Member states might choose to abstain from voting, instead of blocking an 
intervention, if their participation would conflict with other alliances or might have 
a negative impact on relations with countries they are closely linked to. If 
unanimity cannot be reached, member states would not lose their right to war 
against outlaw states (or states threatening their security) as Rawls does not 
bind the right to war to the consent of the Society of Peoples. Nevertheless, the 
question of war is a reasonable one to vote and decide upon, as joint action 
would be more effective and could be considered more legitimate than states 
alone acting of their own accord. 
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 As integration within the Society of Peoples is, by far, not as deep as it is 
within the EU, most decisions might be taken between the heads of government 
of the member states. They would decide on questions of war and which country 
receives which form and amount of assistance; the donors would probably not 
want to give away their control over the flow of money. Specialized Councils 
might only be needed for matters of defence and human rights promotion as well 
as foreign aid programmes. These would, working hand in hand with the 
Commission, then design concrete programmes and report to the Council if 
requested. The Council would also decide on the Society’s budget98, whereas 
the Commission would be in charge of spending it according to decisions made, 
as well as for general administrative and organisational matters. 
The Commission would serve as a permanent representative institution 
that enables the Society to act and react quickly and to guarantee continuous 
and effective work, for example, when it comes to foreign aid programmes. It 
would organize daily tasks and coordinate running programmes and initiatives 
decided upon by the Council. As the Commission might be overstaffed if each 
member provides one commissioner, they may be appointed on a rotating basis. 
A representative for each member state is not necessary, as the Commission 
would not be representing the member states but the Society of Peoples as a 
whole.  
As membership within the Society of Peoples is not restricted either 
regionally or according to the type of regime, principally all sovereign states that 
meet the criteria necessary for peoplehood could apply for membership. Once 
established on the initiative of states that should, without a doubt, meet the 
relevant criteria, Council members would have to reach a consensus concerning 
new members.  
Because regimes might disqualify from membership within the Society of 
Peoples, the organization would need a procedure to expel members if 
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 The Society of Peoples would need an independent budget to pay administrative and 
operational expenses. Costs related to programmes to attend both its duty of assistance and any 
necessary economic or military interventions, as both would have to be decided upon by the 
Council, could be covered by the member states according to their GDP, as regulated within the 
EU. 
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necessary, which is not given within the EU. It seems reasonable that the same 
procedure for becoming part of the Society of Peoples should take effect: the 
Council would need to decide unanimously (minus the candidate to be expelled) 
on the exclusion of the member state. Before that could happen, a procedure, 
equal to that within the EU (notifications of a breach of the principles of the Law 
of Peoples, and the possibility to react to the criticism, followed by sanctions and 
penalties), seems reasonable, except for cases where direct action is needed.99 
 
 
How a Society of Peoples Might Improve International Relations 
Rawls’s Society of Peoples might contribute to more peace and stability in 
the international realm, eventually leading to a lasting peace, in two ways. First, 
if it was set up as an international institution, it would constitute a peaceful 
haven for its members, protect human rights within and beyond its territory and 
assist burdened societies in establishing well-ordered, and therefore peaceful 
and stable regimes. Second, understood as an international institution as it 
should be, it might help to evaluate and improve existing institutions, foremost 
the UN, thereby again potentially contributing to a more stable, peaceful and just 
international realm. 
 
 
The Society of Peoples as an International Institution 
The Society of Peoples would neither be restricted to a certain region nor 
to a regime type. It therefore might have member states all over the world and 
might possibly embrace all societies in accordance with Rawls’s final aim: an all-
embracing society of well-ordered sovereign peoples ensuring peace and 
stability in the international realm.  
As does the EU, and as would the League of Democracies, the Society of 
Peoples may introduce incentives for non-members to reform into well-ordered 
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 Should a member for example attack another member or show preparations for a genocide – 
how unlikely that may be within a cooperative scheme of reasonable people – direct action may 
be needed on which the Council would then decide in consensus (minus the member who then 
would be object to the intervention). 
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regimes. On the basis of the EU-model, it could incorporate its basic values, 
those of human rights and political participation, into its aid programmes, but 
only to an extent that allows the assisted state to retain a right to self-
determination. If cooperation between members of the Society of Peoples 
becomes closer, eventually comprising of economic aspects too, additional 
incentives might evolve for other states to qualify as members. Although this is 
clearly not found within Rawls’s theory, trade relations are a stabilizing factor, as 
it “was trade that first brought them [different peoples] into peaceful relations 
with one another and thereby into relationships based on mutual consent, 
community, and peaceful interactions” [emphasis in original] (Kant 2006: 8:364). 
In addition, members would suggest themselves as trading partners, as relations 
of mutual trust grow stronger over time. 
The Society of Peoples, like a League of Democracies and the EU, would 
be able to act more swiftly and effectively than the UN. Although unanimity 
would be required for most decisions, members share more common ground 
than UN members and are, at least in the beginning, fewer in number (Daalder 
and Lindsay 2007: n. pag.). Thus, commitment to obligations, such as protecting 
human rights, might also be stronger as members of the Society of Peoples 
have a reasonable character and are therefore more likely to intervene, even 
when stepping in might not support their rational national interest. If founded, a 
Society of Peoples could use its united voice to push the UN towards reform. 
However, in case a reform proved improbable, if not impossible, it might act as a 
capable and independent actor alongside the UN (Stedman 2008: 2). 
“A properly structured coalition would provide a law-governed regime for 
intervention that would prove more effective in preventing the most egregious 
large-scale human rights violations than the current UN system […]. And the 
prospects for creating such an intervention regime may be considerably brighter 
than those for reforming the UN system’s approach to intervention” (Buchanan 
2007: 452). 
 
 
Two main points of critique towards the idea of a League of Democracies 
have been raised: it is unlikely that a League would ever be founded, and if it 
were, it would be unlikely to function, as states would not give away parts of 
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their sovereignty to an international institution.100 The League, if set up, might 
then share the fate of the Community of Democracies in becoming a mere 
debating club, as powerful states would not be ready to give up parts of their 
sovereignty (Kupchan 2008: 97). 
Neither the first, nor the second argument hold for the Society of Peoples. 
As for the first argument, it suffices for Rawls that a Society of Peoples is 
possible within his realistic utopian framework, as it is achievable, even though it 
might go beyond what is ordinarily understood as practically possible; for him it 
is sufficient that the Society of Peoples is something that one can reasonably 
hope for, although it might never be realized. As for the second argument, Rawls 
might highlight that in a Society of Peoples, sovereign states would not have to 
transfer their sovereignty towards the Society of Peoples. If decisions on war are 
taken in consensus, members that do not agree with an intervention could either 
abstain from the vote or vote against and thereby block the intervention, which 
they should only do on reasonable grounds and not out of rational self-interest. 
The decision on war thereby rests with the state but is negotiated between the 
members. A reasonable outcome is to be expected on the basis of the 
reasonable character of the participants.101 Besides, it is already a practice in 
reality that states negotiate decisions on warfare within international institutional 
frameworks. If NATO launches an operation or mission, member states are 
expected to contribute according to their capacities. The same holds true for UN 
resolutions and their enforcement, if necessary. ”Within globalization, 
sovereignty is traded daily” (Jacobs 2008: n. pag.). However, the final decision 
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 Membership in a League would force its members, if the League should mean anything, to 
submit a central part of their sovereignty, namely a huge part of their foreign policy and security 
matters, to the will of a majority or supermajority of member states. As sovereignty is held high 
by the nation states, this seems unlikely (Carothers 2008: 5). Democratic regimes, representing 
the will of their people, would need to devote this will to a majority vote of the League members. 
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 Even if consensus on the necessity of action were reached, it would remain questionable 
whether the member states would also agree on the (right) means to be used, which might not 
necessarily be military force. As was brought up in the discussion around the League of 
Democracies, members might have a common idea of how things should be, but not about what 
means are suitable and legitimate to get there. As a lack of consensus might lead to a lack of 
readiness to act, it is questionable, if the League, and also therefore Society of Peoples, would 
be capable of quick and effective action. At least for the latter, one might hope, with Rawls, that 
the cooperative patterns between the members would enable them to negotiate the right course 
of action in time. 
 157
on whether to participate in a military intervention or not, remains with the 
respective government. 
But why establish a new institution at all? Instead of calling for a new 
organization, one should strengthen existing ones (Carothers 2008: 6f.). The 
necessary institutions are at hand. They need reform, which might require less 
effort and political power than setting up new organs. The UN, which has a 
universal character, not only in theory but also in practice, might be a better and 
more legitimate actor in the international realm. NATO, in addition to being a 
regional actor, was designed as a military alliance, primarily to meet the 
Communist threat during the Cold War. However, to solve problems without a 
military aspect, such as would be the case for the Society of Peoples in meeting 
its duty of assistance, NATO lacks the necessary competences and tools 
(Daalder and Lindsay 2007: n. pag.). 
When the UN was founded, its primary task was to establish an 
international framework to prevent a third world war. Its focus was placed on 
relations between states and not, in keeping with the idea of sovereignty, what 
happens within them. With the development of the human rights regime and 
within the globalizing world, domestic affairs have become more and more 
relevant for the international realm. Whereas functional agencies of the UN do 
good jobs concerning their specific tasks, such as the World Food Programme, 
or World Health Organization, when focusing on security questions, UN policy 
falls short. The required consensus delays action or makes it inadequate. The 
universal approach renders the institution and its actions beholden to the least 
cooperative members (ibid.). Support for the UN system often refers to the idea 
of the UN, but not to its actual performance. The UN does not live up to its 
standards (Perle 2007: 17). To “effectively manage the use of force by states” 
one needs “a rough equality in power among actors within a system, for a 
consensus on fundamental underlying values, for a minimal level of trust and for 
ease in spotting free-riders” (Glennon 2006: 313). These factors would be on 
show within a Society of Peoples. 
Even if one agrees with the assessment that the UN’s effectiveness is 
limited in some cases where quick and decisive intervention is needed and 
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supports the idea that an additional authority is required, one might already find 
such an institution in the authority of regional organizations in their sphere of 
influence. This kind of authority is in place and has been put to the test. The EU 
and NATO intervened in Kosovo, the Organization of American States in Haiti, 
the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
the EU in Albania, the Pacific Islands Forum in the Solomon Islands, some with 
a good result. The democratic, basic structure of the intervening countries did 
not give the NATO intervention in Kosovo legitimacy, but what did were the 
relevant regional organizations, the EU and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (the state was by the majority Muslim), who supported it (Stedman 
2008: 7f.). But how can one decide whether to trust such an organization and its 
purpose? If, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization102 were to 
authorize intervention, would one not question its intention? The legitimacy or 
justification of such an intervention, no matter which organization launched it, 
would still have to be judged by the international community, embodied in the 
only universal institution to date: the UN.  
The question of legitimacy equally has to be raised when it comes to the 
Society of Peoples, in two respects: would a Society of Peoples be perceived as 
a legitimate actor in the international realm, capable of exercising force beyond 
its borders and does it have the normative legitimacy to act?  
This may be denied especially by proponents of a League of Democracies 
and more generally of theorists that consider democracies to be the only 
legitimate regime type. Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane argue in favour 
of a standard of legitimacy for international governance institutions that is 
“accessible from a diversity of moral standpoints and less demanding than a 
standard of justice” (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 409). These standards to 
them are only met by democracies that honour human rights (ibid.). States that 
are not considered legitimate cannot transfer legitimacy and thus are no 
legitimate actors in the international arena (ibid.: 412-414); the consent of a 
government that cannot be considered as agent of its people, as speaking in 
their name, is not crucial (Buchanan 2010: 313). 
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 Member states are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
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Although there might be disagreement on what constitutes a human right, 
the authors (minimally) consider physical security, liberty (minimally including 
freedom from slavery, servitude, and forced labour) and subsistence as such. As 
with Rawls, the list is left open (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 419f.). The rights 
mentioned are covered by Rawls's human rights minimalism. However, next to 
honouring human rights, “where democratic authorization of the exercise of 
political power is possible, only a democratic government is legitimate” 
(Buchanan 2007: 235) as it is the only system in which the fundamental equality 
of person is realized (ibid.: 250). Buchanan (and Keohane) take up the 
autocracy-democracy divide: the possibility that there may be societies that are 
non-democratic but honour human rights and have a legitimate claim to be 
respected is excluded. Although decent societies only maintain a weak 
understanding of formal equality, a certain level of equality is secured.103 Making 
a democratic basic structure a necessary criterion for a state to be considered a 
legitimate actor in the international realm might lead to the imperialism Rawls 
seeks to avoid. 
A second argument against the legitimacy of a Society of Peoples (and a 
League of Democracies) to intervene in other states is that any “use of force by 
a self-selecting group of […] states will not generate legitimacy beyond that 
group” (Stedman 2008: 3). As a possibly all-embracing organisation with 
member states from all parts of the world, the Society of Peoples might stand a 
good chance of being accepted as legitimate actor in the international realm. 
The intervention in Kosovo shows that the EU, in extreme cases, is willing to act, 
even without UN mandate; the Society of Peoples might be as well. After all, 
actions taken by the Society of Peoples would be in accordance with the UN 
Charter. 
A second more pragmatic argument to legitimize the use of force on 
outsiders is that, what happens within other states might be vital for one’s own 
security; one should thus have a legitimate interest and possibility to intervene 
(Daalder and Lidsay 2007: n. pag.). Focusing on normative legitimacy, the 
“rightness or wrongness of a particular course of action ought to reside at least 
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 For an in-depth debate around Rawls’s human rights minimalism, see chapter 4. 
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in part in the nature of the action itself” (ibid.). From a normative perspective, it is 
hard to call an intervention stopping genocide, though it may be illegal, 
illegitimate. The normative value of an action should be given priority over its 
procedural aspect (ibid.). Due to the value-base, the League might have an even 
stronger claim to legitimacy than the UN (Buchanan 2007: 452). 
The problem of the UN is that any nation can join and that every member 
has one vote, even Burma, Zimbabwe and North Korea (Lustig 2008: n. pag.). 
Authoritarian China and Russia as veto-powers are granted a disproportionate 
weight (Stedman 2008: 1). Promoting human rights is extremely hard if human 
rights violators take part in the decision-making process. Those would be 
excluded within a Society of Peoples. A UN reform that would ensure that 
member states actually live up to the values proclaimed in the UN Charter, 
including human rights and justice, is more than unlikely. One could thus argue 
that establishing a new institution might be a fruitful alternative as the 
commitment to reforming the UN insofar as to enable it to provide the benefits it 
was established for seems insufficient (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 422, see  
also Buchanan 2007: 450). This new institution could either pursue UN reform or 
constitute an alternative legitimate actor when it comes to questions of 
intervention (Buchanan 2007: 450).  
Most of the arguments put forward in favour of a Society of Peoples may 
also be put forth for a League of Democracies. It might even be more efficient as 
there are fewer member states that have more common ground and share more 
common sympathies. So what specific characteristics make the Society of 
Peoples more favourable than a League of Democracies? 
The Society of Peoples might be an even more valuable alternative when 
looking for an institution that could be considered a legitimate actor alongside 
the UN system: Contrary to the League, the Society would not take over the 
democracy-autocracy divide without giving up securing human rights. Whereas 
proponents of the League “underestimate the importance of the non-democratic 
world” (Heisbourg 2007: 17), the Society of Peoples would be accompanied by a 
much weaker impulse to further block-building in the international arena. It would 
enhance broader patterns of cooperation and enable moral learning across the 
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boundaries of different political systems on the basis of shared values and 
interests, on the basis of an overlapping consensus. It could produce incentives 
to reform without being charged with cultural imperialism. Whereas “a post-Cold 
War and post-George Bush United States will not have the capacity or the 
legitimacy to unilaterally take on global crisis” and whereas “working through the 
United Nations […] s more often than not a recipe for paralysis” (Diehl 2008: n. 
pag.), the Society of Peoples might have the legitimacy and the capability to act.  
The Society of Peoples would represent members from all regions of the 
world and have a strong normative claim. It should not supplant the UN but act 
alongside it with a united voice pushing towards reform. Meanwhile, it might act, 
if necessary, when the UN cannot reach unanimity. Even if not realized, the 
concept of the Society of Peoples as a model for an international society as one 
should be, is helpful to evaluate and improve existing institutions, foremost the 
UN. 
 
 
The Society of Peoples – A Model for Exploring the Possible 
The concept of a Society of Peoples, and Rawls’s theory in general, can 
function as a guideline for a liberal society’s foreign policy. Breaking down the 
democracy-autocracy divide by taking reasonable pluralism seriously in theory, 
could, in practice, improve relations between liberal and decent societies, lead to 
more understanding and sympathy between the two regime types, as well as 
other possible well-ordered regimes, and help to establish new patterns of 
cooperation. 
Including decent peoples in his Society of Peoples is a central aspect of 
Rawls’s vision. Advocators and opponents of a League ignore that there are 
states that may neither be part of a League of Democracies nor of a “League of 
Dictators”. These are the regimes Rawls is especially aware of and wants to 
integrate into a cooperative system or offer aid to in the form of the duty of 
assistance. The Society of Peoples, even only as a model of a society as it 
should be, can have a stabilizing effect on the state world, thereby making 
peace at least more probable. Whereas the League of Democracies could be 
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considered an institutional instantiation of the democratic peace (Rudolf 2008: 
2), the Society of Peoples equally could be understood as an instantiation of a 
decent peace. 
 
 
Conclusion 
By breaking down the autocracy-democracy divide and allowing decent 
societies into a cooperative scheme as equal partners, Rawls foregoes further 
block building that a League might probably cause.104 A “global forum that 
denies autocracies a say in world affairs promises to deepen cooperation where 
it is least needed […] at the expense of cooperation where it is most needed” 
(Kupchan 2008: 99). From the Rawlsian perspective, one might argue that well-
ordered societies not only share interests but also sympathies, with, even more 
valuable with respect to effective cooperation, trust and respect growing over 
time. This makes them favoured partners of cooperation. As the development of 
the EU has shown, cooperation might become closer; broadening the scope 
over time, stronger integration might enhance stability by developing mutual 
trust and respect. Programmes, such as Erasmus, would also contribute to this 
within the Society of Peoples.105 
The intensification of effort to improve what is already in existence, 
primarily the UN, instead of calling for a new institution, seems reasonable. 
Nevertheless, thinking about such an institution, discussing its purpose and, 
within that, drawing an alternative sketch of how international relations could 
and/or should be organized, is a task worth doing. This chapter is not to be 
regarded as a call for the establishment of a Society of Peoples, but rather as an 
appeal to reflect on the concept more closely than secondary literature has done 
so thus far. Even if never realized, the idea of the Society of Peoples and its 
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 “For the sake of consistency, we should predict that if a league will help democracies see 
beyond limited short-term interests and construct shared interests and positions, then a league 
of authoritarian states would do the same for the Russias or Chinas of the world, with a resulting 
dramatic drop in global cooperation” (Stedman 2008: 7). 
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 Such initiatives may be pursued by non-governmental actors within the member states, in the 
case of Erasmus, for example, by the universities. That way, the interference of regimes into the 
spheres of others would remain at a minimum, and further ties and understanding between 
members of the different societies may evolve. 
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discussion is fruitful, as is Rawls’s concept as a whole, to serve as a guideline 
for well-ordered regimes’ foreign policy and as a “long-term goal of political 
endeavour”. In this way, it does contribute, whether realized or not, to more 
peaceful and stable international relations. 
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6. Decent Peoples and the Real World  
Rawls does not satisfactorily answer the question of whether peoples can 
or do exist in a non-ideal, real world framework.106 If one sets the standards 
high, peoples do not exist. The question of whether or not states that correspond 
to Rawls’s concept of peoples actually exist is essential to his theory, especially 
where decent societies are concerned, as they seem to be mere constructions, 
an impression supported by the imaginary society Kazanistan, as elaborated in 
chapter 3. If there are no existing or historical decent societies, they might be 
invented to justify imposing liberal principles, i.e., the principles of the Law of 
Peoples, on non-liberal regimes. If one were able to identify decent societies in 
the real world, it would strengthen Rawls’s arguments and theory in three major 
ways. First, it would mean that LP would be more applicable to international 
relations and real world structures and therefore more helpful for improving real 
world conditions. Second and related to the first, identifying decent societies 
would be useful, as LP is supposed to be a guideline for the foreign relations of 
liberal regimes. It would thus be an appealing model for liberal regimes to 
improve their relations with states qualifying as decent, not only as they are 
suitable cooperation partners, but also to enhance international stability and 
justice and to advance peaceful relations. Third, it would provide an argument 
for the assumption that Rawls does take reasonable pluralism seriously; if 
decent societies lacked counterparts in the real world, Rawls’s justification for 
imposing the principles of the Law of Peoples on other societies would be 
pointless. They would remain liberal principles that are only honoured by liberal 
democratic societies and imposing them on other regimes would constitute a 
form of liberal imperialism, which Rawls in LP aims to avoid and which, from a 
Rawlsian perspective, constitutes a violation of liberal principles, foremost the 
principle of reasonable pluralism. Taking reasonable pluralism seriously Rawls 
would consequently have to enlarge the democratic peace thesis, which he 
supports, to a decent peace thesis. As liberal peoples meet the criteria for 
decency as well, this thesis assumes that liberal and decent peoples strongly 
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 For a closer discussion see chapter 2. 
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tend not to wage war against one another.107 Based on the analysis of Rawls’s 
actors in chapters 1 and 2, the chapter at hand strives to identify suitable 
candidates for decent societies and thus states that within the Rawlsian 
framework might cooperate fairly within a Society of Peoples and reasonably 
agree to the principles of the Law of Peoples. 
Michael Doyle in his 2006 article “One World, Many Peoples: International 
Justice in John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples” tries to identify decent peoples as 
part of his elaborations on Rawls’s regime types. His analysis, however, is 
limited to the presentation of a table showing the criteria for decent peoples, 
some possible candidates, and some further elaborations on the characteristics 
of the candidates and the conclusions that may be drawn from them. For the 
purposes of this thesis, a broader, referring to the number of regimes covered, 
and more profound, referring to the criteria and how they could possibly be 
measured, analysis is necessary for several reasons. First, Doyle hardly 
deliberates on why he chooses his candidates, which are found, with the 
exception of Bhutan and Nepal, in the Near East or North Africa. Thereby, 
promising candidates (such as Brunei or Singapore) are excluded. Doyle’s 
analysis is thus too limited. Second, Doyle’s criteria are unsatisfactorily selected 
and their measurement is unclear. The consultation hierarchy is considered as a 
presupposition. Rawls, however, leaves room for other types of decent societies, 
which Doyle automatically excludes. Also, the significance of the table he 
presents is to be questioned. In the columns of the criteria 2b (responsibility for 
cooperative effort), 2c (official’s belief in the system) and a “possible further 
criterion” (representation of historically oppressed groups mostly by its 
members) only have a few entries. The available entries are not always 
meaningful and do not convey a satisfactorily idea of whether and to what 
degree the criterion is met. Taking 2c as an example, there are only three 
entries referring to the eight candidates. The first refers to fair court trials and the 
treatment of suspects and prisoners, the second to basic needs and the third to 
the torture of prisoners. The relation to the “sincere belief held by judges and 
ministers” is not clearly carved out. There is not a single entry in 2b. The study 
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 A detailed elaboration is postponed until the following chapter. 
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at hand uses Doyle’s undertaking and his results as a basis for a study 
considering candidates from all regions of the world and shall identify 
measurable, clearly defined criteria that leave room for different kinds of decent 
regimes next to the consultation hierarchy. 
As Rawls’s criteria for decency are ideal and not met by any existing 
regime, one option is to reduce the standards, but defining peoples as ideals 
and then reducing the standards does not seem appropriate. Therefore, a 
concept of “aspiring decent societies” is developed, and the question of how 
Rawls’s criteria can best be adjusted is deliberated upon. The criteria identified 
as necessary for aspiring decency are further specified and transferred into a 
coding frame to make them applicable to existing states in accordance with 
available data. In a further step, possible candidates are analysed with regards 
to the set criteria, and conclusions on whether there truly exist regimes that 
qualify as aspiring decent are drawn. 
 
 
Identifying Aspiring Decent Regimes – Criteria 
 To be able to identify aspiring decent regimes, the ideal requirements for 
peoplehood have to be relaxed, while keeping Rawls’s ideas and conceptions in 
mind. From the content of LP, one can deduce that Rawls is not reluctant to 
such a reduction of standards, as he is well aware of peoples with “somewhat 
dirty hands” (LP: 94) and refers to relatively well-ordered regimes (LP: 89, 105). 
 Aspiring (liberal and) decent regimes will be those that promote Rawls’s 
criteria and take them into account when setting up their basic structure, for 
example their constitution, and when pursuing their domestic policies. They, 
however, not always live up to the standards set by Rawls, for example regimes 
that generally honour the basic human rights he puts forward but might violate 
them under exceptional circumstances in a minor way, with respect to extent 
and frequency. Drawing a line between minor human rights violations and gross 
forms is a difficult task that I will attempt to treat with care. In the following, 
Rawls’s criteria for liberal and decent peoples are summed up and how far they 
can and should be relaxed to meet the requirements for an aspiring decent 
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regime is discussed. To establish criteria for identifying existing aspiring decent 
regimes, findings about Rawls’s criteria for decent peoples are summarized. 
Then, Michael Doyle’s set of criteria, used in the search for decent peoples, is 
presented. Out of these possible criteria, a set of necessary characteristics is 
developed that is applicable and measurable with the data available on the 
respective regimes, thereby keeping Rawls’s conception in mind. With further 
necessary specification, this set then serves as a basis for a coding frame.  
Decent peoples by definition have  
1. a decent basic structure and government, which represents the members of 
society and pursues their interests within the framework of reasonable 
principles. Government has to  
2. grant members of society a role in processes of political decision making,  
3. limit pursuing its rational interests by reasonable principles (reasonable 
character) and  
4. honour basic human rights (LP: 4, 64, 71). Peoples  
5. do not wage wars of aggression and thereby voluntarily limit their sovereignty 
(LP: 42, 51, 79).  
6. Liberal and decent peoples respect other peoples of like character as equal 
cooperation partners in the international realm.  
Further criteria could be expected: 
7. Peoples honour the principles of the Law of Peoples and therefore have a 
8. duty of assistance towards burdened societies (LP: 92, 62). 
9. Decent peoples maintain a consultation hierarchy (LP: 4, 64, 71). 
Doyle in his analysis refers to four or five criteria, counting the consultation 
hierarchy as basic presupposition. His criteria for decent regimes are:  
1D. that the foreign policy be non-aggressive,  
2D. that human rights are secured,  
3D. that the cooperative effort is everyone’s responsibility,  
4D. that judges and ministers believe in the system, and 
5D. that, as a possible criterion, formerly oppressed groups are, in the majority, 
represented by members of their own group (Doyle 2006: 116). 
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At this point, the focus lies solely on the qualities of aspiring decent 
regimes on a monadic level. Points that are relevant to relations with other 
societies are excluded. They become relevant in the following chapter. Rawls’s 
arguments as to why decent peoples are members of good standing in the 
international realm are based on their domestic basic structure and their 
reasonable character, both attributes that can be well examined on a monadic 
level. A peaceful foreign policy is to be regarded as a result of the basic 
structure and a reasonable character, as both contribute to the satisfaction of 
society and thereby the lack of a reason to go to war for purposes other than 
self-defence or to stop gross violations of human rights. The same holds true for 
the respect towards other people: they are respected because they incorporate 
a similar basic structure and a reasonable character. The reason why decent 
regimes would agree to the eight principles of the Law of Peoples is to be found 
on a domestic, not an international, level, so that is where the focus should lie in 
order to find measurable characteristics for these regimes. Therefore, as they 
touch on external relations, points 5 and 1D (no wars of aggression), as well as 6 
(respect towards people of like character) and 7 (allegiance to the Law of 
Peoples) are considered no further. Rawls leaves room for different kinds of 
decent peoples, so the consultation system (9) is not a necessary criterion, and 
on this basis, it too is left aside. 
3D (responsibility for cooperative effort) proposed by Doyle, as well as of 
course by Rawls, is hard to measure and Doyle does not make a single point 
concerning it. Furthermore, its importance for the decent character of a society 
is only limited. Rawls only writes that decent peoples view “persons as 
responsible and cooperating members of their respective groups” (LP: 66). The 
criterion is thus excluded from the analysis, due to its incommensurability and its 
limited importance.  
In addition, as indicated earlier, there is hardly a point made about 4D 
(belief in the system by judges and ministers). Doyle here refers to fair court 
trials, the treatment of suspects and inmates as well as a country’s capacity to 
meet the basic needs of its citizens. Going back to LP, Rawls elaborates that 
judges and state officials need to be convinced that the law is in harmony with 
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society’s common good idea of justice that grants human rights. If those rights 
are regularly violated, this harmony is not given. Judges need to show their good 
faith and defend those laws (LP: 66f.). In a footnote, Rawls links his criterion to 
an idea developed by Philip Soper, according to whom, in order to be stable, a 
legal system must be perceived to be just and defended by judges and state 
officials, who represent it, in case of normative attack. Courts thus have, next to 
their adjudicatory function, justificatory tasks (Soper 1984: 112f.). The people’s 
respect for the authority of the state officials relies on the belief in the legitimacy 
of the system they represent, which is linked to the peoples’ perception of 
whether the system serves their interests or at least is not unfair (ibid.: 18). 
Different approaches on how to measure this criterion might be taken, none of 
which have proved to be satisfactorily.  
First, the autonomy of judges and the judiciary in general may be 
evaluated, but that would miss Rawls’s point, which is their support of the (legal) 
system (LP: 66f.). The support, however, cannot be properly measured. As 
judges and ministers in the regimes to be classified are mostly appointed by the 
respective ruler, support for the government and the system is more than likely, 
and not helpful in judging the reasonable character of the regime at hand. Qatar 
may serve as an example here. “The law provides for an independent judiciary, 
although in practice it is dependent since all judges held their positions at the 
discretion of the government” (2005 HRRQ: n. pag.108). Around half of the 
judges are foreign nationals and their resident permits need to be granted by 
civil authorities. Based on recommendations of the Supreme Judiciary Council, 
all judges are appointed by the emir for renewable three-year terms (ibid.). Also, 
there is no data available covering all candidates for the timeframe. 
Second, the support of state officials for the system might be measured in 
relation to corruption. A high level of corruption could be considered an indicator 
for the misuse of power, in the case at hand by state officials. A corrupt judge, 
for example, does not represent the state and properly apply the law, but 
perverts the course of justice in favour of the bribe giver. However, corruption is 
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 U.S. Department of State (2006c): 2005 Human Rights Report: Qatar; hereafter cited as 
2005 HRRQ. 
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not necessarily linked to a weak or non-existent belief in the system, but might 
be caused by poor payment or even by tradition. In the case of Tonga, for 
example, the links between relatives are especially strong. If the duty towards 
the state conflicts with duties towards family members, there is a strong 
pressure on state officials to act in favour of their relatives. Also, families are 
hierarchically organized and orders by superiors are to be followed (James and 
Tufui 2004: 10f.). In addition, when making a request to a person, one is 
traditionally expected to present a gift (ibid.: 5). Those and other possible 
reasons for corruption make it an unsuitable indicator for the officials’ belief in 
the system. 
Third, with reference to Doyle, one could take fair court trials as indicator 
for meeting the criterion. Following the UDHR, “[e]veryone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in 
the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him” (art. 10). Understanding the belief in the system in terms of guaranteeing 
fair trials does seem to miss Rawls’s point. Here, it is not decisive whether the 
judge stands behind the system, but rather whether court procedures are 
correctly applied and rights, such as formal equality, are granted to the 
defendant.  
Last but not least, as Rawls links the belief in the system to the harmony 
between norms, such as human rights, and legal practice, one could assume 
that if human rights and thus formal equality are generally respected and 
protected by state representatives, the criterion might best be covered. 
Representing (formerly oppressed) groups by members of those groups 
(5D), for Rawls, is preferable as they have a better understanding of the interests 
and needs of the people they represent. However, 5D is not a necessary 
criterion for Rawls (LP: 75), and therefore excluded from the analysis.  
The decent background structure, by definition, includes, and mainly 
manifests itself in, granting members of society a meaningful role in processes 
of political decision making; 1 (decent basic structure) and 2 (political 
participation) can therefore be subsumed. Honouring basic human rights (4 and 
2D) is one (and on the domestic level the only) central expression of a people’s 
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reasonable character, because guaranteeing basic human rights displays a 
willingness to limit rational interest by reasonable principles. 
In summary, then, two criteria for a monadic reflection on aspiring decent 
regimes remain: 
1) a decent government (offering at least minimal political participation) and 
2) a reasonable character (expressed by honouring basic human rights). 
These are also central to Rawls’s conception of peoples (“The term ‘peoples’ 
then, is meant to […] highlight their moral character and the reasonably just, or 
decent nature of their regimes.”, LP: 27) and are the main principles 
characterizing the model society Kazanistan (“Kazanistan honors and respects 
human rights, and its basic structure contains a decent consultation hierarchy, 
thereby giving a substantial political role to its members in making political 
decisions.”, LP: 64). Closeness to Rawls’s understanding of decent peoples is 
thus preserved. 
In order to fit them into a coding frame, the two criteria are specified and 
then applied to the possible candidates for aspiring decent regimes. The coding 
frame in each case offers two or three possibilities, either “yes” or “granted”, “no” 
or “not granted”, or, if open to degrees, “limited” is a third alternative, which will 
be selected if a given case partially meets the respective criterion. 
 
 
Political Participation 
As far as political participation is concerned, for Rawls it is important that 
the reasonable interests of all members of society are represented. The different 
aspects listed within the coding frame are not all necessary conditions; at least 
one, although the more the better, has to be met to provide the population with 
what Rawls calls “a meaningful role in processes of political decision making” to 
a sufficient degree, which will be properly analysed in each case. The possible 
ways, in which political participation is considered, are: 
elections, 
political parties/associations, 
institutions (offering participation) and 
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access to the ruler or state officials. 
Institutions offering participation might be the only necessary criterion when it 
comes to Rawls’s model society Kazanistan. The study undertaken here, 
however, shall leave room for different possible types of decent societies, to 
include all those regimes that, from within the Rawlsian framework, could be 
understood as reasonable, or at least not unreasonable, basic structures. 
Therefore, the additional criteria are incorporated. Below, with reference to the 
coding frame, further specifications are introduced. 
Elections. Free, fair and regular elections are a central criterion for 
democracy. Therefore, an aspiring decent society cannot be expected to meet 
the criteria of free, fair and regular elections. However, limited elections might 
very well point towards a society that Rawls would classify as decent, as they 
might offer a certain amount of political participation and hint towards the 
population’s consent to government. Furthermore, representative bodies may be 
elected in free, fair and regular procedures, although the body itself may have a 
mere consultative purpose. To qualify as “existent”, elections have to meet 
international standards and, with reference to James Lee Ray, at least half of 
the adult population must be entitled to vote (Ray 1993: 256f.), including 
permanent non-national residents, who have been living in the county for 
several years, or might have even spent their whole life in that territory. To be 
counted as “limited”, Rawls’s criterion (the population in some way has to be 
reasonably represented) is decisive, meaning that those parts of the population 
entitled to vote must have free access to the elections, there need to be at least 
two competing candidates and the results of the election must have some 
impact on the relevant political institutions. To score “none”, there are either no 
elections, or they do not meet the pertinent criteria. 
Political parties/associations. Political parties are a clear indicator of 
political participation. In countries where political parties are generally banned, 
political associations may take over the role of parties and therefore be 
considered, too. To count as “existent”, political parties have to be permitted and 
be able to freely engage in politics. As for Rawls a consultation system suffices 
for decency, parties are also counted as existent if they only have a consultative 
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function and do not have direct influence on political decisions. To count as 
“limited”, political parties/associations exist, but are subject to government 
restrictions, exceeding common terms and conditions, such as a certain amount 
of members. To count as “none”, political parties/associations either do not exist 
or are forbidden by law and not tolerated by government. 
Institutions (offering participation). “Institution” here is understood in a 
wider sense, covering formal organizations of government as well as societal 
customs, thereby including, for example, regular public meetings of government 
with group/village representatives. For Rawls, it is essential that the basic 
structure of a consultation hierarchy includes representative bodies (LP: 71) and 
so this aspect is a necessary criterion for a consultation hierarchy. As Rawls 
leaves room for other types of decent peoples, representative organs are not a 
necessary criterion for decent regimes as such. One possible example are 
village representatives that forward their villages’ interests directly to 
government. These representatives do not necessarily have to be elected, but 
need to pursue the reasonable interests of the group they are representing, 
minorities included. 
Access to the ruler or state officials. Here, the population may forward 
grievances or comments on government decisions directly to the ruler or his 
representatives. The ruler might travel the country for this purpose, for public 
audiences or informal meetings to take place, such as occurs in the diwaniyya 
system109 in Kuwait. 
 
 
Human Rights 
Although Rawls leaves room for a further extension of his set of human 
rights, this section only deliberates on the four he explicitly refers to including 
those that are connected to them. This minimal set reflects core liberal values: 
liberalism’s “ends are life and property, and its means are liberty and toleration” 
(Owen 1994: 94). Some specifications have to be made. To count as “granted”, 
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 “[The] country’s unique diwaniyya system […] allows Kuwaiti citizens to engage with their 
leaders and participate in decision-making processes in an informal, quasi-tribal context” 
(Economist Intelligence Unit (2008c): Country Profile Kuwait: 8; hereafter cited as CPKu 2008) 
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the rights specified below not only have to be granted, for example by the 
constitution, but also to be honoured and protected by the state. Individual cases 
of violations that were not authorized and have been prosecuted by government 
are not considered. To count as “limited”, rights are generally honoured and 
secured, but exceptional instances of violations of one or more of the rights 
covered, if not explicitly authorized, then at least with the knowledge and thus 
toleration of the government, might exist. To count as “not granted” the rights 
are not honoured or secured by government and violators are not prosecuted.  
The right to life. The right to life not only refers to a right not to be killed 
(except for in cases of self-defence or in some societies death penalties), but 
also, for Rawls, a right to an entitlement towards means of subsistence and a 
right to security. With “security”, Rawls likely refers to the “security of person”, 
which “must be understood in the context of physical liberty and it cannot be 
interpreted as to referring to different matters (such as a duty on the state to give 
someone personal protection form an attack by others, or right to social 
security)” (Macovei 2002: 6). Included are the right not to be unlawfully detained 
(UDHR: art. 9) as well as not to be “subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” (UDHR: art. 5). Regular violations of these 
principles are counted as violations of Rawls’s first core human right. 
The right to liberty. For Rawls, the right to liberty includes freedom from 
slavery, serfdom (UDHR: art. 4), forced occupation (UDHR: art. 23) and to a 
“sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and 
thought” (LP: 65). This last point needs further qualification, as the UDHR covers 
more than Rawls’s human rights minimalism considers.110 Liberty of conscience 
and freedom of religion and thought are not fully granted by Rawls to the extent 
the UDHR suggests. According to Rawls, there may be a state religion and 
believers of other religions might suffer from some disadvantages. There has to 
be liberty of conscience, but not equal liberty:  
“[T]his liberty of conscience may not be as extensive nor as equal for all members 
of society: for instance, one religion may legally predominate in the state 
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 “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance” (UDHR: art. 18). 
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government, while other religions, though tolerated, may be denied the right to 
hold certain positions” (LP: 65). 
 
Referring to his model society Kazanistan, Rawls states that “Islam is the 
favoured religion, and only Muslims can hold the upper positions of political 
authority and influence the government’s main decisions and policies, including 
foreign affairs” (LP: 75). Rawls’s freedom of religion therefore may be more 
suitably referred to as freedom of belief or worship: believers of faiths other than 
the state religion may practice and teach their religion in private and may suffer 
from minor forms of discrimination or disadvantages in relation to believers of 
the state religion. This plays into another aspect, needing further specification:  
The right to formal equality is not further specified by Rawls and its 
meaning is therefore unclear. The principle of formal equality (“Things that are 
alike should be treated alike”), formulated by Aristotle, needs further 
qualifications to define which “things” or “aspects of things” are to be put in 
relation to one another. One example, which might be relevant to the cases to 
be analysed herein, is the question of evaluating evidence in court trials. 
“Things” here could generally refer to “evidence provided by a person” or be 
divided into “evidence given by males” and “evidence given by females”. In the 
first case, men and women would be treated as alike, in the second they would 
not, and giving men’s evidence double the import would be in harmony with the 
principle of formal equality. The tolerated unequal treatment of believers of faiths 
other than the state religion, as shown above, hints at the latter interpretation of 
formal equality. Also, formal equality for Rawls does not include a right to equal 
political representation (LP: 71). However, everyone has a right to some kind of 
participation in the process of political decision making, so baring women from 
voting, from the right to own property or denying them self-determination is not 
acceptable within a liberal (Rawlsian) framework. 
The right to property. “(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as 
well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property” (UDHR: art. 17). The owners are entitled to do with what they own as 
they wish, including selling, renting or exchanging property, as well as inheriting 
property. “Limited right to property” will be chosen in cases where women or 
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other groups of society are excluded from the right or if the right to own property 
is violated by government and “not granted” if the right to property is generally 
not granted or secured. 
 
As the criteria have been set, further questions concerning timeframe and 
choice of candidates need to be answered. To ensure comparability between 
the candidates and a reliable and significant amount of data to base the analysis 
on, the study covers the decade from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2009, 
as data sets are available for this period concerning the main resources: the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Profiles (CP), the Background Notes 
(BN), the World Fact Book (WFB), the Human Rights Reports (HRR), provided 
by the US Department of State, and the Freedom in the World reports published 
by Freedom House (FH). The short forms are hereafter used for citation with the 
first letter of the respective country added to specify the report or profile at hand. 
The chosen timeframe should also enable me to capture a possible 
development of the candidates towards higher degrees of decency or even 
towards liberalism, a prognosis supported by Rawls. 
Changes of government and reforms may influence the political basic 
structure and politics of a state during the decade. Therefore, some of the 
candidates may be evaluated as aspiring decent regimes from a specific point, 
such as after a change of government, onwards, or within a specific period; a 
country governed by a decent ruler for a certain period of time may qualify as 
decent only for that period. Furthermore, only regimes that have been stable for 
at least five years are considered, to guarantee a certain degree of stability and 
sufficient time for central ideas to be conveyed to the people and to have 
become understood and accepted. Stability here does not refer to stability for 
the right reason, but implies that a political regime successfully exercised power 
over the respective territory and people without major changes to the system. A 
threshold concerning population is not considered, as the consultation system, 
partly including direct access to the ruler or his representatives, is more 
suitable for territorially small countries with small populations. 
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Identifying Aspiring Decent Regimes – Procedure 
The approach to identify aspiring decent regimes within the set timeframe 
is threefold. In a first step, possible candidates are selected by means of 
exclusion. Therefore, a flowchart is elaborated, in which, first, the countries are 
excluded that are not autonomous as they cannot be considered fully 
responsible for their domestic structure and when focusing on the following 
chapter their foreign policy. In a further step, democracies are excluded. The 
EIU Index of Democracy (EIUID) is taken as an indicator: Those regimes that 
are classified as democracy or flawed democracy by the Index in 2006 and 2008 
are considered as democratic and thus might qualify as (aspiring) liberal 
democratic rather than aspiring decent. Democracies that do not qualify as fully 
democratic but flawed might be considered relatively well-ordered within the 
Rawlsian framework.111 For those states that are not covered by the Index (such 
as Liechtenstein or Tonga), the background notes are used as a basis for 
evaluation. Then, the focus shifts the respective government human rights 
record. If the regime in one of the four (groups of) rights scores “not granted”, 
meaning one or more of Rawls’s core human rights are not honoured or secured 
by government and violators are not prosecuted, it is excluded from the further 
analysis as guaranteeing the four core human rights is a necessary criterion for 
decency. Last but not least, those regimes that do not meet the stability 
requirement are excluded. The remaining candidates are analyzed by evaluating 
the data introduced earlier and measuring the criteria presented above by 
means of a coding frame. “Yes”/“granted” will be marked in green, “limited” in 
yellow and “no”/“not granted” in red. Categories with insufficient information or 
that do not fit the state at hand are left blank. 
In a third and last step, conclusions are drawn. Are there suitable 
candidates and if so within what timeframe? Are there candidates that show a 
                                                     
111
 The Index of Democracy only exists since 2006. Other indices that cover the whole period 
have been considered. However, the Democracy Index seems the most suitable. Freedom 
House, for example, focuses on freedoms (the more free, the more democratic) but does not 
include other factors whereas the Democracy Index has a broader understanding of democracy, 
covering electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, 
political culture and civil liberties.  
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positive development and might meet the criteria for aspiring decency in the 
foreseeable future?  
Possible candidates have already been mentioned in secondary literature. 
Doyle proposes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and maybe also 
Bhutan as suitable candidates for decent peoples, highlighting Oman as 
probably best meeting Rawls’s criteria. Doyle also tests Jordan, Nepal and 
Saudi Arabia (Doyle 2006: 116ff.). Chris Brown names Singapore as an 
example of a decent “mildly authoritarian” regime (Brown 2002b: 18).  
 
 
Identifying Aspiring Decent Regimes – Results 
 The flow chart, functioning as a means to identify possible candidates, 
needs further elaboration. A red arrow indicates that the criterion is not met, 
green ones that the regimes meet the criterion. The states enlisted on the right 
are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Figure 1. Exclusion of unsuitable candidates for aspiring decent societies 
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 Additional specifications need to be made. The Holy See is excluded from 
the analysis, as it does not possess a single exclusive citizen and the 
representative institutions do not represent the citizens, but rather, Catholic 
Christianity. The Palestinian Territories are excluded as their statehood is (at 
least) contested. Although Albania slightly misses the threshold for democracy in 
the EIUID, it is categorized as democracy in the flowchart; despite some 
irregularities, it has a functioning multiparty-system and is categorized as an 
electoral democracy by Freedom House (FHA 2009: n. pag.112). Bhutan does 
not pass the stability test as the kingdom has been in a constant process of 
change from a monarchy towards a democracy, a development started with a 
new constitution in 2001 and completed in 2008 with the first free and fair 
elections (BNBh 2010: n. pag.113). However, the regime might be of interest as a 
possible society that transformed, or is in the process of transforming, from 
decency to liberal democracy. A second interesting candidate excluded from the 
coding frame due to its human rights account but interesting for exploring 
possible decent regimes is Brunei, as its basic structure comes close to Rawls’s 
model of a consultation system. Whereas Bhutan is treated in a short excursus, 
Brunei is discussed as a possible future aspiring decent society. 
 Reviewing the candidates referred to in secondary literature, Oman, Qatar, 
Singapore and the UAE pass the test, whereas Bahrain and Kuwait fail due to a 
critical human rights record. In 2000, diverse serious human rights abuses were 
reported in Bahrain, amongst others torture as well as arbitrary arrest and 
detention (2000 HRRBa: n. pag.114), but the record improved in the following 
years. However, allegations of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment occurred and until 2008, there were no known cases in which police 
officers had been punished for abuses (in 2008, the Ministry of the Interior 
“announced that it disciplined 23 police officers […] for committing human rights 
abuses”; 2008 HRRBa). In the same year, “Bahraini human rights organizations 
                                                     
112
 Freedom House (Ed.) (2009a): Freedom in the World 2009 – Albania; hereafter cited as FHA 
2009. 
113
 U.S. Department of State (Ed.) (2010j): Background Note Bhutan; hereafter cited as BNBh 
2010. 
114
 U.S. Department of State (Ed.) (2001a): 2000 Human Rights Report: Bahrain; hereafter cited 
as 2009 HRRBa. 
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allege that the detainees have been subjected to regular torture and sexual 
assault” (FHBa 2008). Furthermore, domestic violence, including spousal rape, 
is a prevalent problem that is not sufficiently addressed by government (2009 
HRRBa).  
 Focusing on Kuwait, reports that detainees are abused during investigation 
occurred.115 Government stated that it investigated the cases; however, the 
results or the punishment of offenders were seldom made public (2000 HRRKu, 
2005 HRRKu, 2009 HRRKu). Moreover, government “occasionally arrests and 
detains persons arbitrarily” (2000 HRRKu). Spousal rape is not criminalized. In 
theory, domestic violence can be put to trial as assault, but in practice, the 
security of women is not effectively protected (2009 HRRKu).116  
 To score “limited” concerning the right to life and security, exceptional 
instances of violations of one or more of the rights covered might exist. Despite 
there being only a few cases reported annually in the decade under review, the 
fact that there are violations in every year and that those cases are barely 
prosecuted moves Bahrain beyond threshold for “limited”. A similar result is to 
be attested for Kuwait. The countries are thus excluded as suitable candidates 
for aspiring decency. 
 As a conclusion, nine regimes may be considered as possible candidates 
for aspiring decent societies, which in a second step are now analysed by 
means of the coding frame. 
                                                     
115
 Different forms of abuses were reported, in 2000 including blindfolding, verbal threats, 
stepping on toes, slaps and blows (2000 HRRKu), or in 2005, allegations of torture, beatings 
with sticks and reports of members of the police forces raping detainees (2005 HRRKu).  
116
 In most cases, perpetrators are not arrested, even if there is documented evidence, including 
eyewitness accounts, hospital reports, or a social worker’s testimony and in the rare cases 
where perpetrators are convicted, they seldom face severe penalties (2009 HRRKu). 
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Figure 2. Identification of aspiring decent societies 
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Qatar, Singapore, and with deficits Oman, meet the criteria for aspiring 
decent regimes – following a weak interpretation of formal equality – and are 
discussed in more detail. As Samoa and Tonga almost meet the standards and 
as Brunei’s basic structure comes close to Rawls’s consultation hierarchy, those 
three might constitute suitable future candidates and a closer look at their basic 
structure and political performance is taken. Bhutan, because of its unique 
transformation from a monarchy to a parliamentary democracy, is of interest and 
will be introduced and analysed in an excursus.  
 
 
The Sultanate of Oman... 
is a monarchy with a population of about 3.200.000 people of which only 
around 577.000 are Omani citizens (BNO 2007). The Sultan rules as absolute 
monarch. The cabinet (the Council of Ministers) consists of 30 members who 
are appointed by the sultan. Although there are no political parties, Oman, since 
1996, has a bicameral parliament, constituted by the Consultative Council and 
the State Council (BNO 2007). While State Council members are appointed by 
the sultan, the Consultative Council is elected according to universal adult 
suffrage every four years (FHO 2009).117 The right to vote is limited to citizens. 
Elections are generally regarded as free and fair. The council functions as a 
means to exchange information between people, government and ministries. It 
may summon and question service ministers, reviews drafts, provides 
recommendations of economic and social legislation and needs to approve state 
financial plans. Foreign affairs, defence, security and financial matters are not 
under the authority of the council. Parliament reviews legislation and advises the 
sultan, who alone decides. It serves as a bridge between the government and 
the people (BNO 2007). Citizens have two further options to communicate their 
concerns to the government, either through their local governor, or directly 
towards the sultan, who travels the country each year for precisely this purpose 
(Doyle 2006: 116). “In general the political authority of the sultan is widely 
                                                     
117
 The sultan introduced universal adult suffrage by decree in 2003, the first elections in the 
decade analysed for the purpose of the thesis. In earlier elections only a small portion of 
citizens, chosen by tribal leaders, were allowed to cast a vote (FHO 2009). 
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accepted, and there are few demands for major political change” (CPO 
2008: 11). Oman’s background structure fits into Rawls’s sketch of a 
consultation hierarchy and within that meets the first criterion. 
Basic human rights are guaranteed by a royal decree authorized by the 
sultan in 1996. Those rights are only granted within the framework of Islamic 
and customary law (BNO 2007). Problems arise relating to the principle of 
formal equality and the liberty of conscience. Concerning formal equality, 
discrimination on the basis of sex, ethnic origin, race, language, sect, place of 
residence, and social class is forbidden by law, but in practice, the government 
does not enforce the law effectively (2009 HRRO). However, women are 
granted equal opportunities in education; they hold important jobs in industry 
and other sectors (Doyle 2006: 116). The government grants religious freedom 
as long as religious practice does not disturb public order or contradict with 
morals. Islam is state religion (CPO 2008: 7). Although core human rights are 
not fully secured, the government generally grants and respects them.  
 
 
The State of Qatar… 
is an “absolute monarchy with all powers vested in the emir” (CPQ 2009: 4) 
and a generally moderate society (ibid.: 7). Approximately 1.800.000 people live 
in Qatar of which only 225.000 hold citizenship (2009 HRRQ). Formerly a British 
protectorate, Qatar became independent in 1971. It is in the possession of vast 
oil and gas reserves (WFBQ 2010: n. pag.118). 
Qatar’s political system offers opportunities to take part in processes of 
political decision-making. While parliament, which reviews legislation and offers 
recommendations, is fully appointed (CPQ 2009: 6), adult citizens elect 
members of the Central Municipal Council, who represent society. The right to 
vote is very limited; in 2007, only 50.000 citizens were allowed to vote (2009 
HRRQ). Elections are thus classified as “limited”. The council advises ministers 
in matters of agriculture, local public services, and municipal affairs (2009 
HRRQ). The first elections took place in 1999 (WFBQ 2010). The constitution of 
                                                     
118
 CIA (Ed.) (2010b): The World Fact Book. Qatar; hereafter cited as WFBQ 2010). 
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2005 provides for an Advisory Council, but elections were not yet held (CPQ 
2009: 3).119 The Advisory Council would consist of 45 members, of which 30 
would be elected and 15 appointed by the emir (WFBQ 2010). Political issues 
are, in part, discussed in public. Domestic topics, as well as sensitive themes 
such as the inefficiency of government, are frequently discussed in state-owned 
radio programmes where citizens may freely express their views120 (2005 
HRRQ) and “government did not prosecute anyone for the expression of views 
considered offensive” (ibid.). The Doha Debates121, a series of public debates 
broadcasted via the BBC, constitute a platform where people, citizens or not, 
can express their views on contentious international topics. Non-citizens, 
however, remain less inclined to discuss sensitive topics, such as the separation 
of state and religion, or regional democratic reforms, in public (2009 HRRQ).  
Focusing on human rights, the government’s record meets Rawls’s criteria 
if one applies the soft understanding of formal equality because, though steady 
improvements have been made, women still suffer from discrimination. In 2002, 
the National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) was established, composed of 
government officials and members of civil society. The NHRC investigates and 
improves human rights conditions in Qatar (2005 HRRQ). The right to physical 
security is generally granted. While spousal rape and domestic violence are not 
explicitly criminalized, a general prohibition against violence exists under which 
                                                     
119
 In 2011, the emir announced that elections would be held in 2013 (BBC 2011b: n. pag.). 
120
 Topics such as lack of responsiveness by various ministries to citizens' needs, poor schools 
and roads, failure to deliver adequate water, and problems with the health care system are 
discussed in radio programmes (2005 HRRQ). In 2000, the emir’s meeting with the Israeli Prime 
Minister was criticized in radio and television call-in programs and talk shows (2000 HRRQ). 
Nevertheless, citizens – and non-citizens even more so – avoided discussing sensitive political 
and religious issues (2005 HRRQ). 
121
 Although the debates are funded by government, they enjoy editorial independence (Qatar 
Foundation 2012a: n. pag.). On can attend the debates, tickets are available online, or watch 
them on the BBC or online (Qatar Foundation 2012b: n. pag.). Two speakers, one in favour, the 
other arguing against the topic to be discussed, present their arguments. The chairman then 
asks questions after which the discussion is open to the audience. Finally, an electronic vote for 
or against show the views held by the audience (Qatar Foundation 2012a: n. pag.). Current polls 
are open for participation online. The latest topic has been the inter-marriage between blood 
relatives. Referring to international issues, the situation in Bahrain was debated in December 
2011 (Qatar Foundation 2012b: n. pag.). Another forum, equally supported by the Qatar 
Foundation, is “Lakom Al Karam”, meaning “the decision is yours”, a television discussion forum 
broadcasted in Arabic. Since 2006, Qataris aged 16 to 30 discuss sensitive domestic topics, 
such as human rights or democracy in Qatar (Qatar Foundation: n. pag.). 
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these practices are prosecuted.122 Concerning the right to liberty, freedom of 
belief and worship are granted, though restricted in public. Islam is the state 
religion, but discrimination based on religion is forbidden by law (2009 HRRQ). 
As Rawls does not demand full freedom of religion, Qatar meets Rawls’s 
criterion. While forced or compulsory labour is prohibited by law, foreign 
workers, constituting three-quarters of the work force, are vulnerable to 
abuse.123 The government, however, offers assistance to victims, for example 
via the Labor Board (2000 HRRQ). The right to property is generally granted 
(2005 HRRQ). “The constitution asserts the principle of equality between 
citizens in rights and responsibilities” (2009 HRRQ). However, next to social 
discrimination against women, legal discrimination remains, for example 
focusing on inheritance rights; while Muslims hold the right to inherit from their 
Muslim spouses, a non-Muslim spouse only inherits up to one-third of the 
property of her deceased husband (Muslim women are not allowed to marry 
non-Muslims) if he formally willed her a portion. Equally, a Muslim does not 
automatically inherit his non-Muslim wife’s properties (2005 HRRQ). 
Furthermore, sisters inherit only half as much as their brothers. Although judges 
tend to evaluate testimonies according to credibility, in court the testimony of a 
man, in theory, counts for as much as the testimonies of two women. Tradition 
limits women’s participation in politics. The situation of women has improved 
over the last decade (2009 HRRQ). As an example, in “2008, the law on 
compensation equalized the amount to be paid in case of loss of life, which 
beforehand was mottled if the dead person had been female” (ibid.). 
Qatar meets the criteria for aspiring decency, with deficits when it comes to 
formal equality, and thus qualifies as aspiring decent. 
 
 
                                                     
122
 A centre provides shelter, financial assistance, psychological counsel and legal advice for 
victims of domestic violence (2009 HRRQ). 
123
 Foreign workers depend on their respective employer for residency rights. If a foreign 
employee wants to leave the country, the employer’s consent is needed. The employer can thus 
force the employee to work for longer periods than he wishes. Unskilled workers and domestic 
servants are sometimes paid late (2000 HRRQ). 
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The Republic of Singapore... 
 is currently one of the world’s most prosperous states with around 
4.840.000 inhabitants (BNSi 2009). First a British colony, founded in 1819, the 
island became part of the Malaysian Federation for two years after which it 
became independent in 1963 (WFBSi 2011). In contrast to most of the other 
candidates for aspiring decent societies, Singapore has poor natural resources 
and a semi-democratic structure (CPSi 2008: 3). The EIU Index of Democracy 
classifies it as a hybrid regime (EIUID 2008: 6). 
”Singapore is in theory a parliamentary democracy” (CPSi 2008: 3). In 
practice, however, it is ruled by a single party. Political power is divided between 
the president124, the prime minister and a unicameral parliament. The ruling 
People’s Action Party (PAP) has hampered the emergence of a credible 
opposition through strict political and social controls.125 The office of prime 
minister, given to the leader of the party holding the majority of seats in 
parliament, was held by PAP-leader Lee Kuan Yew from independence until 
1990. Since 2004, the office has been held by his eldest son (CPSi 2008: 3f.). 
The unicameral parliament is elected according to universal adult suffrage. 
Additionally, up to nine members are nominated into parliament by the 
president, put forward by a special committee. At least three seats have to be 
held by the opposition (WFBSi 2011).126 As the population is granted a role in 
processes of political decision making Singapore’s government qualifies as 
decent. It does not count as a (liberal) democracy, as the same party, and within 
limits the same family, has been ruling since independence. The opposition was, 
                                                     
124
 Up until a constitutional change in 1991, the president held only ceremonial duties, but since 
then, is elected and has power over legislative appointments, government budgetary affairs and 
internal security matters (WFBSi 2011). 
125
 Freedom of speech is restricted and lawsuits are used to silence critics. Extra-parliamentary 
protest is strongly restricted and controlled (CPSi 2008: 3f.). The government has broad powers 
to limit citizens' rights and to handicap political opposition, which it has used (2009 HRRSi). 
126
 Since 1959, the PAP has continuously been holding most of the seats. In 1961, the 
oppositional Barisan Sosialis Party resigned from parliament, making the PAP the sole 
representative party between 1961 and 1984, when the Workers’ Party won two out of 79 seats 
(CPSi 2008: 4). In 2001, the primacy of the PAP decreased when oppositional parties won 25 
per cent of the votes; in 2006, it decreased further when 33,4 per cent of the votes were secured 
by oppositional parties, thereby contesting 47 out of 84 seats (WFBSi 2011). The parliamentary 
elections were generally fair and free of tampering; however, the PAP placed obstacles in the 
path of political opponents, such as changing election law in order to make it harder for low-
membership parties to set up a list of candidates (2009 HRRSi). 
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due to the PAP’s placing obstacles in the path of political opponents, only in the 
2006 elections strong enough to gain a meaningful amount of seats. Still, “the 
polls resembled past elections in serving more as a referendum on the prime 
minister’s popularity than as an actual contest for power” (FHSi 2009). 
Singapore may, if it manages to overcome the one party system, serve as an 
example of a decent regime reforming itself into a liberal democracy.  
Rawls’s core human rights are guaranteed and respected in most cases; 
as caning serves as punishment for numerous offenses, the right to physical 
security is not fully secured. Though spousal rape is not regarded as a crime by 
law, it may be put to trial as assault. Victims of domestic violence are offered 
proper assistance. Women hold equal legal rights. Minorities are granted an 
active part in society (2009 HRRSi); “they actively participated in the political 
process and were well represented throughout the government, except in some 
sensitive military positions” (ibid.). Freedom of religion is generally granted, but 
some religious sects underlie restrictions or are banned (WFBSi 2011). 
 
 
Brunei Darussalam – The Abode of Peace... 
is a sultanate, independent since 1984, and was formerly a British 
protectorate. It possesses vast oil and natural gas resources and provides its 
population with “one of Asia’s finest health care systems” (BNBr 2009), 
economic benefits to subsidize food and housing, and ensures free primary 
education (ibid.). As an Islamic monarchy, Brunei has been ruled by 
descendants of the same family for more than 600 years. Despite having a 
written constitution since 1959, the country has been ruled under emergency law 
since 1962127 granting the sultan almost absolute power. The current ruler holds 
the offices of Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Finance, is head of the 
                                                     
127
 After an election, the victorious party, Parti Rakay Brunei (PRB), was hindered in establishing 
a government, which led to a rebellion put down by the sultan (with the assistance of the British 
military). The PRB was subsequently banned, and since then, the sultan has ruled under 
emergency law. No other election has been held. Currently, the National Development Party, 
registered in 2005 and headed by the former PRB leader, is the only political party. Two others 
were banned in 2007: the People's Awareness Party was banned for internal leadership 
quarrels, and the National Solidarity Party for failing to furnish accounts. As there are no 
elections, parties hardly play any political role (CPBr 2008: 4-7). 
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police force, chancellor of the national university and head of the Islamic faith. 
Other major political offices are held by his family members (CPBr 2008: 4f.). 
Concerning processes of political decision-making, the sultan is advised by 
four councils128, whose members have mainly been appointed by him. 
Government reports aspects of its politics as well as the budget to the 
Legislative Council, which was reinstated in 2004 (ibid.). Four of 29 seats are 
not appointed but indirectly elected by village leaders (BNBr 2009). Members of 
the council may speak their minds freely but may be suspended for offences, 
such as disloyalty to the sultan. Other forms of influencing political decisions 
exist: based on a traditional system of village chiefs, people may secretly vote in 
village consultative council elections. The elected council can put forward the 
interests of the community, for example during regular meetings with the 
minister of home affairs (2009 HRRBr). “The government also met with mukim 
(collections of villages) representatives to allow for airing of local grievances and 
concerns” (ibid.). Individuals can directly express their views by taking part in 
internet discussions and writing letters to local newspapers or directly towards 
the sultan when he appears in public (ibid.). The sultan is supported by the 
public (BNBr 2009). Brunei’s political system comes close to Rawls’s model 
society Kazanistan: the sultan is advised by several councils, but may decide 
freely. The government, in some fields, has to report its decisions to the 
Legislative Council, which can question these decisions. Representatives of 
villages are heard either by the sultan or one of the ministers.  
The human rights record keeps Brunei from qualifying as aspiring decent. 
While government “generally respected its citizens’ human rights in several 
areas” (2009 HRRBr), there were minor deficits concerning the right to life, 
security and to liberty, and major ones as far as the right to property and formal 
equality are concerned.129 
                                                     
128
 The Religious Council advises the sultan on matters concerning Islam, the Privy Council on 
the awarding of honours, and the Council of Ministers on the respective resorts. The Council of 
Succession determines the succession to the throne in case of dispute (CPBr 2008: 5). 
129
 The right to life and the integrity of the person are generally respected, but cases of caning 
exist that is used as punishment under Brunei’s criminal law, watched over by a doctor, who is 
authorized to stop the procedure (Amnesty International 2009: n. pag.). Though the government 
took initiative against violence against women, several cases were reported. Domestic violence 
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The Independent State of Samoa… 
is a parliamentary democracy, based on the British Westminster system, 
that incorporates traditional Samoan customs with a population of around 
188.000 people (BNSa 2009). 
Focusing on Samoa’s basic structure, from independence in 1962 until 
2007, the head of state, holding the executive authority, was Maliteoa Tanumafili 
II, who had been appointed for life. After his death, a new head of state was 
elected by parliament for a five-year term. The parliament, the Fono, is elected 
by universal suffrage every five years in generally free and fair elections.130 
However, only Matai131, heads of extended families that are selected by family 
agreement, may stand for election. Two of the 49 parliamentary seats are 
reserved for non-ethnic Samoans in order to represent their interests, which are 
selected in separate elections (2009 HRRSa). The Human Rights Protection 
Party holds the majority of seats in parliament. The Samoa Democratic United 
Party has been the opposition party in the 2006 elections. Due to divisions within 
the party, it sank below the required number of eight members, necessary for 
forming a party in parliament. Two new parties were formed in 2008 (BNSa 
2009). The members of parliament by majority vote select the prime minister, 
who appoints the ministers, who are “subject to the continuing confidence of the 
Fono” (BNSa 2009). Legislation passed by the Fono needs to be approved by 
the head of state (FHSa 2009). 
Next to this parliamentary system, Samoa maintains a second, traditional 
system of civil administration, the village government, which enjoys powers 
within the limits of the constitution and the respective village’s territory and 
                                                                                                                                                            
is criminalized, but spousal rape is not. Freedom of liberty is generally granted. Islam is state 
religion. Religious freedom is restricted but a freedom of worship is granted. However, in 2008, 
28 foreign citizens were expelled for religious violations. Sharia permits the enforcement of 
“Khalid”, which forbids close contact between persons of different sexes; married couples and 
close family members are excluded. 163 cases were reported in 2008. Stateless persons and 
women are not allowed to own property. Discrimination based on sex, race, disability, language 
or social status is not forbidden by law. Though men and women have similar rights concerning 
divorce and child custody, women may not pass on their nationality (2009 HRRBr). 
130
 As in 2001, cases of bribery led to by-elections ordered by the Supreme Court after the 2006 
elections. The by-elections were considered free and fair (2009 HRRSa and 2005 HRRSa). 
131
 Of the more than 30.000 matai, only 16.000 live in Samoa. Men and women may be selected 
as matai. However, only around eight per cent are women (2009 HRRSa). 
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concerns. Whereas the first was adopted after independence, the second is 
Samoa’s “indigenous system of government, based in the first instance on each 
village’s evolved power structure, history and traditions and practices” (Samoa 
Observer 2010: n. pag.). Both systems work alongside each other (ibid.). 
Samoa’s human rights account is generally good, but there are certain 
deficits. The right to life is generally granted. The right to physical security is not 
fully secured.132 Focusing on means of subsistence, Samoa relies on foreign aid 
and remittances from Samoans living abroad when it comes to satisfying the 
basic needs of its people (WFBSa 2009).133 Still, the situation of some 
Samoan’s is poor. A local survey conducted by the Ministry of Finance 
discovered that around 20 per cent of the families in Samoa live under the 
essential needs criteria set by the ministry, covering food, clothing, schooling, 
housing, travel and traditional needs (Elisara 2006: 6f.). The freedom of religion 
is generally granted (2009 HRRSa). Women enjoy equal rights under the law. 
Despite the fact that discrimination is prohibited by law, matai as well as 
members of specific families traditionally enjoy advantages (2009 HRRSa). The 
right to own property is granted. 
 
 
The Kingdom of Tonga… 
is formally a constitutional monarchy, but the king retains significant power 
(CPT 2008: 3f.). “While the Constitution allows the monarch broad powers, 
many of which do not require the legislative branch's endorsement, the King 
sometimes permits ‘the system’ to operate without his guidance” (2000 HRRT). 
Political life is dominated by the king and 33 hereditary nobles, who also 
dominate the Legislative Assembly, which functions as parliament. This 
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 Cases of police abuse occurred, but are prohibited by the constitution and have been 
investigated. Domestic violence against women and children is common but mostly unreported 
due to fear of reprisal or social pressure. Though spousal rape is not criminalized, abuse of 
women, if reported, is prosecuted. Also, village fono punished aggressors in cases of domestic 
violence if signs of abuse have been visible. Corporal punishment for children is tolerated, 
severe abuses are aggressively prosecuted (2009 HRRSa). 
133
 In 2006, the UN recommended upgrading Samoa’s status from a Least Developed Country to 
a Developing Country (BNSa 2009). 
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unicameral parliament consists of a cabinet made up of nine nobles elected by 
their peers, and nine representatives elected by the general population. Citizens 
21 years or older and resident in Tonga may vote. Elections for the people’s 
representative-seats are generally regarded as free and fair. The assembly has 
limited powers. The King appoints the Prime Minister and appoints and presides 
over the Privy Council (the cabinet134), which makes major policy decisions 
(2009 HRRT). Laws passed by the Privy Council are subject to review by 
parliament. Since the early 1990s, a pro-democracy movement exists; most of 
the nine seats elected by the population were constantly held by pro-democratic 
candidates. In 2006, for the first time, one of the people’s representatives was 
appointed prime minister (CPT 2008: 3-5). 
 While Tonga generally grants the right to physical security135 and a 
sufficient amount of liberty when considered within a Rawlsian framework, the 
right to property is limited, as women are not allowed to own land. The right to 
formal equality is extremely limited; nobility enjoys substantial advantages, not 
only as far as representation is concerned, and women suffer from 
discrimination (ibid.). 
 
 
Excursus: The Kingdom of Bhutan… 
completed its transition from an absolute hereditary regime to a 
constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system in 2008, with the adoption 
of a new constitution and first ever elections to a bicameral parliament (BNBh 
2010). It is of special interest as it might be an example of a decent regime 
transforming itself into a democratic state. Bhutan’s society is marked by 
cultural, religious and ethnic diversity (CPBh 2008: 2): the population of about 
                                                     
134
 The Cabinet generally includes nobles and commoners, both serving at the King's pleasure. 
For the first time, in 2005, two of the nine elected people's representatives were appointed 
cabinet ministers (2005 HRRT). 
135
 Domestic violence is rarely prosecuted under laws against physical assault. When abuse was 
reported to the police, victims were often encouraged to return to their homes (2005 HRRT). 
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672.000 people consists of three major ethnicities136 and several smaller ones; 
there are four major languages and 18 dialects (BNBh 2010). Bhutan was 
traditionally a decentralized theocracy and converted into a monarchy in 1907. 
“Bhutan’s monarchy is unique in that it has actively spearheaded the transition 
to full parliamentary democracy” (CPBh 2008: 6). In 2007, elections to the 
National Council (the upper house where five members are appointed by the 
king) took place, followed by elections to the National Assembly (the lower 
house) at the beginning of 2008 (BNBh 2010).137 Concerns about the process 
remain as there was no real opposition inside parliament. The two parties 
contesting the election, of which one won 44 out of the 47 available seats in the 
National Assembly, were both pro monarchy (CPBh 2008: 5f.). Democratic 
reforms granted the National Assembly the authority to remove the monarch 
with two thirds of the vote (WFBBh 2010). 
Bhutan’s human rights record does generally meet Rawls’s minimal set of 
human rights, but these rights are not fully secured.138 The kingdom might 
qualify as an aspiring decent regime. However, due to the constant process of 
change, further observations are necessary to evaluate the actual political 
performance of the regime. 
 
 
Conclusion 
“Decent hierarchicals do exist, but they are few in number” (Doyle 2006: 
15). Three regimes were identified that qualify as aspiring decent societies and 
that therefore can be considered as reference points for Rawls’s realistic utopian 
                                                     
136
 The Ngalops (supposedly Tibetan origin) make up the majority of the population and 
dominate government and civil services. The Sharchops (Bhutanese) and the Lhotsampas 
(Nepali origins, predominantly Hindu) are the other two major groups (BNBh 2010). 
137
 Elections were held according to universal adult suffrage; registered residents with legitimate 
citizenship, age 18 and above were allowed to vote (BNBh 2010). The voter turnout was around 
80 per cent (CPBh 2008: 6). 
138
 The right to physical security is generally granted but not secured effectively: persons from 
refugee camps arrested in relation to bomb attacks were tortured by the Bhutanese police, and 
there are unconfirmed claims that opposition politicians disappeared. Freedom of worship is 
granted, but government favoured Drukpa Kagyupa and Nigmapa Buddhism, providing 
subsidies and aid (2009 HRRBh). Formal equality is generally, but not comprehensively, 
granted. Lhotshampas, for example, are marginalized and deprived of or denied citizenship and 
thereby the right to vote. Measures to eliminate discrimination are taken (CPBh 2008: 3). 
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concept of decent peoples. Oman and Qatar offer their citizens a meaningful 
role in processes of political decision-making. A representation problem remains 
in that representation is limited to citizens only. As the majority of residents are 
non-citizens, this exclusion is controversial. There are, however, other 
possibilities for voicing opinion, such as contacting the local governor or directly 
addressing the sultan in the case of Oman or by means of public debate, such 
as the Doha Debates in the case of Qatar. Focusing on Qatar, a further 
development towards democratic reform is likely. The establishment of an 
Advisory Council would move Qatar closer to Rawls’s concept of a consultation 
hierarchy: if the emir then wanted to dissolve parliament, he would be urged to 
justify his decision; the elected parliament would be able to summon ministers to 
explain aspects of their policy and could remove them by means of a no-
confidence vote (CPQ 2009: 6). Although it is formally a democratic republic, 
Singapore’s political system does not provide fair conditions for political 
elections and therefore does not qualify as democratic. The ruling “PAP 
completely controlled key positions in and out of government” (2005 HRRSi). 
However, Singapore meets the criteria for decency. 
The identified aspiring decent regimes, as well as the candidates not (yet) 
meeting the criteria, can be subdivided into two mayor groups: traditional 
monarchies headed by an absolute ruler, such as a king or emir, and regimes 
that maintain a (one) party system, which are seemingly democratic but have a 
clear authoritarian character as the president and/or his party enjoy a quasi-
monopoly on exercising political power. 
Brunei is a prime example of the former group as it has been ruled by the 
same family for 600 years (CPBr 2008: 4). The regimes in this type are close to 
Rawls’s invented state of Kazanistan: Islam (with exception of Tonga) is the 
state religion and they generally have consultative systems, for example, via 
Municipal Councils, village representatives or opportunities to directly address 
the ruler or his representatives. This category falls together with Doyle’s results, 
and his assessment that existing decent societies do not include the major non-
liberal powers, but are rather weak in power, territorially small and lack 
population (Doyle 2006: 115). 
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Singapore is an example of the latter type, where the PAP has ruled since 
independence, controls key positions in and outside of government and hinders 
a credible opposition from developing. Kazakhstan (not qualifying as decent due 
to its human rights record) would also fall into this category, as the same 
president has ruled since independence, “dictates policy” and “is treated as 
being above politics or criticism” (CPKa 2008: 5, 4). Samoa, with its two 
administrative systems, seems to be a hybrid of both groups. Bhutan might 
develop from the former type (traditional absolute monarchy) into the latter type 
of aspiring decent regimes: a system in which one party holds a quasi-monopoly 
on political power, in the case of Bhutan, supporting the king. It still remains 
unclear whether Bhutan will manage to transform itself into a constitutional 
monarchy with a fully functioning democratic parliament. 
The chapter has provided an analysis with the demand to go beyond 
Doyle’s investigation in potentially covering all regions of the world and 
presenting an in-depth analysis of possible criteria and characteristics of 
aspiring decent societies. Thereby, it has been possible to identify three regimes 
as well as two different forms of decent basic structures. Decent regimes do 
exist and more may develop over time. Rawls’s concept, with reduced 
standards, is thus applicable to real world international relations and may serve 
as a fruitful guideline for the foreign policy of liberal societies as it paths the way 
for further patterns of cooperation and more peace and stability in the 
international realm. Rawls takes reasonable pluralism seriously and has 
sketched an ideal type with existing counterparts to justify imposing principles 
that are not only supported by liberal democracies, but shared by decent 
societies on non-liberal regimes. The implications of the findings for a decent 
peace thesis are analysed and discussed in the following chapter. 
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7. The Decent Peace Thesis 
“The question we must ask is whether peace is only guaranteed by democratic justice within and 
between peoples or can be the result of agreements between different cultural and political 
systems” (Audard 2006b: 308). 
 
Rawls’s international theory is based on the assumption of a democratic 
peace: democracies do not wage war against one another. Thus, if all societies 
were democratic, a stable peace would be a reality. In LP, Rawls goes beyond 
the democratic peace thesis: there are other types of regimes, i.e., decent 
societies, which are part of the zone of peace and need to be respected due to 
the principle of reasonable pluralism. Rawls argues that decent societies also 
respect peoples of like character, that is to say liberal and decent regimes, and 
live in peace with them within the Society of Peoples. As a consequence, Rawls 
would have to assume that there is something like a “decent peace”: liberal and 
decent peoples do not wage war against one another. If all societies were either 
liberal or decent, perpetual peace might be reached. As with the democratic 
peace, exceptions may be possible (Russett 1993: 37f.).139 Rawls also directly 
addresses the possibility of war between peoples (LP: 123). 
As indicated in chapter 2 and elaborated in chapter 6, instead of referring 
to “peoples with somewhat dirty hands” in non-ideal circumstance, referring to 
“aspiring liberal and decent regimes”, states that aspire to meet the criteria 
Rawls considers as necessary for peoplehood, is helpful to differentiate between 
ideal agents in ideal theory and non-ideal agents in the real world. The thesis is 
thus reformulated as follows. Aspiring liberal and decent regimes strongly tend 
to not wage war against one another. If all states were either aspiring liberal or 
decent, peaceful, stable and reasonably just, international relations might be 
reached. In contrast to the democratic peace thesis, the decisive benchmark for 
a decent peace is no longer regime type, but rather, a reasonable character and 
shared norms that constitute an overlapping consensus between the societies. 
Within a Rawlsian framework, decency sets the threshold of what is reasonable 
                                                     
139
 There are degrees of democratic practice. Imperfect democracies, for example states that 
have recently undergone violent domestic challenges or changes or have become democratic 
might not be constrained by the norms other democracies are as their practice of democracy is 
imperfect (Russett 1993: 37f.). 
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and thus, may be considered crucial for a zone of peace. Due to the principle of 
reasonable pluralism, well-orderedness and not regime type is decisive for 
respect and cooperation and thus peaceful and stable relations. 
At no point in LP does Rawls directly refer to a decent peace or its 
possibility. In Walter Riker’s words, “[u]nfortunately, Rawls […] never clearly 
explains or defends his claim that the democratic peace can be extended to 
decent societies” (2009: 618). However, the assumption of a decent peace 
follows from Rawls's international theory and, as at least some aspiring decent 
societies exist, it is worth deliberating on this conjecture beyond Rawls’s 
elaborations in LP. Corresponding considerations are found in Riker's article 
“The Democratic Peace is Not Democratic”. Riker analyses Rawls’s peace 
argument and claims that decent societies do not pose a threat to peace and 
stability in the international community. Democratic peace could, according to 
Riker, be realized in a world society only constituted by decent societies, as the 
reasons put forward for democratic peace are not strictly, but usually, related to 
democracies (ibid.: 618). Decent societies share characteristics with democratic 
peoples; next to their well-ordered basic structure, there is an overlapping 
consensus on a set of norms on the basis of which they cooperate peacefully. 
This overlapping consensus partly covers elements that are considered 
responsible for the peaceful relations between democracies, such shared norms 
or processes of peaceful conflict resolution. The theoretical explanations for a 
democratic peace could thus be extended to decent societies, which would be in 
line with Rawls’s claim that democratic and decent peoples maintain peaceful 
relations with each other; the degree to which the different characteristics made 
responsible for the democratic peace also hold for decent societies and thus the 
evidence for Rawls’s claim, need to be explored. 
In the following, arguments in favour of a democratic peace are introduced 
and discussed. It is then explored whether these arguments also hold for a 
decent peace on two levels: first, theoretically from within a Rawlsian framework, 
and second, on the basis of the data referring to the aspiring decent regimes 
identified in the previous chapter (Oman, Qatar and Singapore). Whereas the 
first shall show whether or not a decent peace thesis can be reinforced in theory, 
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the second displays whether or not, empirically, there is a decent peace 
between aspiring decent and democratic societies. Both shall point out that 
there are theoretical as well as empirical reasons why decent societies, from a 
liberal viewpoint, should be considered as equal cooperation partners in the 
international realm as well as from the perspective of decent societies that there 
are no reasons to go to war against other decent or liberal regimes, provided 
that they show respect in their mutual relations.  
The chapter thus builds on the findings from chapters 1 and 2 concerning 
Rawls’s actors and those of the previous chapter focusing on existing aspiring 
decent societies. Moreover, it explores whether a decent peace is possible and 
– in conjunction with chapters 4 and 5 – sketches how it might look. 
 
 
Why Democratic Peace 
The “idea that one variable alone is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a state of  
peace in the sense of non-war seems to be ridiculously naive”[emphasis in original]  
(Gleditsch 1992: 371). 
 
The debate around a democratic peace is rooted in Immanuel Kant’s 
Toward Perpetual Peace. Kant states that there is peace between republics, 
regimes that respect the rule of law and the basic freedoms of its people, 
thereby including, but not exclusively covering, democracies (Kant 2006: 8:350, 
Chan 1997: 64). The first systematic analysis on the peaceful character of 
democratic regimes was Quincy Wright's A Study of War (1983: 84, 161-163) 
published in 1942. Dean Babst in 1964 argued for the dyadic thesis that 
democracies do not fight each other. Today, many agree that although 
“democracies are not generally less warlike than nondemocracies […], they 
rarely (if ever) fight each other” (Chan 1997: 61, see also Levy 1988: 662 and 
Gleditsch 1992: 369f.).140 Opponents of the democratic peace thesis, however, 
argue, for example, that it “is only intellectual suppleness – the continual 
tinkering with definitions and categories – that allows democratic peace theorists 
                                                     
140
 Russett formulates these findings more carefully: “It is enough to say, first, that wars between 
democracies are at most extremely rare events, and second, that even violent conflicts between 
democracies that fall short of war are also very rare” (1995: 169). 
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to deny that democratic states have fought each other” (Layne 1994: 40). Cases 
mentioned to disprove the democratic peace proposition have been refuted by 
proponents of the thesis.141 Thus far, there have been no convincing examples 
of war between democracies. 
The chapter at hand does not repeat the discussion around the democratic 
peace; rather, it explores the possible explanations for the zone of peace, 
including those presented by opponents of the democratic peace proposition, 
and tests them in reference to a possible decent peace in theory and practice. 
Taking the thesis that democracies at least strongly tend not to wage war 
against one another for granted, it is still to be argued why that is so. Supporters 
mostly focus on the normative account (shared norms are the basis for a zone of 
peace) and the institutional constraints account, whereas opponents, mostly (so 
called) realists, formulate a set of reasons that are not based on democratic 
values and basic structures, but on different causes, such as wealth or 
interdependence. As the realist arguments are not linked to a democratic 
background structure, they might also hold for a decent peace, to which all 
arguments are related in a further step. 
Possible explanations for the phenomenon of democratic peace are: 
1. the normative account, 
2. constitutional constraints, 
 2.1. re-election constraints,  
3. the satisfaction account, 
4. the interdependence account: 
4.1. trade establishes peaceful relations, 
4.2. shared institutions establish peaceful relations, 
5. realist arguments: 
                                                     
141
 Examples from the literature are the US-interstate war, Germany in World War I and Finland 
in World War II. Christopher Layne refers to the US-interstate war. There, one would have to 
count the US-Confederates as democratic, despite prevailing slavery and no right to vote for 
women, as was also the state of affairs in Wilhelmine Germany (Risse-Kappen 1994: 370). In 
the case of Wilhelmine Germany, “the chancellor was responsible to the Emperor William rather 
than the legislature. The electorate had little leverage over war decisions” (Owen 1994: 121f.). 
David Spiro counts Finland in World War II as an example, supposedly waging war against the 
allied democracies (Spiro 1994: 61f.). However, there is no record of combat casualties between 
them (Russett 1995: 168). 
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5.1. the non-zero-sum-enterprise, 
5.2. stability, wealth and shared interests establish peaceful relations, and 
6. historical processes of global social change. 
Points 4 to 6, in part, are not directly related to the concept of democracy; trade, 
shared institutions, common interests, stability, etc. may strengthen ties between 
all types of regimes. Cooperation, however, needs common understanding and 
trust; the existence of economic and institutional ties thus may be traced back to 
normative or constitutional causes. Equally, historical processes can be 
influenced, if not affected, by patterns of cooperation that can be linked back to 
shared political regimes, ideas or conceptions. Although these arguments are an 
attempt to explain the phenomenon without reference to democratic values or 
background structures, they are indirectly connected to both, and in addition, 
constitute stabilizing factors between democracies, making them suitable 
justifications for why the democratic security community could and should be 
extended towards decent regimes, which share at least an interest in peaceful 
international relations as well as an allegiance to the principles of the Law of 
Peoples. A further concept trying to explain the zone of peace between 
democracies by synthesizing liberalism and realism is that of perception, 
according to which liberal democracies maintain peaceful relations with societies 
they perceive of as liberal democratic. This approach, due to its exceptional 
perspective, discussed in an excursus, as it might be especially interesting for 
the purpose of the thesis as one of the aims of LP is to change the perception 
liberal democracies might have of (aspiring) decent societies. 
As Riker explains, it is “likely that several conditions (though not 
necessarily all of them, and not necessarily the same sub-set in each case) are 
at work in any historical instance of democratic peace” (Riker 2009: 622 f.). A 
combination of these conditions or even one of them alone might be sufficient to 
generate and secure a democratic, as well as a decent peace. For Rawls, the 
satisfaction account alone suffices for peace (ibid., LP: 47). Below, the possible 
explanations are discussed. 
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The Normative Account – Democratic Norms and Culture 
“The basic norm of democratic theory is that disputes can be resolved 
without force through democratic political processes” (Russett 1993: 31).142 The 
willingness to accept compromises to solve a dispute is another norm prevalent 
in democratic societies (Dixon 1993: 43). Though religious beliefs, convictions 
and cultures may be different (reasonable pluralism) every human being has an 
interest in self-preservation and well-being. These shared interests can serve as 
a basis for a harmonious cohabitation as long as people pursue their personal 
preferences within the limits of the freedom of their fellow citizens. For that to 
happen, members of society need to tolerate and cooperate with each other 
(Owen 1994: 93f.). “Liberalism’s ends are life and property, and its means liberty 
and toleration” (ibid.: 94). 
Transferred to the international level 
“the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply 
across national boundaries toward other democratic countries. In short, if people in 
a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who 
share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-
determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not 
easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite” (Russett 1993: 31, 
see also Chan 1997: 77, Dixon 1993: 43). 
 
In short, the “same structures and behaviors that ‘we’ assume will limit our 
aggression, both internally and externally, may be expected similarly to limit 
similarly governed people in other policies” (Russett 1993: 31f.).143 Claiming 
self-determination for themselves, democracies should grant the same right to 
other states. “Put most simply, if political leaders are accustomed to nonviolent 
procedures of conflict resolution in domestic affairs, then it is likely that such 
methods will also prove useful in settling international disputes” (Dixon 1993: 
45). 
                                                     
142
 Further norms listed by Russett are the norm of equality (in voting, certain rights and dignity), 
a government resting on the consent of the people and an opposition loyal to the system. These 
norms are to be shared by all members of society. For Russett, norms are, though they might be 
violated, more important than the institutional structure (Russett 1993: 31). One could conclude 
that if decent societies support the listed norms, they might also meet the criteria Russett 
regards as constructive for the phenomenon of democratic peace. 
143
 Russett’s formulation “similarly governed” leaves room for other similar types of societies, 
such as decent peoples that, according to Rawls, respect peoples of like character and are 
respected themselves by liberal peoples. 
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As democracies do not want to be dominated, they do not strive to 
dominate fellow democratic regimes. If a conflict between two democracies 
arises, shared norms prevent those conflicts from escalating to a military level. 
The other democracy is perceived within a mutually shared zone of law (Russett 
1993: 33). 
The normative considerations are backed up by the empirical facts that 
democracies tend to negotiate conflicts and accept third-party mediation, form 
alliances and observe treaty commitments (Chan 1997: 93, Russett 1995: 172, 
Dixon 1993: 43). “The more democratic a state the more likely its political 
leadership will maintain conciliatory norms of dispute resolution, and leaders 
with conciliatory norms are more likely than others to adopt or at least accede to 
conflict management efforts” (Dixon 1993: 46). It is not that a peaceful 
disposition is decisive in the “fight” for peace, but the capability to be trusted 
(Chan 1997: 81), and democracies tend to trust regimes that permit meaningful 
political competition (Owen 1994: 95). The normative account can be summed 
up as follows: 
“Liberal democracies are believed reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy, 
because they are governed by their citizens' true interests, which harmonize with 
all individuals' true interests around the world. Liberals believe that they understand 
the intentions of foreign liberal democracies, and that those intentions are always 
pacific toward fellow liberal democracies. […] Illiberal states, on the other hand, are 
viewed prima facie as unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous. […] 
Liberal democracies do not automatically fight all illiberal states in an endless 
crusade to spread freedom, however” (ibid.: 95f.). 
 
As institutions build on norms, the normative model is closely linked to the 
constitutional constraints account and thus the institutional basic structure of a 
liberal society. “Both norms and institutions may contribute to the phenomenon 
of peace between democracies; they are somewhat complementary and 
overlapping” (Russett 1993: 41). They work in tandem: norms forbid wars with 
other democracies and constraints are established to ensure that those norms 
are not violated (Owen 1994: 119). 
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Constitutional Constraints 
Domestic structures result from liberal ideas that are implemented not only 
on a domestic, but also on an international level (Owen 1994: 99). Within 
democracies, constitutional constraints make it improbable to go to war against 
another democracy that shares the same constraints for several different 
reasons. First, there are legal and constitutional restrictions to war, such as the 
division of powers and the system of checks and balances (Russett 1993: 38). 
Governments need the approval of cabinet members or legislatures (Owen 
1994: 90).144 Democratic institutions are complex and function slowly, which 
leaves more room for negotiations. Second, the decision to wage war needs, 
and will cause, public debate. Public support is necessary to legitimize war. 
Governments thus need time to mobilize public support within society, which 
again leaves room for additional negotiations or solutions proposed by third 
parties (Risse-Kappen 1994: 373). Both parties involved in the conflict know that 
the respective other is subject to the same constraints and will therefore not 
launch a surprise attack (Riker 2009: 627, Russett 1993: 40). And third, 
democratic institutions may serve as a “filtering mechanism on the type of 
individuals ultimately designated for leadership positions by promoting those of a 
more conciliatory nature and discouraging selection of more autocratic or 
belligerent individuals” (Dixon 1993: 45). 
“Constitutional” here does not necessarily refer to a written constitution but 
can also mean a set of values embraced by the democratic society, including 
rules for making and applying law. Members of society share those norms and 
thereby constitute a body politic. The rules and values might not always be 
followed, but they are generally accepted. Their violation may cause criticism as 
well as self-criticism (Riker 2009: 628). Again, the close connection between the 
normative and the constitutional constraints accounts becomes visible. They 
constitute the centrepiece of the democratic peace thesis.  
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 The argument is not equally convincing in all cases. Focusing on France, for example, the 
question of war is reserved for the president. Nevertheless, he/she still relies on public support, 
making a war opposed by the public highly unlikely, but there is no institutional barrier that has to 
be overcome. If constitutional constraints were limited to this aspect, the thesis would look as 
follows: the more centralized the system, the higher the likelihood of war. This, however, does 
not seem to be the case (Risse-Kappen 1994: 373ff.). 
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Re-election Constraints. Politicians are generally sensitive towards the 
political consequences of a war. If it is regarded as illegitimate by the public or 
judged as non-effective or too expensive, politicians put a possible re-election at 
risk, a consequence they have good reason to abstain from. Democratic rulers 
will thus only wage war if it is widely considered legitimate, if the cost-benefit 
expectations are reasonable and, of course, if they expect to win the war. 
Governments need the public support of a majority of people. As in democracies 
the population holds multiple opinions and pursues diverse interests, a broad 
consensus in support of the decision to go to war is hard to gain (Riker 2009: 
629).145 
Re-election constraints are based on the rational interest of those in power: 
if they want to stay in power, they may not fight wars that are perceived as 
illegitimate by the majority of the population, too cost-intensive or likely to be 
lost. Although the constraints are based on rational calculation, the explanation 
favoured by realists, the fact that re-election constraints exist is founded on 
democratic procedures and therefore connected to democratic norms (political 
participation) and institutions (electoral procedures). The re-election constraints 
can thus be understood as a sub-category of constitutional constraints. 
 
 
The Satisfaction Account 
As democracies are satisfied, they have no reason to go to war. Their 
basic needs are met, covering those commodities as well as rights and 
freedoms citizens require in order to exercise their rights and liberties and to 
seize the opportunities granted by society (LP: 38). The citizens agree with the 
social structure of their society, whose interests are compatible with those of 
other like-minded societies. Satisfaction not only results in internal stability, but 
also leads to externally stable relations with other societies (Riker 2009: 624). 
Therefore, there are no violent conflicts between democracies. The satisfaction 
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 This argument cannot explain why democracies, in general, do not wage fewer wars than 
non-democratic regimes. However, wars against democracies tend to be regarded as less 
legitimate, to be cost-intensive and hard to win. 
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account seems problematic insofar as democracies do not wage fewer wars 
than non-democracies, but only not against one another.  
 
 
The Interdependence Account 
The interdependence account argues that democracies are linked with one 
another more closely than with other regimes and thereby interdependent on 
several levels. Interdependence leads to cooperation and encourages mutual 
understanding. The benefits gained would be put at risk in cases of violent 
conflict. Interdependence thus supports peace. 
Trade establishes peaceful relations. Economic ties are more frequent 
between democracies than with other regime types, because democracies seem 
to be more reliable in reference to respecting terms of trade and to a constant 
flow of money and resources (Riker 2009: 632). Extensive trade leads to close 
contact, which again supports mutual understanding between societies and 
creates further ties. If conflicts evolve, this closeness favours peaceful conflict 
resolution in two ways: first, mutual trust and understanding make compromises 
more likely; second, economic ties make a violent confrontation more costly. 
Along with economic loss, the advantages that such ties yield would also be lost: 
“the mutual benefits of trade reduce the potential benefits of conquest” (ibid.). 
The idea that trade leads to peace is already found in Kant: “It is the spirit 
of trade, which cannot coexist with war, which will, sooner or later, take hold of 
every people” [emphasis in original] (Kant 2006: 8:368). The development of 
world trade enhances peaceful relations between peoples as securing peace 
between them contributes to trade and thereby serves their interests (Habermas 
1996: 13). Democracies in particular benefit form trade as they are generally 
economically developed. Trade also has implications for the security of states 
and they thus favour trading partners they can trust, i.e., fellow democracies 
(Chan 1997: 75f.). A further hypothesis, going back to Kant, is found in the 
following. 
Shared institutions establish peaceful relations. Democracies enter into 
alliances with one another more frequently than with non-democracies (Risse-
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Kappen 1994: 371) and sign more mutual defence agreements than chance 
would explain (Dixon 1993: 45). Being bound by international networks and 
sharing institutions that are founded as a consequence of signed treaties 
prevents them from pursuing aggressive policies against cooperation partners. 
Furthermore, institutions provide means to solve conflicts peacefully. Setting up 
those institutions, however, presupposes peaceful relations on which 
institutional structures can be built (Russett 1993: 25f.).146 Establishing 
transnational institutions, linkages and patterns of cooperation, is supported by 
the autonomy and pluralism of agents within democracies. Domestic groups and 
lobbyists ensure that existing commitments are observed. Autocracies often 
regulate private and governmental transnational linkages and suppress the 
development of multiple independent centres of power and influence (Chan 
1997: 81). 
 
 
Realist Arguments 
Realists argue that “realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a 
predictor of international outcomes” (Layne 1994: 7). Whereas liberals 
distinguish states primarily according to regime type, realists do so according to 
capabilities, such as power or resources (Owen 1994: 95). The democratic 
peace thesis thus poses a challenge to realism in explaining international politics 
and vice versa (Chan 1997: 60). As stated above, realists put forward reasons 
for democratic peace, which are not directly connected to democracy as such; 
trade and shared institutions, here already subsumed under the 
interdependence account, belong to this group of arguments. Though these 
aspects themselves are not connected to a specified regime type, 
presuppositions that favour their existence are linked to a democratic 
background structure. These arguments are introduced and discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
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 Provided this argument holds true, establishing international institutions that negotiate 
conflicts peacefully would be needed. Maybe the Society of Peoples could function as such an 
organization.  
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The Non-Zero-Sum-Enterprise. All members of a democratic society gain 
from cooperation with other democratic regimes. In case of a conflict, each 
“democracy faces high costs for using force and realizes that its counterpart 
faces a similar disincentive. Both, therefore, prefer negotiation to war” (Chan 
1997: 81). Winners do not crush losers, as they might be future cooperation 
partners.147 If a conflict leads to a military confrontation, all may lose (Russett 
1993: 24). In addition, an inter-democratic war might damage the international 
reputation, credibility and reliability of both conflict parties, a further incentive not 
to escalate conflicts to a military level. The non-zero-sum-enterprise might then 
turn into a negative-sum-enterprise for both sides, which is not in the rational 
interest of either party (Chan 1997: 81). 
States may initiate wars they consider as advantageous and will abstain 
from declaring war if they cannot benefit from it. They will, however, not always 
start a war from which they are likely to profit. Cost-benefit calculations are thus 
not the only motive for and against war (Russett 1995: 166). 
Stability Establishes Peaceful Relations. If states have a stable background 
structure, they have no motive to externalize domestic drawbacks onto the 
international level (Russett 1993: 29). Moreover, they avoid engaging in conflicts 
with other stable societies, because the people are more likely to rally behind 
and defend the state. Therefore, there is a low rate of inter-democratic conflicts. 
Wealth Establishes Peaceful Relations. Democracies tend to be wealthy 
and economically advanced. Waging war against such a state can be an 
expensive (and risky) undertaking. In addition, it may destroy not only sources of 
importation but also markets for potential investment (ibid.: 28). 
Shared Interests Establish Peaceful Relations. As allies choose each other 
according to shared interests, and as democracies generally share interests, 
democracies are natural allies for each other (ibid.: 27f.). In addition, there is a 
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 Closeness to Kant’s sixth preliminary article is obvious (though Kant relates to wartime 
policies while Russett deliberates on how to prevent war): “No state shall allow itself such 
hostilities in wartime as would make mutual trust in a future period of peace impossible. […] For 
there must remain […] some degree of trust in the enemy’s manner of thinking, since otherwise 
no peace could possibly be reached” (Kant 2006: 8:346). 
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high degree of policy conformity between democratic regimes; they hold similar 
positions concerning most international issues (Dixon 1993: 45).148  
 
 
Excursus: Perception and Peace – Synthesizing Liberalism and Realism 
In his 1994 article “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”, John 
Owen tries to formulate a new theory for democratic peace, a synthesis between 
liberalism and realism (Owen 1994: 88, 90). He argues that a zone of peace can 
only be established between societies that perceive one another as liberal and 
democratic (ibid.: 102). Realpolitik and liberalism do both have an impact on 
political decisions. Some political actors are realists, others liberals. Both, 
however, pursue national interest, and in each case, that interest can include 
favouring cooperation over confrontation when referring to fellow democracies. 
Ideas also matter in international relations, and they have an impact on national 
interests. A synthesis between liberalism and realism is thus possible (ibid.: 
122ff.). As Owen states: “I do not argue that power politics has no force in 
determining the foreign policies of liberal democracies. Rather, I describe a 
second force – liberalism – which prods democracies toward peace with each 
other, and toward war with non-democracies” (ibid.: 93). 
According to Owen, the normative account and institutional constraints in 
tandem generate a zone of peace between democracies. However, he also 
includes state interest and thereby realist views into his account of democratic 
peace: human beings strive for self-preservation and well-being. Peace is a 
presupposition for both. Therefore, serving the true interest of its members, a 
society strives for peace and wages war only to generate peace. Liberal 
democracies serving the true interest of their people therefore do not wage war 
against one another. For this to be true, it is also necessary that the societies 
                                                     
148
 Opposing interests can, of course, occur. The conflict between Israel and Turkey about nine 
Turkish citizens that were killed by Israeli forces in 2010 when trying to break the Israeli naval 
blockage of Gaza by ship, exemplifies this. In the course of the events following the incident, 
Turkey demanded for an apology and compensation, expelled the Israeli ambassador and 
threatened to take the case to the ICJ, whereas Israel claimed that there was nothing to 
apologize for (BBC 2011a: n. pag.). However, the conflict did not escalate to a militant level. 
Also, neither Turkey nor Israel qualify as fully democratic when it comes to the EIUID (Israel is 
classified as flawed democracy and Turkey as hybrid regime) (EIUID 2008: 5f.). 
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perceive of each other as democratic (ibid.: 89f.). Wars between democracies 
might occur, but only if they do not perceive each other as democratic (ibid.: 
120). 
“[I]t is not important whether autocratic regimes pursue an aggressive foreign policy 
or not, but only if they are perceived as (at least potentially) aggressive. If the other 
is perceived as (potentially) aggressive, cooperative behavior is not recognized or 
even perceived as some kind of trick. Democratic peace and war against 
autocracies might therefore be part of a self-fulfilling prophecy; […] the perception 
as peaceful or potentially aggressive lead to patterns of cooperation and interaction 
that support the predisposition” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 376). 
 
Mutual recognition as doves (pacific) or non-doves (potentially aggressive) has 
an important impact on decisions for and against war, and “in a world of 
imperfect information, they [governments] often rely on the regime attributes of 
their counterparts to infer their dovishness – emphasizing an assessment of 
their intentions rather than their capabilities” (Chan 1997: 70). The 
“democraticness” of a regime is regarded as an indicator of its “dovishness” 
(ibid.). Democracies also generally have open societies and transparency which 
simplify international communication and coordination (ibid.: 81). 
Owen’s idea of perception is of great value for the chapter at hand and for 
Rawls’s purpose too: if perception is decisive for patterns of cooperation, then 
exploring the peaceful and reasonable character of decent societies may offer 
liberal regimes new cooperation partners and thereby break the effect of a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  
 
 
Historical Processes 
“Unlike realism, the radical view focuses on social and economic inequalities within 
and between societies. In this view the current peace is the peace of the 
successfully run plantation where the slaves go about their business without 
questioning their circumstances” (Gleditsch 2008: 703). 
 
Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, who are central advocators of the radical 
view, offer a critique of the democratic peace thesis, as well as a further 
alternative explanation for the phenomenon, arguing that none “of the terms that 
enable the democratic peace proposition can be taken for granted” (Barkawi and 
Laffey 1999: 423). By considering both as fixed terms, the democratic peace 
thesis becomes trans-historical and indifferent to historical and ongoing 
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processes of change (ibid.:405). Democracy and war have both undergone 
changes that the democratic peace literature does not account for.149 
The democratic peace thesis cannot account for the fact that the frequency 
of warfare between industrialized core states declined in the 20th century. 
Rather, the relation between democracy and war has to be analyzed with 
reference to globalization or, what many authors use synonymously, historical 
processes of global social change (ibib.: 403f.). Instead of asking why some 
states do not use force against one another, one should ask why states 
generally use force. Following Barkawi and Laffey, they do “in service of a 
project of ordering through which liberal spaces are produced” (ibid.: 419). 
Liberal states do not go to war with each other neither for normative, nor for 
constitutional reasons. “The use of force between these states is unlikely 
because they are embedded in geostrategic and political economic relations” 
(ibid.), which the authors consider to be in great part a result of the US grand 
strategy after World War II. The US strived to export its economic and political 
model to Western European states and to “preserve order” in the rest of the 
world where it supported administrative and coercive apparatuses, even against 
local (democratic) political projects (ibid.: 417-419). Zones of peace are a result 
of a strategic alliances between powerful industrial states to globalize capital 
markets, exploit the rest of the world and profit from both (Hasenclever 2006: 
236). 
Along with Barkawi and Laffay, Raymond Cohen offers an alternative 
account that might constitute a link between them and the realist critics of 
democratic peace. “The Chile episode illustrates a grave flaw in the democratic-
                                                     
149
 Warfare has changed: alliance war has become necessary. Links between the military and 
industries of allies were established. Nuclear powers leave no alternative to peace when they 
directly confront each other. Other ways of using force have been developed, such as raising 
troops from foreign or client populations, amongst others, to reduce one’s own casualties, 
manipulating the media, or using force covertly, such as the US did to overthrow democratic 
governments, such as Allende in Chile. Those are not considered as related to the superpowers 
in databases such as the Correlates of War project (Barkawi and Laffey 1999: 410-414). 
Democracies thus only seem more peaceful as covert action and structural use of force are not 
taken into consideration (Hasenclever 2006: 236). 
The use of a “homogenic liberalism ‘defines out’ other historically valid democratic claims and 
may licence violence against them” (Barkawi and Laffey 1999: 409). Neither the understanding 
of “democracy” nor the international system are static (ibid.:411). Democracy needs to be 
conceived of as “an ongoing, historically evolving political project” (ibid.:416). 
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peace theory […]. Allende’s downfall was not war by Singer or Maoz’s 
definitions. But it was war by other means” (Cohen 1994: 218). The argument 
that the US needed to intervene covertly because of both a lack of political 
support and democratic restraints, for Cohen, is merely a way of explaining 
away a counter example (ibid.: 219).  
Cohen offers two alternative explanations for the zone of peace. The first 
explanation links to realism.  
“Within the realist paradigm – which the democratic-peace theory purports to 
overthrow – it is accepted that states will resort to violence in the pursuit of valued 
goals or if they perceive their vital interests to be threatened. They may do this with 
regret; they may prefer covert to overt action; they may resist war if at all possible. 
But in the final analysis, realism asserts, they will fight rather than quit. The 
character of the target regime is of secondary importance. When the United States 
intervened against elected governments, it did so for Realpolitik reasons with the 
means both available and appropriate in the circumstances” (ibid.: 219). 
 
The second explanation implies that factors other than regime type account for 
peace: the unifying effect of the external Soviet threat, the shared trauma of two 
catastrophic World Wars, the development of democracy and a trend to 
economic interdependence (ibid.: 221). From this perspective, historical 
processes and experiences are at work, too. “Rather, the soundest conclusion to 
draw from the evidence is that democratic states in the North Atlantic/Western 
European area, sharing a particular set of historical circumstance and a 
common cultural heritage, have avoided going to war” (ibid.: 208). Pacific unions 
can occur under particular historical circumstances and do not depend on 
regime type (ibid.).  
 
 
Discussing the Democratic Peace 
Realists, along with the radical view supported by Barkawi and Laffey, put 
forward convincing arguments that explain why democracies do not fight each 
other without directly referring to democracy specific norms or institutions, but to 
capability and rational interest or strategic alliances in a globalizing world and 
they question the arguments put forward in favour of a democratic peace thesis. 
Instead of democratic norms and culture, realist imperatives are considered as 
central: above all, democracies pursue their rational national interest (Layne 
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1994: 14). Furthermore, institutional constraints do not explain the zone of 
peace between democracies.  
“If democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it, democracies would 
be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not. If citizens 
and policymakers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and 
material costs of war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on 
the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary is democratic: the lives lost 
and money spent will be the same” (ibid.: 12). 
 
Democracies respect each other simply because of their national interests. 
Proponents of the democratic peace reject both arguments: Layne 
presupposes that all citizens within liberal democracies are liberal and that they 
all agree that the conflict partner is liberal. Neither condition is necessary for 
democratic peace, only that statesmen think that a war would be too unpopular 
and thereby be constitutionally constrained specifically because their positions 
rely on the consent and support of the people (Owen 1994: 120). Strategic 
considerations may have been predominant in the cases Layne analysed, but 
democratic peace does not rule out that factors other than democratic norms (or 
institutions) may lead to peaceful solutions of inter-democratic conflicts. 
Democracies do pursue strategic interest and strive for power (Russett 1995: 
166). The imperatives of power politics equally hold for them as for other regime 
types (Owen 1994: 95f.). They do not, however, fight each other. “Variables 
suggested by realism such as relative power, alliance status, and the presence 
of a hegemon did not erase the effects of democracy” (ibid.: 92). 
Also, the same motives that drive democracies away from wars with fellow 
democracies might drive them into war with non-democracies and thus explain 
why democracies are generally not less war prone than other types of societies. 
Focusing on the normative account, the assumption that internal structures and 
procedures are applied on an interstate level, leads to the conclusion that non-
democratic societies cannot be expected to grant other states a proper right to 
self-determination as they do not offer this right to their own people. Whereas 
there is a presumption of amity between democracies, a presumption of enmity 
characterizes relations with non-democratic states (Russett 1993: 32).150 
                                                     
150
 The differentiation between friend and foe sounds Schmittian and can and should be 
overcome, a process to which LP makes a valuable contribution. As far as the candidates for 
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“Liberal ideology prohibits war against liberal democracies, but sometimes calls 
for war against illiberal states” (Owen 1994: 93). As normative constraints and 
law cannot be expected to stop authoritarian regimes from using military force in 
conflicts, democracies do not restrain from using it either (Russett 1993: 33). 
Similar arguments relate to constitutional constraints: whereas in conflicts 
between two democracies both governments are accountable to the same 
constraints, processes of decision making in autocratic societies are quicker; if a 
conflict with an autocratic regime arises, democracies adapt to the processes of 
conflict resolution applied by their opponents in order to not fall behind (Risse-
Kappen 1994: 373ff.). Authoritarian rulers are also not bound by re-election 
constraints and are statistically more likely to stay in office after losing a war 
(Chan 1997: 79f.).However, the stakes seem to be higher for dictators in another 
respect. Whereas democratic rulers might loose their office, dictators might be 
exiled, imprisoned or even killed. 
Democratic peace proponents accept the argument that a non-zero-sum-
enterprise, stability, wealth and shared interests favour peace, but also do not 
see any contradiction with the democratic peace thesis: “Neither an 
unfavourable strategic cost-benefit evaluation nor shared democracy is a 
necessary condition for avoiding war. But […] either may well constitute a 
virtually sufficient condition” [emphasis in original] (Russett 1995: 167). 
Proponents of the democratic peace question and convincingly argue that realist 
arguments alone do not explain the phenomenon. Realist viewpoints therefore 
do play a role, but not the only role. Moreover, many of the arguments are 
indirectly connected to democracy: democracy favours stability and wealth. 
Shared norms and institutions generate shared interests. That democracies gain 
from cooperation also relies on the fact that they trust each other and are thus 
more likely to cooperate on fair terms. 
Joanne Gowa relies on the shared-interest-explanation in her critique of 
the democratic peace proposition: the shared interests do not rely on 
democracy, but on shared interests evolving out of the Cold War. “I conclude 
                                                                                                                                                            
aspiring decent regimes are concerned, some of the absolute rulers enjoy broad support within 
society. In Oman, for example, “the political authority of the sultan is widely accepted, and there 
are few demands for major political change” (CPO 2008: 11). 
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that an explanation based on shifting interests is more consistent with this 
dispute-rate pattern […]. Thus, for example, the advent of relative peace 
between democratic states after 1945 can be interpreted as a product of the 
interest patterns that the advent of the Cold War induced” (Gowa 2000: 3). She 
assumes that the democratic peace will not “survive the erosion of the East-
West split” (ibid.: 4). However, the zone of peace between democracies has 
survived since. 
Barkawi’s and Laffey’s account might provide a reasonable sketch of why 
and how zones of peace occur. The stress on alliances between powerful states 
based on interest links to the realist arguments and is covered in the later 
application to aspiring decent societies. Nevertheless, they cannot show why 
democracies with different economic levels cooperate and why the alliance of 
powerful states seems to be limited to the ones they are limited to, and not to 
powerful states in general. So again, the structures they emphasize might play a 
role but cannot explain the phenomenon as a whole (Hasenclever 2006: 236). 
Furthermore, defining the terms one works with and thereby simplifying 
argumentation, is necessary to be able to work with these terms at all. The 
emphasis on developments of forms and understandings of war and democracy, 
however, is a valuable contribution. Owen’s account of perception might be 
useful here: to focus on whether states perceive of each other as democratic – 
or in Rawlsian words as “peoples of like character” – at the point at which 
conflict occurs leaves room for historically changing understandings of 
democracy. In summary, the account is helpful in shedding some light on 
possible deficiencies in the democratic peace account that can be resolved via 
Owen’s idea of perception or are already covered by realist arguments and are 
thus not covered as an extra point in the analysis. 
Following Cohen, “the conjunction of peace and democracy may simply be 
explicable in terms of a complex and unique convergence of historical 
circumstances” (Russett and Ray 1995: 324). He names the Soviet threat, the 
end of imperial competition, the spread of the welfare state and growing 
economic interdependence as examples. Again it seems that the factors Cohen 
puts forward are factors that favour peaceful conflict resolution, equal to wealth 
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or shared interests, but that cannot account for the whole democratic peace 
phenomenon: democracies all over the world are covered by the democratic 
peace thesis and not only those in South America or the North Atlantic that 
Cohen discusses. Cohen argues that India, New Zealand and Japan inherited 
their regimes from the Anglo-American tradition (Cohen 1994: 211). However, 
his argument is not persuasive. These democratic regimes cannot be counted 
as sharing the criteria he puts forward (a shared language, culture, or history). 
Wealth, economic growth, alliances, geography, military capacities and 
many more factors reduce the probability that democracies will wage war 
against one another. Still, the conclusion that regime type does play a role and 
that, although one amongst many factors, it is a decisive one, is not to be 
dismissed (Risse-Kappen 1994: 370). The “democratic peace proposition does 
not rule out the possible contribution of other factors (for example strategic 
calculation) to avoiding war. Peace can be maintained by a variety of factors, 
including shared democracy” (Chan 1997: 71). Democracies are more likely to 
form alliances and those alliances tend to last longer, a fact only found with 
democratic dyads (ibid.: 81f.). Nations, such as England and France, waged 
wars against one another before they were both ruled by freely elected 
governments, but have not since (Babst 1964: 14). “These results cannot be 
explained just by security interests; democratic norms seem to matter” (Chan 
1997: 82). 
David E. Spiro has argued that though the statistical number zero, referring 
to the number of wars among democracies, sounds powerful, it is in fact 
statistically insignificant as democracies are rare and wars are too (Spiro 1994: 
50f.). Whereas that might be true for the 19th and part of the 20th century, it has 
ceased to be as democracy has spread.151 The thesis can, however, be 
                                                     
151
 Gleditsch, for example, argues against Spiro: “Kant's writings might be dismissed as 
theoretical speculation about a hypothetical future world with no empirical evidence and without 
much consequence in a world of despots. In the two centuries since then a 'separate peace' has 
spread to an increasing number of states […]. Not only are there more democracies around, but 
their numbers are increasing. […] With 50% democracies – not an unrealistic target for the close 
of this century – the separate peace encompasses close to 25% of all pairs” (Gleditsch 1992: 
373). Also, Spiro considers all pairs, whereas Maoz and Russett, for example, focused their 
research on relevant dyads and excluded pairs that, due to their geography or economic 
strength, would not wage war against one another (Risse-Kappen1994: 369). 
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dangerous, if democracies use it as a justification to enlarge the zone of peace 
by forcing regimes towards change. The “thesis can fuel a spirit of democratic 
crusade and can be used to justify covert or overt interventions” (Chan 1997: 
59). It can motivate democracies to abstain from making concessions to non-
democracies, precisely because peace is only secure between democracies 
(ibid.: 59f.). 
Through the respectful relations that exist between democratic states, 
established for whatever of the above presented reasons, citizens of those 
states are able to form economic, social and cultural ties, for example via trade 
agreements or educational exchange; a web of mutually advantageous 
cooperation develops (Doyle 1983: 213). Though the arguments explaining the 
phenomenon of democratic peace are different and partly independent points, 
they are interwoven in some form. Economic interdependence forwards 
cooperation on all levels. Democracies thereby constitute a security community, 
coexisting in a stable peace with one another (Russett 1993: 42). 
The empirically testified absence of war between democracies is neither 
what Kant, nor what Rawls, related to; Kant’s foedus pacificum152 and Rawls’s 
Society of Peoples go beyond that. They refer to a stable, contractually based 
and institutionalized system that generates lasting peaceful relations between 
liberal (and decent) regimes (for Kant see Risse-Kappen 1994: 371). Whether 
decent peoples and whether aspiring decent societies can be a part of this 
community is discussed below. 
 
 
Decent Peace and The Law of Peoples 
Aside from the question of whether decent peoples as defined by Rawls 
meet central aspects of the characteristics favouring democratic peace, it 
remains contentious whether or not the identified aspiring decent societies 
satisfy the necessary criteria to support a decent peace thesis. An analysis of 
                                                     
152
 The “pacific federation” is based upon a treaty among peoples, established to bring about 
and secure peace; it shall not serve to acquire power, but to maintain the freedom of its 
members and gradually encompass all states, thus leading to perpetual peace (Kant 2006: 
8:356). 
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the candidates shall explore whether a decent peace can be explained by the 
same factors as the democratic peace phenomenon. For that purpose, the 
possible explanations for a democratic peace are applied to decent peoples, as 
well as to the identified aspiring decent societies. By applying those 
characteristics to decent peoples the consistency of Rawls’s peace argument in 
LP, indirectly formulating a decent peace thesis, is reviewed; testing the decent 
peace proposition empirically displays how this thesis relates to real world 
international relations. Moreover, the empirical test of the decent peace 
proposition completes the analysis of the previous chapter in surveying the 
relations between aspiring decent and democratic societies beyond the monadic 
level. An excurses on the role of Oman and Qatar in the Arab Spring explores 
the domestic and foreign policies of two of the three identified aspiring decent 
regimes with focus on their decent character. 
 
 
The Normative Account 
From a normative angle, the central arguments for a democratic peace are 
that 1) disputes between democracies can be resolved via democratic political 
processes and that 2) democracies conceive of themselves and other 
democracies as autonomous, self-governing people who share values. Non-
democratic states are excluded as they do not grant their members a right to 
self-determination and are thus not expected to grant such a right on an 
international level. The same holds true for conflict resolution procedures: as 
non-democracies do not possess democratic processes of political decision 
making, they cannot draw on such procedures to resolve interstate conflicts.  
1) Conflicts in decent societies are resolved via a consultation process and 
the ruler’s duty both to provide reasonable justification for his decision and to 
answer to critique. If one assumes that decent regimes apply these processes in 
the international realm, one would expect there to exist a kind of international 
Hobbesian Leviathan, who would base his political decisions on a consultation 
process, where the states subject to those decisions may send one or more 
representatives to give counsel to this Leviathan, whose decision would then be 
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binding. The Leviathan would have to justify his decision. One could not expect 
any sovereign state to subject itself to such a system. 
Even though decent regimes do not grant their people an extensive right to 
self-determination (referring to free choice of government), they claim and grant 
other well-ordered regimes a right to self-determination on the international 
level. So what could be an alternative sketch of a decent regime, applying its 
internal procedures to interstate relations? Consultation combined with a 
principle of unanimous vote seems likely (and is not far from international 
practice). Organized according to this principle, the Society of Peoples could 
constitute an international zone of law and peace under which aspiring liberal 
and decent regimes cooperate under fair terms. 
2) Although they are not democratic, decent societies share values with 
liberal societies, i.e. core human rights; both regime types offer forms of political 
participation and have an allegiance to the principles of the Law of Peoples. 
Those principles might serve as a fundament to build upon to create a fair 
system of cooperation and a Society of Peoples as an international institution.  
“Both decent societies and democracies regard the basic structure of society as a 
genuine scheme of social cooperation between persons, but each organizes 
persons into a body politic differently. In decent societies, group membership 
mediates between persons and political authority, while in democracies there is no 
such mediation” (Riker 2009: 621). 
 
Liberal and decent regimes share sufficient common ground to cooperate 
peacefully on an international level. Inter-state conflicts could be resolved via a 
consultation process aimed at reaching a consensus on how to best settle the 
dispute. This might be less stable and just than democratic procedures, but it 
still may suffice to support the thesis at hand. Similarly to liberal regimes, “the 
culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to 
apply across national boundaries” (Russett 1993: 31). Although liberal and 
decent societies do not generally share normative convictions, they do have an 
overlapping consensus which suffices to serve as a normative basis for a fair 
system of cooperation that again is the basis for peaceful and stable relations. 
 
 218
Focusing on aspiring decent societies, Oman, Qatar and Singapore share 
norms with liberal societies. As shown in the previous chapter, aspiring decent 
regimes honour and protect the core human rights of their citizens. They do not, 
however, share fundamental liberal and democratic norms, such as democratic 
processes of decision-making or the norms of equality and self-determination on 
the domestic level. These conventions are considered decisive when referring to 
the democratic peace. While the people in aspiring decent societies generally 
support the government, they are not granted a proper right to self-
determination.153 This point, however, is important, as the self-determination 
granted by a state to its people is a mirror of the self-determination that regimes 
grant to other states on an international level. Nevertheless, the relevant 
regimes have managed to settle conflicts with neighbouring countries peacefully 
through diplomacy and by accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
The aspiring decent regimes conceive of themselves and other states as 
autonomous and self-governing, both fundamental characteristics to possess 
when negotiating conflicts. They only participated in international disputes when 
authorized by the UN (and within limits in reference to the US-led war on terror). 
Although they do not offer their people a full right to self-determination, they do 
grant some options to participate in processes of political decision-making and 
to political discussion, that generally enable the people to solve internal conflicts 
peacefully and to communicate their grievances. In the case of Oman, the sultan 
is widely accepted by the people (CPO 2008: 11), and in Qatar, society is 
generally moderate (CPQ 2009: 7), with citizens openly discussing sensitive 
political and religious issues (2009 HRRQ). Singapore even possesses an 
elected parliament.  
The normative account is thus partly met by aspiring decent regimes: they 
do share common ground with liberal societies on an international level and are 
capable of solving inter-state conflicts peacefully. 
 
 
                                                     
153
 Singapore here may pose an exception. As the ruling party, however, hinders a credible 
opposition from evolving and thereby leaves no room for a credible alternative to their rule, it is 
questionable whether the right to self-determination is granted.  
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Constitutional Constraints 
Decent societies maintain decent institutions and share social norms that 
are internalized by members of society. Fundamental human rights are 
respected, reflecting a respect for persons. In the case of the consultation 
hierarchy, this manifests itself in the ruler’s duty to justify his politics towards the 
population or their representatives. With respect to waging war, consultation 
procedures and public debate slow down the process (Riker 2009: 628) and 
reduce or even nullify a possible fear of a surprise attack a democracy might 
have towards other forms of authoritarian regimes. Before the ruler decides on 
the question of war, he has to consult the relevant group of representatives, and 
those representatives might discuss the topic within the group they represent 
first. “Decent societies will not be as diverse as democratic ones, but there is still 
good reason to believe that substantial consensus regarding war will be hard to 
reach” (ibid.: 630).154 The constitutional constraints within decent societies are 
not as strong as in liberal regimes. Their political leaders do not depend on 
public support; there is no (or rarely) a division of powers or a system of checks 
and balances. 
 
Constitutional constraints within aspiring decent societies are not as strong 
as within liberal regimes. The aspiring decent societies partly maintain 
democratic institutions. In the case of Oman and Qatar, the Majlis al-Shura 
serve as a bridges between citizens and government ministries, but the final 
decisions remain solely with the rulers. Singapore maintains an elected 
parliament that cannot be regarded as exemplary with respect to democratic 
procedures. As far as Oman and Qatar are concerned, in reference to decisions 
on war, political leaders are not dependent on public support and are not 
hindered by an effective system of checks and balances. As foreign policy is 
excluded from the issues that their councils may discuss and comment on, 
constitutional constraints do not hold for these two regimes, but do have an 
impact on Singapore due to its parliament. 
                                                     
154
 As decent societies might be constituted out of a mix of diverse ethnic and religious 
groupings, Riker’s conclusion seems questionable. A possible extensive diversity, depending on 
the respective society, strengthens the argument. 
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Re-election constraints do not hold for Oman and Qatar, but to a certain 
degree for Singapore; although the ruling PAP has constantly governed since 
independence without any meaningful opposition, current developments promise 
more democratic competition. 
 
 
The Satisfaction Account 
Like democratic societies, decent peoples, according to Rawls, are 
satisfied societies. The population’s basic needs are met.155 Lacking 
commodities are acquired by trade. The society’s interests are compatible with 
those of other like-minded states, including democracies. That rights in decent 
peoples may not be distributed equally does not constitute a reason for 
instability or dissatisfaction, as decent societies are associationist. Members do 
not perceive of themselves as free and equal citizens but as members of a 
group, and therefore do not strive for equal political freedoms (Riker 2009: 627). 
“Rather, they would expect political freedom consistent with their group’s place 
in the consultation hierarchy” (ibid.). 
 
Oman has the 52nd highest per capita income in the world, but 
unemployment is a prevailing problem: in 2004, an estimated 15 per cent were 
without work (WFBO 2011). Nevertheless, the economic situation suffices to 
satisfy basic needs. Some “of the largest budgetary outlays are in the areas of 
health services and basic education” (BNO 2007). Health care in Oman is 
generally good (CPO 2008: 14f.). 
Qatar stands out due to social and economic progress (BNQ 2010). The 
per capita income is the highest in the world and the unemployment rate far 
below one per cent (WFBQ 2010). Government invests parts of its vast oil 
                                                     
155
 Views differ on what needs are basic. A minimal definition would cover only food, water and 
shelter. Rawls presents a different understanding, which serves as a basis for analysis here. For 
Rawls, it is a pre-requirement of the principles of justice that basic needs are met, as they are 
the basis that enables citizens to understand and exercise their basic rights and liberties (PL: 7). 
“[B]elow a certain level of material and social well-being, and of training and education, people 
simply cannot take part in society as citizens” (PL: 166). Along with economic and social well-
being, in the following, access to a certain degree of education and healthcare is also 
considered as important. 
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revenue in infrastructure projects and civil services (CPO 2009: 13). Citizens 
enjoy free access not only to water and electricity, but also to health care and 
education (BNQ 2010).156 
Singapore “enjoys a remarkably open and corruption-free environment, 
stable prices, and a per capita GDP higher than that of most developed 
countries” (WFBSi 2011). The unemployment rate is low, at an estimated 2.1 per 
cent in 2010 (ibid.). The “state of education appears to be satisfactory” (CPSi 
2008: 13) and good medical care is widely available (BNSi 2009). 
A solid basis for satisfaction is thus given in all three cases. Oman, in 
comparison to the other two, lags behind, but still provides the means necessary 
to meet the basic needs of the people to a degree that provides no reason to 
externalize internal conflicts or to acquire commodities in shortage by pursuing 
an aggressive foreign policy. 
 
 
The Interdependence Account 
The interdependence account is not as relevant for Rawls’s theory. 
Peoples do not necessarily need to cooperate as far as, for example, trade or 
the duty of assistance are concerned. International ties exceeding the principles 
of the Law of Peoples are not required (Riker 2009: 633). The account may, 
however, support the decent peace thesis. 
A possible economic, social, cultural or other interdependence between 
liberal and decent regimes is not discussed by Rawls except for mutually 
granted fair terms of cooperation and membership in the Society of Peoples. 
Mutual trust and respect, growing over time, favour close economic and social 
ties. The duty of assistance and the right to war can be practiced more 
effectively as a joint programme, a combined effort, which requires close 
cooperation on several levels. The Society of Peoples as such would constitute 
at least one shared institution. In summary, liberal and decent societies are not 
                                                     
156
 Noncitizens, however, do not enjoy these privileges free of charge and do not enjoy the same 
benefits as citizens in general (2009 HRRQ). 
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necessarily interdependent, but the character of the relations between them, as 
described by Rawls, hints at close relations on diverse levels. 
 
Aspiring decent regimes share trade relations or other ties with each other 
– as the question of war is at hand, and as security is vital for these states, 
military ties here seem most interesting – as well as with liberal regimes. 
Oman maintains broad diplomatic relations (BNO 2007). Its relations with 
its neighbouring countries are good157 and a free trade agreement with the US 
was signed in 2006 (CPO 2008: 7). Concerning defence and security matters, 
Oman maintains close ties with Britain and the US, on which it relies in matters 
of defence (ibid.: 10f.). Ties with Qatar are close, with both being members of 
the GCC. 
Like Oman, Qatar also maintains close ties with Kuwait and the UAE. As 
Qatar is too small to defend its territory (and natural resources), it signed 
defence agreements with the US, the UK and France. There are also, as in 
Oman, regional security agreements within the GCC (CPQ 2008: 9f.). 
Singapore embraces globalization and keeps good diplomatic relations 
with its main trading partners (Hong Kong, Malaysia, the US, Indonesia, China 
and Japan; WFBSi 2011) (CPSi 2008: 3), whereas relations to neighbouring 
countries are partly volatile. Free trade agreements with New Zealand (2000), 
Japan (2001), Australia (2002) and the US (2003) exist. An economic 
cooperation agreement with India is in place. Singapore is a founding member of 
the ASEAN158, which pursues economic as well as political aims. An ASEAN 
Free-Trade Area was founded in 2003. Focusing on defence, strong links with 
the US exist. Both signed a Strategic Framework Agreement in 2005, thereby 
expanding their cooperation concerning defense and security (BNSi 2009). 
Singapore is also a member of the Five-Power Defence Agreement (together 
with the UK, Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand) (CPSi 2008: 11). In case of 
                                                     
157
 Ties to the UAE are especially good. Oman is an active member of the GCC, along with 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (CPO 2008: 9). Relations with Yemen are 
now stable and there are regular on-going delegation exchanges with Iran (BNO 2007). 
158
 Member states include Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (Shaw 2003: 1185). “Singapore supports the concept of 
Southeast Asian regionalism and plays an active role in ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum” (BNSi 2009). 
 223
an external threat, members must consult each other. Furthermore, 
Commonwealth forces are stationed in Singapore as a result of the agreement 
(BNSi 2009). 
Whereas there is no identifiable pattern in trade relations, all candidates 
generally rely on democratic regimes as far as their security is concerned (with 
the exception of Malaysia in the case of Singapore). Power politics here might 
serve as an alternative explanation, as the US, on which the examined regimes 
rely, is not only a democracy, but also the world’s major military power. The 
main institutions the regimes are involved in are constituted by well-ordered and 
non-well-ordered regimes. 
 
 
Realist Arguments 
Two arguments are pertinent: first, that cooperation between democracies 
is a non-zero-sum-enterprise, where both parties stand to gain through 
cooperation, and second, that stability, wealth and shared interests lead to 
peaceful relations. As liberal and decent societies tolerate and respect each 
other and cooperate on fair terms, their basic structures favour cooperation, 
from which all parties benefit. As soon as they establish ties, they may end up 
losing out from violent confrontation. In addition, liberal and decent regimes 
share at least an interest in peaceful and stable international relations and in 
enlarging the zone of peace constituted by them.  
Stability is central to Rawls’s theory, both on a domestic, as well as on an 
international level: there is no need for peoples to externalize domestic 
discontent. Well-ordered societies are stable by definition. Therefore, the 
stability argument as indicator for a zone of peace holds for liberal and decent 
societies. 
“States in the midst of a political transition or those that have recently had 
regime changes face a higher risk of war” (Chan 1997: 83f.). This empirical fact 
is of interest for Rawls’s model. As he hopes for liberal reforms in decent 
societies, those changes may cause instability within, and thus between, 
members of the Society of Peoples. Newly elected governments in a period of 
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change might face heightened domestic problems through the escalation of 
international conflicts, thus drawing attention away from the domestic sphere 
(Hasenclever 2006: 236f.). The phenomenon of war occurring in a process of 
change towards democracy has been researched by, amongst others, Edward 
D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Whereas it may be true that democratization in 
the long run promotes peace and stability in the international realm, “ill-prepared 
attempts to democratize weak states […] may lead to costly warfare in the short 
run, and may delay or prevent real progress toward democracy over the long 
term” (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 3). Negative examples are Yugoslavia, 
Pakistan, Burundi and Rwanda. Prerequisites for effective democratic reform are 
not only literacy, wealth and the rule of law, but also a shared national identity 
and strong political institutions. Democratic transitions are not always 
dangerous; when strong institutions are in place, peaceful reform is likely (ibid.: 
2f.). For the cases in hand, the transition that Rawls hopes for seems non-
problematic, as it is conceived as a result of a longer process and as these three 
examples have institutions, the rule of law, and in the case of Singapore even a 
party system, in place. 
With reference to wealth, Rawls argues that financial prosperity, as well as 
natural resources, are not necessary to establish a well-ordered regime, and 
therefore should not be criteria within his theoretical framework. From a realist 
viewpoint, decent regimes neither have an interest in waging war against other 
decent or democratic regimes, nor is aggression against other liberal or decent 
regimes rewarding for them. 
 
As indicated earlier, the identified aspiring decent regimes maintain ties to 
well-ordered, as well as non-well-ordered regimes. Constellations, in which the 
parties involved gain from cooperation but lose in case of violent confrontation, 
therefore exist in relation to other well-ordered as well as to non-well-ordered 
regimes. As all regimes share an interest in the stability of their respective 
regions, shared interests tie Oman and Qatar together, but not Singapore.  
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As far as stability and wealth are concerned, all three regimes have been 
stable since independence.159 Qatar is a wealthy society. Oman’s economic 
situation is good, due to its natural resources. Singapore, although it lacks 
natural resources, possesses a well-developed economy. All three states 
therefore may be considered as stable and wealthy. 
 
The above discussion has shown that indicators for a zone of peace 
between well-ordered peoples are, in part, met by decent peoples and aspiring 
decent regimes. What remains to be examined, is whether or not the identified 
aspiring decent societies have been involved in violent conflict with regimes that 
Rawls would consider as being well-ordered. 
 
 
Decent Peace – An Empirical Fact? 
The aspiring decent societies identified in the previous chapter have all 
been involved in conflicts over the relevant decade (2000 until the end of 2009). 
None of the disputes, however, have escalated into a violent conflict. 
Involvements in interventions legitimized by the United Nations and in part in the 
US-led war on terror do not clash with the assumption of a decent peace.  
Oman, Qatar and Singapore have been involved in border disputes, which 
have been settled peacefully: Oman and Yemen concluded an agreement on 
their maritime borders in 2003. Qatar was involved in border conflicts with its 
neighbours Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which, after 60 years, were settled 
diplomatically: in 2001, the parties involved accepted an ICJ judgement (CPQ 
2009: 9). Equally, Singapore’s disputes with Malaysia and Indonesia about their 
maritime borders with both were settled by accepting ICJ jurisdiction (WFBSi 
2011). 
Oman is concerned with the stability in the region and actively promotes 
efforts to achieving peace and stability in the Middle East (BNO 2007). It 
                                                     
159
 Ongoing tensions between the central government and outlying groups led to an armed 
internal conflict in the 1970s. Currently, however, the “outbreak of armed conflict within Omani 
territory is highly unlikely” (CPO 2008: 11). Oman, however, had a share in the Arab Spring, 
which is discussed in an excursus later in this chapter. 
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therefore also supports a peaceful solution to the conflict arising from Iran’s 
nuclear weapons programme. Referring to the war on terror, the Omani public 
opposed the war. Government, however, on the one hand expressed only 
discrete criticism, but on the other hand provided low-key military support (CPO 
2008: 6f.). Oman also supported the US campaign in Afghanistan by providing 
refueling and support flights (ibid.: 10). 
Qatar enjoys the reputation of being a regional mediator, in which capacity 
it functioned in conflicts in Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan and between Palestinian 
factions. In 2006, it contributed in negotiating a truce between Israel and 
Hezbollah, and was the only Arab country to send troops to support the UN 
Interim Force in Lebanon (CPQ 2009: 8 f.). Like Oman, Qatar pursued a 
diplomatic and peaceful solution to the Iran conflict (ibid.: 3). In 2006, Qatar was 
the only UN Security Council member that voted against Resolution 1696, which 
called for sanctions against Iran should it not suspend its uranium-enrichment 
programme. Qatar’s independent foreign policy has, however, caused frictions 
with Saudi Arabia, which stay on a non-volatile level. The US al-Udeid Airbase in 
Qatar was used for the attack on Iraq (ibid.: 9). 
Singapore participated in several peace-keeping missions authorized by 
the UN, amongst others in Kuwait (BNSi 2009). Although border conflicts have 
been settled, relations with both Malaysia160 and Indonesia161 remain conflict 
stricken. 
The identified aspiring decent societies have not been involved in military 
conflict with either liberal or aspiring decent regimes. Therefore, the 
phenomenon of a decent peace may be testified. 
 
 
 
                                                     
160
 Singapore’s frictions with Malaysia relate to disputes around several topics including water 
supply, alleged environmental damage caused by Singapore’s land reclamation work, and 
Singapore’s air force’s rights to fly over Malaysian territory (CPS 2008: 10). 
161
 The causes for frictions with Indonesia are manifold. Singapore, for example, refused to sign 
an extradition treaty with the help of which Indonesia would have been able to prosecute corrupt 
Indonesian businessmen operating from Singapore. A defence agreement, signed by the two 
states in 2007 to stabilize relations, was rejected by the Indonesian parliament (CPS 2008: 10). 
 227
Excursus: Oman, Qatar and the Arab Spring 
“Oman shared in at least a portion of the 2011 drama, but for […] [Qatar], 
the Arab Spring has transpired largely at arm’s length, experienced primarily 
through the comfortable prism of satellite television and social media” (Maloney 
2011: 176). Despite the events of 2011 that have come to be called the Arab 
Spring, Arab Awakening or similarly, lie outside the decade that has been 
researched, an excursus on the role of and events in the two countries seems 
appropriate at this point, especially with reference to the satisfaction account 
when focusing on Oman, and the involvement in and impact on international 
conflicts when it comes to Qatar.  
Traditionally, the sultan of Oman can count on the support of his people 
and there has only been a low level of political activism that has not threatened 
his rule. Young Omanis, however, have become dissatisfied with their political 
and, most notably, their economic situation, due to a high level of unemployment 
and limited opportunities to take part in processes of political decision making. In 
February 2011, a series of protests began. The demonstrators focused on 
economic grievances and called, for example, for more employment and higher 
wages. The protests, however, escalated: the police used tear gas, batons and 
rubber bullets against the protestors, whereas demonstrators threw stones and 
set cars and government buildings on fire. The protest spread to smaller villages 
and the claim for political reform became stronger (ibid.: 180f.). In the course of 
the events, more than five people were killed (Klaibar 2012: n. pag.). 
 The sultan reacted promptly: he raised the minimum wage, promised 
50,000 new jobs and reshuffled parts of his cabinet. Elections to the 
Consultative Council were held in October 2011 and three members of the 
movement could acquire seats. In the same month, reforms were implemented, 
financed with the help of other Gulf states. The Consultative Council now has 
the right to initiate laws and to question ministers. Furthermore, instead of being 
appointed by the sultan, the Council’s president is elected by its members. The 
sultan’s quick reaction diminished the extent and duration of the protest (ibid.). 
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 Although Qatar remained stable during the Arab Spring162, it played a 
decisive role in the events on two fronts: first, via the emir’s direct diplomatic 
undertakings and second, in the form of media coverage by the Qatar based 
satellite channel Al Jazeera. 
 Al Jazeera, launched in 1996, has become a well-established source of 
information, with a reputation of covering issues important to the Arab world 
professionally and independently, contrary to the local channels that mostly are 
under the control of the respective Ministry of Information (the Qatari ministry 
was dissolved shortly before the channel started broadcasting). The channel 
receives government funding. With its coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, Al Jazeera’s popularity rose extensively, as did its influence on the public 
opinion in many Arabic societies (Sousaiaia 2011: n. pag.). This image changed, 
however, when the government took (more) influence on the coverage of the 
events in the different countries affected by the Arab Spring. Whereas there 
were vast reports on Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, protests in Bahrain, Oman and 
Saudi Arabia were hardly covered.163 “The role of Al Jazeera in inspiring the 
Libyan and Yemeni protesters is […] undeniable. But when protest movements 
reached the Gulf States […], Al Jazeera’s coverage became inexplicably tame” 
(Sousaiaia 2011: n. pag.). The unequal coverage that made obvious that 
“favourable and unfavourable coverage of the regime became a bargaining chip 
in regional negotiations” (ibid.) led to a declined in the channels reputation. 
Despite its small size and population, Qatar has emerged as a major player in 
the region and gained an international reputation (ibid.), not only for the media 
coverage of regional developments. 
 In the course of the Arab Spring, Qatar took a pioneering task in the Arab 
world: it was the first Arab country joining the intervention in Libya164 and led the 
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 Despite some protests in the internet, since the 1950s, “there have been no potential 
contenders to the power of Qatar’s ruling family” (Steinberg 2012: 7). 
163
 The coverage on Syria exemplifies Al Jazeera’s role as Syria’s foreign minister insisted that a 
deal with the Arab League would include that the channel stopped its critical coverage of the 
events in his country (Sousaiaia 2011: n. pag.). 
164
 Qatar took a leading role in Libya by calling for intervention and supporting it in the Arab 
League, by being the first Arab (and second overall) country recognizing the National 
Transitional Council, by sending fighter jets and troops, including special forces, by sending 
weapons and training Libyan rebels (Steinberg 2012: 4f.). “Qatari armed forces […] were 
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criticism of government crackdowns in Yemen and Syria. Furthermore, the emir 
was the first Arab leader calling for a military intervention in Syria (BBC 2012: n. 
pag.). This position shows a move away from its image as a regional mediator, 
preserving good relations to all regional powers aiming to enhance stability in 
the region by mitigating the diverse conflicts (Steinberg 2012: 1, 3). 
 However, Qatar’s support for the uprisings connected to the Arab Spring 
does not extend to other Gulf states: it supported the GCC’s intervention in 
Bahrain and sent troops to protect buildings and infrastructure as the stability in 
the Gulf region is of primary importance for Qatar’s foreign policy and its 
domestic stability (Steinberg 2012: 6f.). 
 As a conclusion, the unrests in Oman rendered moot the stability of its 
political system. Reforms could only be financed with the support of other Gulf 
states, among them Qatar. However, in comparison to the fate of other states 
that have been subject to the Arab Spring, the protests in Oman were rather 
limited and although the claims did include more political rights and freedoms, 
they did not extend to the sultan’s resignation.  Qatar, which was untroubled by 
the Arab Spring, used the events to strengthen its power and influence in and 
beyond the region while trying to safeguard stability in the Gulf region. With 
reference to the thesis, the developments in both countries support the findings. 
Oman as a weaker candidate suffered from some instability, which it overcame 
by prompt reaction and by making concessions to the people on the streets, 
whereas Qatar remained stable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
involved in every phase of the armed conflict in Libya” (ibid: 5). In addition, Qatar provided 
medical treatment and humanitarian aid (Buchanan 2011: n. pag.) and funded the establishment 
and maintenance of a television station to counter Gaddafi’s propaganda (Watson 2011: n. 
pag.). After Gaddafi’s death and the downfall of his regime, Qatar took the lead in training the 
Libyan military, collecting weapons and trying to integrate the diverse rebel groups into newly 
established institutions (Black 2011: n. pag.). 
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Conclusion 
To date, democratic peace is an empirical fact that is supported by 
convincing theoretical explanations. Though realist arguments have an impact 
on all types of political regimes, democracies do maintain special relations that 
cannot only be explained by realist views. According to Riker, all  
“things considered, we can conclude that international relations between 
democracies and decent societies would be peaceful, according to the terms of the 
democratic peace thesis. If all societies were democratic or decent, we would have 
a peaceful world order” (Riker 2009: 634). 
 
Focusing on decent peoples, the analysis herein has shown the following 
result: the main arguments supporting democratic peace, i.e. the normative 
account and the constitutional constraints, are partly met. The re-election 
constraints are not met, but as stated above, not all criteria need to be satisfied. 
Most important to Rawls’s theory, the satisfaction account is shared by liberal 
and decent peoples, which following Riker, may constitute a sufficient criterion in 
itself for democratic and decent peace. Rawls’s comments referring to 
interdependence are only marginal as he completely excludes trade and as he 
hardly deliberates on institutional ties between members of the Society of 
Peoples. The realist arguments partly apply to decent peoples. It can thus be 
concluded from the analysis that there are good, though – if compared to the 
arguments for a democratic peace – weaker, reasons that support a decent 
peace on the basis of democratic peace theory. 
The central indicators for democratic peace, i.e. the normative and the 
constitutional constraints accounts, only apply limitedly to aspiring decent 
societies. Singapore stands out due to its democratic institutions. The 
satisfaction account central to Rawls is met by all three societies and thereby 
might provide justification. The candidates rely on democratic regimes as far as 
their security and defence are concerned and they maintain trade relations with 
well-ordered and non-well-ordered regimes, sharing institutions with both. The 
realist arguments are met by aspiring decent societies (which also holds true for 
many other regimes, independent of their type). 
Empirically, there is such a thing as a decent peace phenomenon. The 
regimes have not been involved in a war against a democracy or an aspiring 
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decent regime. Furthermore, whereas Oman was affected by the Arab Spring, 
Qatar remained stable. An empirical argument for a decent peace, based on the 
partial satisfaction of the criteria for a democratic peace as well as on the 
absence of war between aspiring decent and democratic societies, can thus be 
made. 
Summing up, whereas theoretical justification for democratic peace exists, 
the findings on decent societies and a decent peace are less strong. The major 
arguments for democratic peace are only partially met, but the criterion central 
for Rawls, that is satisfaction, is realized. There are thus, indicators that point 
towards, but only provide weak justification for, a decent peace thesis. However, 
even though application on the empirical data of only three cases might not pose 
a “significant” result, the theoretical enlargement of the democratic peace thesis 
towards decent societies offers justification for the assumption of decent peace, 
and the empirical test shows that there is at least no factual contradiction to this 
thesis. 
Though the factors explaining democratic peace only partially apply to 
aspiring decent societies, a decent peace may be justified and aspiring decent 
societies may be perceived as trustworthy “doves” and thereby suitable 
cooperation partners. In reference to Owen, liberal and realist arguments in 
tandem favour a decent peace. Aspiring decent societies do not pose a threat to 
international security. As they honour core human rights, there is no reason for 
democratic societies to intervene. Liberal and decent regimes thus share some 
values as well as an interest in a stable and peaceful international realm. LP and 
the thesis at hand might contribute in changing the ways in which liberal regimes 
perceive of (aspiring) decent societies. If, as Owen convincingly argued, the 
perception of other regimes as “doves”, mostly associated with democracy, 
matters when it comes to international cooperation, Rawls’s theory might 
enhance fair, peaceful and stable cooperation between liberal and decent 
societies by contributing to the perception of each other as doves. 
Although the inquiry has not satisfactorily proven that a decent peace 
thesis holds true, it may well have contributed to a better understanding of 
Rawls’s concept of decent societies. The extension of the democratic peace 
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presumption to a decent peace has shown that it is supported in theory and 
practice. Furthermore, cooperation may function as an incentive to voluntary 
democratic reforms within aspiring decent regimes. The presumption of enmity 
that characterizes the stance of democracies towards non-democratic regimes 
has been successfully put into question and incentives to consider aspiring 
decent regimes as members of good standing in the international community 
have been provided. 
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8. Conclusion 
This dissertation is aimed at providing a clear sketch and discussion of 
Rawls’s international theory as presented in LP, and at assessing whether it 
might meet its task, which is to function as a guideline for the foreign policy of 
liberal regimes with the intention of bringing about more peaceful, stable and just 
international relations. Rawls’s theory has been explored, analysed, tested, 
defended and critiqued, from within and beyond the Rawlsian framework. A 
profound analysis of central aspects of LP and Rawls’s terminology in chapters 
2 and 3, specifically, the differentiation between peoples and states, as well as 
his typology of political regimes, functioned as a baseline for understanding and 
discussing LP. In the chapters following, 4 to 7, the applicability and value of 
Rawls’s theory to and for international relations were assessed. The central 
concepts, the principles of the Law of Peoples and the Society of Peoples, were 
presented and discussed, to investigate both their problems as well as their 
contributions to international peace, stability and justice. It was explored whether 
at least aspiring decent peoples exist, and discussed whether the democratic 
peace thesis, both within the Rawlsian framework and in reference to empirical 
cases, could be enlarged to a decent peace thesis. 
The analysis has shown that Rawls’s terminology is unclear. Rawls re-
defined the term “people” as an ideal, well-ordered society. The term 
emphasizes that for peoples, government actually represents its people, and it is 
this point that differentiates Rawls’s theorizing from other thoughts. Whereas 
peoples in LP are “states as they should be”, Rawlsian states are “states as they 
should not be”. Both stipulations lead to confusions and complicate the 
understanding and application of LP. Whereas ideal concepts are a suitable 
means to identify ideal norms, as well as to evaluate non-ideal real world state 
behaviour in comparison to the ideal, peoples as ideals should not function as 
agents in non-ideal-theory, as, by definition, no non-ideal state will never meet 
the ideal standards. In effect, Rawls’s ideal theory is not fully ideal, but rather, 
stays within his realistic utopian framework, sketching the “best we can 
reasonably hope for”. This framework ensures that, despite its utopian elements, 
LP remains applicable to real world relations and agents. Ultimately, while 
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idealizing is a valid means, referring to aspiring liberal or decent regimes might 
be a more suitable approach when it comes to non-ideal conditions. 
Furthermore, Rawls’s understanding of state is too negative, as state 
sovereignty is already bound by international law and the human rights regime, 
and as states, as well as individuals, should be understood as capable of 
reasonable and rational action. 
The five types of political regimes (idealized liberal and decent peoples, 
benevolent absolutistic regimes, burdened societies and outlaw states) that 
Rawls introduces correspond to his differentiation between peoples, societies 
and states. While the thesis has presented a clear differentiation between these 
types, based on LP, the list is open for additions. Burdened outlaw regimes is 
one candidate, as well as a further separation between aggressive and non-
aggressive outlaw states. However, as a model and for the sake of a 
manageable degree of variables, the five types constitute a sufficient basis for 
understanding and discussing Rawls’s theory, and the principles of the Law of 
Peoples can be applied equally to these five alone or even the possible seven 
plus regimes. Further specifications would be helpful in developing Rawls’s 
theory further, and for establishing closer links to the plurality of the state world. 
A focus of critique has been on the question of toleration between liberal and 
decent peoples. Reasonable pluralism, self-determination, effectiveness and 
practicability were shown to be adequate arguments in favour of toleration.  
While the relations between liberal and decent peoples are thus marked by 
toleration, peoples hold a limited right to war, justified in cases of self-defence 
and to protect human rights. The limited right to war gives peoples the means to 
stop policies that are beneath the threshold of what is reasonable and tolerable. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the right to war is granted both for the sake of 
international peace and stability, and for the sake of the people suffering from 
these gross violations. Towards burdened societies, peoples have a duty of 
assistance. 
When it comes to the principles of the Law of Peoples, the fact that they 
are well-established principles of international law supports their perception as 
an overlapping consensus between well-ordered societies, with the exception of 
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the duty of assistance. The thesis has shown that further elaboration is 
necessary concerning method (the OP) and content (the principles selected in 
the OP):  
The arguments that Rawls presents in favour of the selection of principles 
are mostly based on stipulations. The most pressing questions, such as why 
liberals should opt for a minimal set of principles and why decent peoples should 
agree to this set, could be resolved by constructing one, rather than two, 
international OPs, in which all well-ordered peoples, liberal and decent, are 
represented. This construct would not abandon Rawlsian theorizing but in fact 
contribute to taking decent peoples more seriously. Decent peoples are treated 
as second class peoples throughout LP and Rawls never seriously takes into 
consideration their perspective. In a shared international OP, they would be 
represented as equal cooperation partners and ultimately, both of the above 
questions could be resolved. The minimal set would then constitute the 
threshold of principles on which well-ordered societies can reasonably and 
minimally agree.  
Focusing on the outcome of the selection process, the principles of the 
Law of Peoples are in need of further elaboration, and as with the regime types, 
possibly of further additions too. Rawls’s human rights minimalism, established 
within the limits of Rawls’s realistic utopia, may not be satisfactory from a liberal 
viewpoint, due to not covering the full set of human rights covered by the UDHR. 
Focusing on practice, however, the minimalism constitutes a feasible set of 
human rights that can and should be honoured and protected. Rawls, thus, does 
not present an ideological, but a feasible claim, consistent with his concept of 
reasonable pluralism and his realistic utopian framework. Rawls’s human rights 
minimalism also follows from his connecting human rights to intervention. To 
add a principle to the list of Rawls’s core human rights, such as the freedom of 
association, would imply a right to war in order to stop gross violations of these 
norms, which first, seems unrealistic, and second, would legitimize intervention 
in almost every society, thus exceeding reasonable limits. The set is left open 
with good reason as, if the human rights regime undergoes further development, 
other human rights might be added. 
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 Limitations on the conduct of war also need further elaboration. This thesis 
argued that the criteria of necessity and proportionality (the amount and quality 
of force used should be proportionate with the intended aim) taken from the use 
of force in self-defence, should apply equally to all cases where force is used. 
As a result, the use of force would, in addition to the restrictions covered by 
Rawls, only be legitimate if it were the only means available, and the amount of 
use of force should be as restrained as possible. 
The thesis also defended the duty of assistance against Rawlsian critics 
who favour an international principle of distributive justice. In effect, the duty 
incorporates much more than critics allow for and would, if properly applied, 
make poverty history, as it includes that the basic needs of members of society 
need to be met. Further, it enables societies to manage their own affairs in an at 
least decent way. Instead of perpetuating dependency, it would produce agents 
capable of maintaining their own well-ordered basic structures, through the use 
of their own powers, and with their own resources. Nevertheless, the thesis 
showed that further additions to the duty of assistance might be fruitful. The 
negative duties Pogge puts forward, the duty not to harm others in pursuing 
one’s own economic interests and not to benefit from injustices by directly or 
indirectly supporting the exploitation of humans abroad, were assessed as 
reasonable amendments. Both additions are in line with Rawlsian thinking. If 
moral learning over time generates additional common ground, further principles 
might be added to the overlapping consensus. 
A remaining problem is that of the possibility of their being burdened 
outlaw regimes. The ruler, not willing to establish a well-ordered basic structure, 
might be considered as one of the burdens that the society is facing. In these 
cases assistance might imply intervention, or it might follow intervention to help 
the people to reform their basic structure and the system that made intervention 
necessary in the first place. 
When it comes to the Society of Peoples, the notion has thus far received 
too little attention. It is not only a term for referring to all well-ordered peoples, 
but also the space in which peoples cooperate. As a consequence, it can be 
attributed with important tasks that need a more precise framework in which they 
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can be pursued effectively and within reasonable limits. The Society of Peoples 
could, as an institution, act alongside the UN to enhance peace, stability and 
justice in the international realm. As a model, it could function as an incentive 
both for UN reform, and to unite the voices of all those states that might qualify 
as aspiring liberal or decent.  
The thesis demonstrated that there are societies that qualify as “aspiring 
decent”, relating to regimes that aspire to meet Rawls standards, namely Qatar, 
Singapore and within limits, Oman. Whereas Qatar and Oman are close to 
Rawls’s model society Kazanistan, Singapore, in effect, has been taken as a 
model for a second type of decent regime (for which Rawls leaves room in LP): 
a system in which one party holds a quasi-monopoly on political power but that 
does not qualify as liberal democratic despite having a well-ordered basic 
structure. 
The fact that there are states that correspond to Rawls’s model of decent 
peoples is decisive for his theory. It shows that LP is not merely a “wolf in 
sheep’s clothing”, there to impose liberal principles, and also that Rawls does 
take reasonable pluralism seriously. LP thus displays how liberal (and decent) 
societies can pursue reasonable foreign policies and enhance international 
peace, stability and justice avoiding liberal cultural imperialism and thus 
honouring the principles of reasonable pluralism and of self-determination. In 
addition, it makes LP more applicable to real world relations and offers current 
liberal regimes potential international partners towards whom cooperation could 
(and should) be enhanced. If, following Wendt, anarchy is what states make of 
it, then democratic peace and an aggressive policy towards autocratic regimes 
is the result of socially learned practices and rules to judge the aggressiveness 
of a regime by its regime type (Risse-Kappen 1994: 376). Owen’s idea of 
perception is of great value both here and for Rawls’s purpose: if perception is 
decisive for patterns of cooperation, then emphasizing the peaceful and 
reasonable character of decent societies might offer liberal regimes new 
cooperation partners, and thereby break the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
For these reasons, Rawls’s theory and the dissertation at hand may contribute 
to a change in perception when it comes to decent societies. 
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Exploring the decent peace thesis, arguments for a democratic peace in 
part apply to decent societies. The overlapping arguments applying to both 
types of regimes in effect constitute a sufficient basis for a decent peace 
proposition in harmony with Rawls’s theory: decent peoples are less reasonable 
and less just; the common sympathies shared with liberal societies are not 
equally as strong as those shared between liberals, but sufficient for peaceful 
coexistence and even respect and cooperation. The empirical argument for a 
decent peace, however, due to the small number of cases, is rather weak. 
Ultimately, a decent peace can at least be considered likely.  
Summing up, the following results can be attested: there are many 
elements in LP that are unclear, starting with the terminology chosen. Also, 
there are many aspects that need further elaboration and addition, such as the 
list of the principles of the Law of Peoples and the typology of regimes. Rawls’s 
theory is thus in need of further work for political philosophers and scientists to 
do. Last but not least, the mostly negative critique has had the effect of 
overshadowing unique elements in Rawls’s international theory that might be 
fruitful for meeting the aim Rawls formulates: to set up a guideline for the foreign 
policy of liberal societies aimed at peaceful, stable and just international 
relations along the lines of liberal principles that for Rawls incorporate the 
toleration of non-liberal but decent regimes and thus respect and toleration 
instead of liberal imperialism that might enhance instability and conflict instead 
of peaceful and stable international relations. Rawls not only formulates claims 
for more reasonable and just international policies, but also provides support for 
existing and evolving norms of international conduct. He presents incentives for 
the reform of regimes as well as international institutions, or even a basis for the 
establishment of an international institution shared only by liberal and decent 
regimes and for joint development aid programs. The impact LP could have on 
international political philosophy and theory has yet not been exhausted. 
Though being an extension of Rawls’s domestic theory, LP is not A Theory 
of International Justice in three respects: the focus does not lie on justice, but on 
peace and then stability and then justice – each one being in need of the other. 
While liberals are the addressees of both theories, the scope of LP is much 
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broader, as it incorporates and further develops aspects of PL, foremost the idea 
of reasonable pluralism. Whereas in TJ liberalism was treated as a 
comprehensive doctrine, in PL it became a political conception, leaving room for 
different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In LP, liberalism is one political 
conception that needs to leave room for other reasonable political conceptions in 
the international realm. Last but not least, LP is not, as such, a complete work, 
but rather, a more general structure on which one can build. 
This project hopes to have not only shed light on some of those aspects, 
but also to have undertaken a first step towards making LP not only more 
applicable, but also more complete, by sketching possible enlargements of the 
typology of regimes, through discussion of the principles and the suggestions for 
further additions, by sketching how a Society of Peoples might be constituted 
and showing how this provides a helpful model, by identifying aspiring decent 
regimes and last but not least, by testing the decent peace thesis. 
Rawls is searching for a minimal, realistic, utopian (not maximal ideal) 
conception of global justice that has “legitimate purchase on international politics 
in the here and now” (Sutch 2001: 177). However, as it stands and despite its 
realistic utopian framework, LP is in need of further rapprochement with real 
world circumstances, actors and relations. By presenting a clarification and 
critique of Rawls’s terms “peoples” and “states”, and by identifying aspiring 
decent regimes, two gaps, one between ideal and non-ideal theory, as well as 
one between construction and reality, have been bridged. 
 
At a conference, I was asked how I could seriously claim that decent 
societies should be respected as equals. My answer is that I can, but with two 
qualifications: first, I would be referring to the kinds of societies that have been 
sketched here, and second, I would restrict the claim to governments not to 
individuals; liberal governments should respect decent regimes, but individuals 
in liberal societies can, of course, use their rights and liberties to criticize decent 
regimes and to assist liberals in those regimes that strive for reform. I would not 
claim that Qatar is equal in justness to liberal regimes. But Rawls does not 
either. The claim is merely that there are good reasons for liberal governments, 
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to whom LP is addressed, motivated by liberal ideas, to tolerate and respect 
such societies. Even if reasonable pluralism and self-determination are not 
accepted as reasons for this practice, practicability and effectiveness should be: 
when it comes to decent societies, cooperation is a better means than coercion 
in building a peaceful, stable and reasonably just, international society and in 
supporting democratic reform.  
The German example, referring to World War II and the holocaust, aptly 
demonstrates what the consequences can be of an (unreasonable) 
comprehensive doctrine becoming a political conception. The fear that the 
democratic peace thesis might be misused for justifying wars targeting the 
advancement of peace via democratization of authoritarian regimes seems 
reasonable. Rawls’s understanding of the implications of reasonable pluralism to 
the international realm might help to avoid those wars in showing a way to 
enhance international relations without maintaining liberal imperialism. Equally, 
the development of a decent peace thesis, as undertaken here, might do so too. 
The idea of a decent peace may be what Kant called a philosopher’s 
“sweet dream of perpetual peace” (Kant 2006: 8:343), because, taking 
everything into consideration, LP aims at an all-embracing Society of Peoples 
that assists burdened societies to establish well-ordered regimes through which 
they would then qualify as members of the Society of Peoples, and that fights 
outlaw states and, presumably, subsequently supports their development into 
liberal or decent regimes. Dreaming Rawls’s dream a bit further, decent 
societies would recognize the advantages of democratic liberalism and 
therefore, step by step, reform towards a liberal democratic people, so that 
finally, a society of liberal peoples could develop, which would, with each reform, 
be even more peaceful, stable and just. It follows that LP would then be in line 
with cosmopolitan claims. For Rawls, the Society of Peoples however, is the 
best we can “reasonably hope for”. Either way, LP as a guideline exemplifies 
how Kant’s dream of a perpetual peace could be realized. 
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